THE DREAM OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN IRAQ
(About the PMF)
(Mnt Goat: this article is about the Iranian backed militias in Iraq (PMF). If you want to learn more about their operations in Iraq or the detriment to Iraq, this is a good read)
If a referendum were held in Iraq today, we would find that many Iraqis support “radical solutions” that might come through a military coup or foreign military intervention, because there is a general feeling that it is difficult to change the negative conditions through the institutional and democratic mechanisms currently in place .
This mood, in fact, is what was behind the acceptance of radical transformations at various points in Iraqi history, at least since the coup of Bakr Sidqi in 1936, which is considered the first military coup in the entire Arab region .
With every coup or violent upheaval, emotions surge, many are optimistic, but the emotional fervor quickly fades, leaving behind a reality far worse and more complex than before. But will the Iraqi people ever learn? After every disaster, a large percentage of citizens tend to interpret the violent transformation as not being good, and that we need another “transition” that is good, rather than rejecting the idea of violent transformation, coups, and revolutions altogether .
Many have been waiting, at least since the beginning of this year which is nearing its end, for those crushing blows that the United States of America will direct at the militias in Iraq, as if the Iraqi militias were merely an isolated body, and not a network of forces, interests and influence, intertwined with security and military policies, in a way that makes it difficult to separate them from the body of the state itself .
What if America assassinated the “fifty names” list circulating on social media, and bombed militia camps and their weapons depots in one dark night? Would Iraq be okay the next morning ?!
Many reports confirm that the first reaction to such a hypothetical event will be chaos on various levels, not least in the security file, in addition to the disruption of the map of power and the balance of pressure between them, which will motivate adversaries to try to fill the void quickly, creating a new circle of conflicts .
Calm and stability will not be achieved quickly after this scenario, for many reasons, including that the authority of the state is incomplete, and that the ability to enforce the law in the street is clearly lacking, especially with the infiltration of many militia figures, or those loyal to the militias, into state institutions, outside the organizational structure of the militias themselves .
America, up to this point, is not concerned with withdrawing security powers from groups operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are spread across areas north and west of Baghdad, and manage vast areas of the shared borders with Syria and Jordan, in cooperation with the army, the federal police, and the counter-terrorism service .
This deployment is not merely a routine distribution of units, but reflects a perception built since after 2015 of the Iraqi security doctrine, where factions are no longer just a supporting force, but a partner in security decision-making .
In the vicinity of the capital, specifically to its north and west, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) control areas such as Tarmiya and Abu Ghraib, which have historically been gateways for security threats and are now under heavy security control by these factions. This presence effectively makes the PMF the de facto controller of security at Baghdad’s entrances and exits, an influence that extends beyond the military dimension to the political and strategic spheres .
In the west, specifically on the border strip with Syria and Jordan, the Popular Mobilization Forces not only perform the traditional border guard duties, but also dominate vast areas of the desert .
Although this deployment is carried out under the protocol of the Joint Operations Command, and in cooperation with the army, the federal police and the counter-terrorism service, the reality on the ground imposes a kind of “division of roles”; while the army and police hold the city centers and official ports, the Popular Mobilization Forces take on the task of holding the ground in the rugged and open areas, enjoying great operational independence .
The current approach to bringing about change in Iraq is to continue pressuring the militias and their political fronts to force them to implement change. The desired outcome may not be immediate, nor may it fulfill all the “revolutionary aspirations” of a large segment of Iraqis in their vision of change, but this is the picture as it appears today .