Monday, January 5, 2026
TRUMP’S FORTUNE TELLER PROMISES IRAQIS “DAYS THEY HAVE NEVER SEEN BEFORE,” AND THE FACTIONS RESPOND FROM PARLIAMENT: “WELCOME TO DEATH!”
The upcoming arsenal of sanctions
TRUMP’S FORTUNE TELLER PROMISES IRAQIS “DAYS THEY HAVE NEVER SEEN BEFORE,” AND THE FACTIONS RESPOND FROM PARLIAMENT: “WELCOME TO DEATH!”
As the Iraqi parliament held its first session, electing a deputy speaker affiliated with the factions, Washington was simultaneously outlining an unprecedented punitive strategy. Former Trump advisor Gabriel Souma, described as an “expert on the inner workings of the White House and Trump’s policies,” went so far as to warn of a potential moment when Iraqis might find themselves buying the equivalent of one dollar for “five bags” of Iraqi dinars. Between this catastrophic scenario and a parliament where a member of Kataib Hezbollah declared his “loyalty to the Popular Mobilization Forces” and vowed to pass the PMF law despite Washington’s opposition, Iraq appears to be heading toward a difficult test: an economy beholden to the dollar and a legislative body openly defying American demands.
Gabriel Souma: The prophecy of sanctions and the potential “night of collapse”
Gabriel Souma is not merely a political commentator; he has long been presented as a professor of international law and an expert on Middle Eastern affairs. He served on President Donald Trump’s advisory team during the previous term and participated in sensitive discussions concerning the legality of US strikes in Iraq and Iran, as well as Washington’s financial and punitive policies in the region. When he speaks today in such definitive terms about “unprecedented measures” that Iraq will face if Mark Savaya fails to implement Trump’s demands in Baghdad, he is reflecting the prevailing mood within the president’s inner circle more than offering a cold, academic analysis.
When Souma says that Savaya “represents Trump 100%, and 99% is unacceptable,” he is outlining the limits of his mandate: a special envoy with no room to maneuver outside the rigid script, at a time when the White House is brandishing options ranging from strangling dollar channels through the Federal Reserve, to broader restrictions on the banking and energy sectors, culminating in a near-siege if Baghdad decides to fully align itself with the factions. This posturing is consistent with the general trajectory of Trump’s current strategy toward Iraq and Iran, which relies on escalating sanctions and financial pressure rather than large-scale military engagement, while using the threat of cutting aid and reconsidering oil waivers as a continuous bargaining chip.
In this context, the image of “Iraqis buying one dollar for five bags of Iraqi currency” is not so much a literal economic prediction as it is a crude metaphor for the possibility of an exchange rate spiral out of control and a collapse in purchasing power, if Washington decides to use its entire arsenal of financial pressure all at once against a country that depends almost entirely on the dollar to finance its trade and banking system.
Mark Savaya: Envoy of the tough deal between the White House and Baghdad
Mark Savaya himself is not a traditional diplomat. An Iraqi-American businessman of Chaldean descent, he rose from the retail and medical cannabis industries in Michigan to become Trump’s special envoy to Iraq in October 2015, a move widely interpreted as a shift by the president toward “deal-making diplomacy” rather than classical diplomatic hierarchy. His writings and public pronouncements reveal a clear inclination to use economic and financial tools to reshape the relationship with Baghdad: encouraging investment and infrastructure development on the one hand, and linking any concessions or exemptions to Iraq’s commitment to curbing the influence of Iran and its armed factions on the other.
From this perspective, Savaya becomes a dangerous link: if he succeeds in persuading Iraqi political forces—especially the Shia ones—to accept a “settlement” that subjects the factions to state authority and freezes any move to legally enshrine them as a parallel power, the specter of maximum sanctions may recede. However, if he fails, as Souma warns, the very mandate he carries from Trump could easily be transformed into an indictment against Baghdad before the American sanctions machine.
A parliament with a declared populist bias… when the logic of defiance prevails
In contrast, the factional forces are acting as if they are seizing a moment of power within the new parliament. The election of a first deputy speaker from one of the Shiite armed groups, classified by the US as an “Iranian-backed group,” has raised clear concerns in Western analyses, which saw this move as a message that the Baghdad legislature is leaning more towards the Popular Mobilization Forces camp, at a time when US pressure is mounting on the issue of the Popular Mobilization Forces and its laws.
At the heart of this mood comes the statement by MP Hussein Mounes, leader of the “Rights” movement, which is close to Kataib Hezbollah, who frankly declared that “Parliament is biased towards the Popular Mobilization Forces” (PMF), and that the PMF law will be passed this time despite American reservations. This is a reference to the law that Washington sought to obstruct in the previous parliamentary session through direct pressure on the Prime Minister and the leaders of influential Shiite blocs. Hussein Mounes himself is not an ordinary name; he has been presented for years as the political face of Kataib Hezbollah and a contender within the Shiite political establishment for the representation of a “resistance” that sees its full institutional integration within the state as a guarantee for the continuation of its armed-political project.
The most vehement pronouncements come from within other alliances close to the factions, where Badr Organization MP Abu Turab al-Tamimi declares, “We are not concerned with pressure. We are 90 MPs, and we don’t care about America or what it wants. If it threatens us with death, then so be it.” This rhetoric, with its defiant tone, expresses a firm conviction among a segment of the political class that any retreat on the issue of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) would constitute a strategic concession to both Washington and Tehran, weakening these forces’ ability to assert their share in both the state and the economy.
The crowd control law: between Marco Rubio’s message and the new “pass promise”
The clash over the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law is not new, but its current level is different. When the draft “Law on Service and Retirement for the Mujahideen of the Popular Mobilization Forces” was introduced in 2025, along with subsequent proposals to regulate the PMF, the issue became one of the most sensitive between Baghdad and Washington. Leaked US messages and phone calls revealed direct warnings from Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, stating that passing the law would be interpreted in Washington as “formally enshrining the influence of Iran and its factions” within the state structure, with the threat of sanctions targeting the energy and security sectors and potentially a review of military and financial aid.
Under this pressure, and with internal division even within the Shiite bloc regarding the timing and form of the law, the government withdrew the draft from the parliament’s agenda at the end of the summer of 2025, after weeks of postponed sessions and sharp disagreements, in a scene that looked like at least a tactical American victory, and a postponement of the final clash rather than a real settlement.
Today, when a member of parliament close to Kataib Hezbollah declares that parliament, given its current leanings, “will pass the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law,” he is effectively pledging to reopen the same issue, but from a position of numerical strength within parliament and with political momentum stemming from the election of a new president and a shift in the balance of power within Shia alliances. This pledge is not interpreted in Washington as a technical legal dispute, but rather as a direct test of the seriousness of Trump and his team’s threats, just as it leaves his envoy, Savaya, a narrow margin for negotiation before these “pressure tactics” become a reality.
The potential dollar war: from the weapon of sanctions to the nightmare of the street
What Soma is threatening in terms of “unprecedented measures” does not come out of thin air. Over the past few months, Washington has sent more than one indication of its readiness to use the economic weapon gradually and extensively against Iraq: issuing warnings about mixing Iranian funds with the Iraqi financial cycle, talking about a series of escalating sanctions on factions, figures and banks under the umbrella of a new presidential memorandum, and threatening to restrict Iraq’s access to the dollar if it continues to harbor groups that Washington classifies as “terrorist organizations” or “arms of the Revolutionary Guard”.
In a worst-case scenario, one can imagine a package of measures beginning with tightening restrictions on the currency auction and correspondent banking transfers, moving through the inclusion of new Iraqi banks on sanctions lists, and culminating in reducing exemptions for importing gas and electricity from Iran, and perhaps even reopening the file on “partial sanctions” on specific sectors—a modified version of the 1990s experience, but with more precise and less publicized financial tools. In such a scenario, the image of “five bags of Iraqi dinars for one dollar” becomes an exaggerated expression of a possible reality: a sharp collapse in the value of the dinar, inflation that devours salaries, and a middle class that vanishes within a few months.
Conversely, the Popular Mobilization Forces and their allies are betting that Washington cannot go so far as to impose a complete blockade, because Iraq remains essential to global energy markets and regional stability, and any total collapse would create a vacuum that would be exploited by powers rivaling the United States, from Iran to China and Russia. However, this bet, while containing a degree of geopolitical realism, overlooks the fact that what the Trump administration is currently threatening are sanctions “broad enough to discipline Baghdad, without reaching the point of its complete collapse”—a level that alone would be sufficient to cause an unprecedented social and economic shock in a country that has barely emerged from the currency crises of recent years.
From the slogan “Welcome to death” to the question: Who pays the price?
In the end, the scene as it appears today looks like a race towards the brink. A Trump advisor is waving before the Iraqis the image of an economy collapsing overnight if the factions are not disarmed according to American conditions, a special envoy has a full mandate to conclude a harsh “deal” with Baghdad, a new parliament whose leaders boast that their “inclination is towards the Popular Mobilization Forces” and that they are ready to pass the Popular Mobilization Forces law defying Washington’s pressure, and a deputy sums up the mood with a speech: “We don’t care about America… If they threaten us with death, then welcome death.”
Amid these slogans and threats, the voice of the only party that has no real choice is absent: the Iraqi citizen who will wake up, in the worst-case scenario, to eroding salaries, collapsing purchasing power, a frozen labor market, a country caught between Washington and Tehran, and a parliament negotiating the future of weapons while the currency plummets.
The question that arises here is not only: Will Trump really dare to push Iraq to the brink of economic collapse if Parliament deliberately enshrines the Popular Mobilization Forces by force of law? But also: Do the “Popular Mobilization Forces” within the Parliament realize that their bet on challenging Washington to the end may make the slogan “Welcome to death” approach people’s daily lives, not as a choice of resistance, but as a reality of poverty, deprivation, and a dead end?
At a moment like this, it seems that Iraq is indeed standing on a sharp dividing line between the “dollar war” and the “war of laws,” where a single signature in the White House, or a single vote under the dome of Parliament, may determine the course that the coming years will take: a difficult and painful path of settlement, or an open path of confrontation, the price of which will be paid first and foremost by the Iraqi street.
SANDY INGRAM: 🔍 WHY IRAQ’S BANKING REFORM IS SO SLOW: The Hidden Clash Between Islamic and Western Banking Systems
🇮🇶 The Real Reason Iraq’s Banking Reform Takes Time
For years, observers have asked the same question:
👉 Why is Iraq’s banking system taking so long to integrate with the global financial infrastructure?
According to Sandy Ingram, the answer has been largely overlooked by Western media and financial institutions. The delay is not just technological — it is structural, philosophical, and systemic.
At the heart of the issue lies a fundamental clash between Islamic banking principles and Western banking models.
🏦 Islamic Banking vs Western Banking: A Fundamental Difference
Western Banking Systems
Western financial systems are built on:
Interest-based lending
Debt-driven models
Guaranteed returns
Predictable loan structures
Standardized repayment schedules
These assumptions are deeply embedded in institutions such as:
The IMF
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Global correspondent banking networks
Islamic Banking Principles
In contrast, Islamic banking, which forms the backbone of Iraq’s financial system, operates on entirely different rules:
Interest (riba) is prohibited
Transactions must be asset-backed
Risk is shared, not transferred
Financing must be tied to real economic activity
Profit and loss are distributed among participants
➡️ This model prioritizes ethical finance and real value creation, not speculative debt.
⚠️ Why Islamic Banking Doesn’t “Fit” Western Assumptions
Sandy Ingram explains that Islamic banking does not naturally align with Western financial expectations.
International systems assume:
Interest payments
Fixed repayment timelines
Uniform loan contracts
Islamic finance, however:
Uses profit-sharing agreements
Adapts returns based on performance
Requires customized contracts
Because of this mismatch, Iraq cannot simply adopt Western banking rules without risking:
Systemic instability
Legal contradictions
Loss of public trust
🏛️ The Role of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI)
Why Reform Must Be Slow and Careful
The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) faces a delicate challenge:
➡️ Redesign the banking framework so it:
Integrates with global financial systems
Meets IMF and BIS requirements
Preserves Islamic banking principles
This balancing act explains why:
Reforms appear slow
Sudden changes are avoided
Testing and phased implementation are required
A rushed transition could destabilize the economy rather than strengthen it.
💡 A Common Misunderstanding: “Just Upgrade the Technology”
Sandy Ingram admits a belief shared by many observers:
“Most of us believed that all it took was updating to high-tech components in the Iraqi banking system.”
That assumption turned out to be incorrect.
The Reality:
Technology upgrades are necessary
But they are not sufficient
The real challenge is financial architecture, not software
Banking reform requires rewriting rules, not just installing systems.
📰 Why Western Media Rarely Explains This
One of the most revealing points in Sandy Ingram’s commentary is the lack of transparency from Western sources.
Western media rarely discusses Islamic banking differences
Even U.S. bankers have not highlighted this issue
The complexity is often “swept under the rug”
As Sandy notes, keeping the public uninformed benefits institutions that prefer simple narratives.
⭐ Featured Snippet: Key Explanation
Why is Iraq’s banking reform taking so long?
Iraq’s banking reform is slow because its Islamic banking system fundamentally differs from Western interest-based banking, requiring careful redesign to integrate with global financial institutions without causing instability.
❓ Q&A: Understanding Iraq’s Banking Reform
Q: Is Iraq delaying banking reform due to incompetence?
A: No. The delay reflects structural differences between Islamic and Western banking systems.
Q: Why can’t Iraq just copy Western banking rules?
A: Doing so would violate Islamic finance principles and risk economic instability.
Q: Do IMF and BIS rules conflict with Islamic banking?
A: They are based on interest and standardized lending, which Islamic finance does not use.
Q: Is technology the main issue?
A: No. The core issue is financial structure and legal alignment.
Q: Will Iraq eventually integrate globally?
A: Yes, but only through gradual, carefully designed reform.
📈 Why This Matters for the Iraqi Dinar & Global Finance
Banking reform is essential for currency credibility
Integration supports foreign investment
Stability attracts global correspondent banks
Long-term reform strengthens monetary sovereignty
This is not delay — it is precision.
🌱 Final Thoughts from Sandy Ingram
The bottom line is clear:
➡️ Islamic banking is very, very different from Western banking.
Until that reality is fully understood and respected, Iraq’s banking reform will continue at a deliberate pace. What many see as delay is actually necessary adaptation.
🌐 Stay Connected for Daily Iraq Banking & Dinar Updates
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🔥 Hashtags
#IslamicBanking #IraqBankingReform #SandyIngram
#IraqiDinar #GlobalFinance #CBI
#BankingSystems #MonetaryReform #MiddleEastEconomy
#FinancialEducation #IMF #BIS #EconomicStability
Sandy Ingram
Islamic banking and Western world banking...is really really different...Western banking systems are built on interest, debt, and guaranteed returns. While Iraq's banking structure is largely based on Islamic finance which prohibits interest and instead relies on risk sharing, asset backed transactions and real economic activity...The IMF, BIS and global correspondent banks assume interest based lending, predictable loan structures and standardized repayment models.
Islamic banking does not naturally fit into these assumptions...Because of this mismatch the Central Bank of Iraq cannot simply adopt Western banking rules without risking serious instability...Instead the CBI must carefully redesign its banking framework to operate within international systems while preserving Islamic banking principles...This is why banking reform in Iraq is proceeding more slowly than usual.
For the longest we have been talking about banking reform in Iraq. Most of us believed, I know I did, that all it took was just updating to high-tech components to the Iraqi banking system. Turns out not only was I incorrect in that belief but many other people were as well.
The bottom line is Islamic banking is very very different than western banking...Those differences have subtly swept under the rug. The western news has not talked about it...Why is Iraqi banking system taking so long to integrate with the global banking infrastructure? Even US bankers did not offer up this information as a news item...They enjoy keeping us in the dark.
Foreign Ministry: Iraq has taken over all sites of the UN mission "UNAMI"
Foreign Ministry: Iraq has taken over all sites of the UN mission "UNAMI".
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on Saturday the handover of all UNAMI sites across the country, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2732 (2024) mandating the termination of the mission's mandate.
In a statement received by the Video News Agency, the Ministry said, "In line with the government's decision to end the work of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), and pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2732 (2024)
Mandating the termination of the mission by December 31, 2025, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Committee for the Handover of UNAMI Sites throughout the Country, Ambassador Mohammed Hussein Bahr Al-Uloom, and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Claudio Cordone, signed the handover report for the UN Integrated Compound in Baghdad."
She added that "the signing ceremony included a tour of the complex and its facilities, during which Ambassador Bahr Al-Uloom commended the efforts exerted by UNAMI over the past two decades and the level of cooperation and fruitful partnership with Iraq, which has actively contributed to supporting stability and development in various sectors, particularly consolidating democracy and promoting human rights, women's rights, and social justice."
According to the statement, Ambassador Bahr Al-Uloom also recalled "the sacrifices of UNAMI, especially the mission members who lost their lives while performing their duties in 2003, most notably the first head of the mission, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello," expressing "Iraq's gratitude and appreciation to all the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who have led the mission, up to the current Special Representative, Ambassador Mohammed Al-Hassan."
Both sides affirmed that "the conclusion of UNAMI's work does not represent the end of cooperation between Iraq and the United Nations, but rather the beginning of a new phase of development partnership, led by the UN Country Team, in line with national priorities and building upon the successes achieved." link
FRANK26 CC VIDEO : 🔥 IRAQ MONETARY REFORM UPDATE: Political Obstacles, Public Protests, and the Battle Over the Iraqi Dinar
🇮🇶 January 2026 Iraq Update: A Monetary Reform Ready — But Politically Blocked
In a January 4, 2026 video update, analyst Frank26 delivers a comprehensive overview of Iraq’s monetary reform, political instability, and growing social unrest. While technical preparations for a new Iraqi dinar exchange rateappear complete, political interference continues to delay its release.
This update highlights a critical reality:
👉 The delay is no longer economic — it is political.
💰 Iraqi Dinar Revaluation: Ready but Delayed
Frank emphasizes that the monetary reform infrastructure is fully prepared, yet the new exchange rate has not been released.
According to his analysis:
The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has completed the technical steps
The financial system is prepared for change
The delay is driven by power struggles and political influence
This reinforces long-held concerns that internal control, not readiness, is the main obstacle.
🏦 Central Bank of Iraq & Governor Ali Alak
Why Is Ali Alak Under Pressure?
CBI Governor Ali Alak is portrayed as the central figure blocking reform.
Key points raised by Frank26:
Alak was appointed under former Prime Minister Nouri Maliki
He is seen as politically loyal rather than independent
Parliament has raised concerns over:
Exchange rate instability
Inflation and market stress
Prolonged delays in reform execution
Legal & Political Developments
The Supreme Judicial Council has reportedly approved Alak’s retirement due to exceeding the legal age limit
Parliament is increasingly pushing for his removal
Public protests are calling for accountability and leadership change at the CBI
🧩 The Maliki Factor: Power, Influence, and Reform Resistance
Former Prime Minister Nouri Maliki is described as a key behind-the-scenes power broker.
Frank warns:
Maliki is attempting to regain influence
Loyalists allegedly remain embedded in financial institutions
Continued influence could:
Increase corruption
Undermine sovereignty
Delay economic recovery
The concern is not just reform delay — but long-term institutional damage.
🏛️ Government Formation: The Missing Piece
Why Government Formation Matters
Iraq’s newly elected parliament is still finalizing:
Appointment of a President
Confirmation of a Prime Minister
Frank identifies Prime Minister Sudani as the best-case scenario to:
Support monetary reform
Stabilize governance
Reduce political interference
➡️ Without a fully seated government, reform cannot move forward.
🚨 Economic Pressure & Nationwide Protests
Public frustration is intensifying across multiple regions, including:
Electricity and water shortages
Rising prices and inflation
Job insecurity, especially among youth
Security incidents, including attacks near gas fields
Growing Instability
Protests reported in several cities
Foreign contractors have been targeted, raising investor concerns
Public trust in leadership continues to erode
🌍 External Influences & Geopolitical Pressure
Frank contrasts two external dynamics:
Regional influence viewed as resisting reform
U.S. pressure, portrayed as supportive of accountability and transparency
He references Donald Trump as a symbol of strong external pressure capable of accelerating reform by forcing institutional accountability.
⭐ Featured Snippet: Key Insight
Why hasn’t the Iraqi dinar revaluation happened yet?
The Iraqi dinar revaluation is delayed primarily due to political interference, leadership disputes at the Central Bank of Iraq, and incomplete government formation — not because of technical or economic unpreparedness.
❓ Q&A: Iraq Monetary Reform Explained
Q: Is Iraq’s monetary reform technically ready?
A: According to Frank26, yes. The delay is political, not technical.
Q: Who is blocking the release of the new exchange rate?
A: CBI Governor Ali Alak is identified as the main obstacle, allegedly due to political loyalty.
Q: Why is government formation so important?
A: A confirmed president and prime minister are required to enforce reform and remove blocking officials.
Q: Are protests affecting the reform timeline?
A: Yes. Growing unrest increases pressure but also raises instability risks.
Q: Is there optimism for change?
A: Cautious optimism remains if leadership changes occur quickly.
📅 Timeline Snapshot
| Timeframe | Event |
|---|---|
| Early Jan 2026 | Dinar exchange rate fluctuates slightly; no revaluation |
| Recent | Parliament reelected; pressure to remove CBI governor |
| Next Few Days | Possible vote on president candidates |
| Ongoing | Protests over services, prices, and unemployment |
| Future | Potential removal of Ali Alak; reform activation |
🌱 Final Reflection from Frank26
Frank closes with a message of faith, perseverance, and patience, emphasizing that reform is “pregnant with many things” — ready to succeed once political barriers fall.
A personal reflection on growth and nurturing amid struggle serves as a metaphor for Iraq’s current journey: progress delayed, not denied.
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Summary
This video, dated January 4, 2026, features a detailed commentary on the ongoing monetary reform and political-economic situation in Iraq, particularly focusing on the Iraqi dinar and the challenges surrounding its revaluation. The speaker, identified as Frank, provides a prayerful introduction emphasizing faith and strength, before delving into his personal opinion and analysis of current events affecting the Iraqi economy and governance.
Monetary Reform & Iraqi Dinar Revaluation:
Frank discusses the highly anticipated monetary reform in Iraq, centered on the revaluation of the Iraqi dinar. He stresses that while preparations for the new exchange rate are complete, the release of this new rate has been repeatedly delayed.Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) and Governor Ali Alak:
The governor of the CBI, Ali Alak, is portrayed as a major obstacle to monetary reform. Appointed by former Prime Minister Maliki, Alak is described as a figurehead and a “yes man” who is loyal to Maliki and allegedly impedes the release of the new exchange rate to serve political interests.- Parliament has grown concerned about Alak’s management, specifically regarding exchange rate instability and economic challenges.
- The Supreme Judicial Council has endorsed a decision for Alak’s retirement due to his exceeding the legal retirement age.
- There is a growing parliamentary push to replace him, supported by many citizens protesting his continued tenure.
Political Context and Influence of Maliki:
Former Prime Minister Maliki is identified as a key political figure exerting influence over the CBI and monetary reform. He is described as attempting to regain power and impede progress to maintain control.- The speaker warns that if Maliki and his loyalists regain control, especially through appointments loyal to Iran, it will worsen corruption and destabilize Iraq internally.
Government Formation and Stability:
Iraq’s newly elected parliament is in the process of forming a government, with emphasis on the urgent need to appoint a president and prime minister to facilitate reforms.- Prime Minister Sudani is considered the best-case candidate to lead the government and support the monetary reform.
- Formation of a fully seated government is essential to push forward the monetary reform and stabilize the economy.
Economic and Social Unrest:
The video details ongoing protests fueled by economic strain, poor public services, rising prices, and political uncertainty:- Demonstrations are reported in multiple cities (Barca, Diala, Herbbo), sparked by electricity and water shortages, job insecurity, and security incidents such as attacks on gas fields.
- Public frustration is growing, especially among youth and unemployed populations, regarding the slow pace of reforms and lack of tangible economic improvements.
- Foreign contractors, including Americans, have been targeted by protesters, signaling deteriorating investor confidence.
Regional and External Influences:
Iranian influence is repeatedly cited as a negative force (“Iranian cockroaches”) opposing reform and stability in Iraq.- The speaker contrasts Iranian-backed elements with the influence of the United States, specifically referencing Donald Trump as a powerful figure supporting reform and accountability.
Outlook and Call to Action:
Frank urges Iraqi citizens to be bold and proactive in demanding accountability, particularly pressuring Ali Alak to release the new exchange rate.- He expresses confidence that if the government is properly formed and external pressure (notably from the U.S.) is applied, obstacles such as Ali Alak will be removed quickly.
- The monetary reform is described as “pregnant with so many things” and ready to succeed once political hurdles are cleared.
Timeline of Events and Developments
| Timeframe | Event/Development |
|---|---|
| Current (Early January 2026) | Exchange rate with USD fluctuating slightly; no major changes in the dinar rate yet. |
| Recent | Iraq working on a 500-megawatt electricity project; economic stability growing but reform delayed. |
| Recent | Parliament reelected with better representation; growing push to question and remove CBI governor. |
| Upcoming (Next 3 Days) | Parliament expected to vote on president candidates, which could lead to prime minister appointment. |
| Ongoing | Protests across multiple cities due to economic strain, poor services, and political uncertainty. |
| Future (Uncertain) | Expected removal of Ali Alak if he continues to block exchange rate release; potential monetary reform success. |
Table: Key Figures and Roles
| Name | Role/Description | Political Affiliation/Influence | Impact on Monetary Reform |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ali Alak | Governor, Central Bank of Iraq | Appointed by Maliki; loyal to Iran | Seen as main obstacle delaying reform |
| Nouri Maliki | Former Prime Minister; influential political figure | Iranian-backed; trying to regain power | Influences CBI and monetary reform negatively |
| Prime Minister Sudani | Prime Minister candidate considered best-case scenario | Reform supporter | Seen as essential for reform progress |
| Iraqi Parliament | Newly elected legislative body | Majority favorable to reform | Pressuring to form government, remove Alak |
| Donald Trump | Former U.S. President (referenced) | External influence supporting reform | Seen as powerful ally against corruption |
Key Insights and Conclusions
- Ali Alak is identified as the principal “enemy” of the monetary reform, acting under political pressure from Maliki and Iranian-backed factions to delay or block the new exchange rate. His legal retirement and removal are actively being pursued by parliament and citizens.
- The formation of a full Iraqi government, including appointment of a president and prime minister, is critical to enabling monetary reform and economic stabilization. Sudani is favored to lead this effort.
- Political corruption and Iranian influence remain significant barriers to reform and stability in Iraq. The speaker contrasts these forces with U.S. involvement, suggesting external pressure will aid reform success.
- Social unrest and economic protests are increasing, fueled by inflation, service failures, and political uncertainty, which intensify pressure on leaders to act.
- Frank emphasizes the importance of public engagement, urging citizens to protest peacefully and demand accountability from those obstructing reform, especially Ali Alak.
- Overall, the monetary reform is portrayed as imminent but stalled due to political manipulation rather than technical or economic constraints.The speaker expresses cautious optimism that these barriers will soon be overcome.
Additional Non-Economic Content
- The video opens and closes with spiritual reflections and prayers, highlighting the speaker’s faith and desire for divine guidance in turbulent times.
- The final segment shifts tone to a personal story about a visit to a friend named Dick in Michigan, showcasing a collection of rare air ferns and plants, symbolizing growth and nurturing amid struggle.
Keywords
- Iraqi Dinar, Monetary Reform, Central Bank of Iraq, Ali Alak, Nouri Maliki, Prime Minister Sudani, Iraqi Parliament, Inflation, Protests, Iranian Influence, U.S. Influence, Donald Trump, Economic Stability, Government Formation, Exchange Rate, Corruption, Public Services, Political Unrest
Summary
This video delivers a comprehensive update and opinion-driven analysis on Iraq’s monetary reform, highlighting significant political obstacles, particularly the role of CBI Governor Ali Alak and former PM Maliki, regional influences from Iran, and the urgent need for government formation. It underscores growing public unrest linked to economic hardship and calls for citizen activism and faith-driven perseverance as Iraq navigates this critical period. The monetary reform is ready but remains blocked by entrenched interests, with external and internal pressures possibly tipping the balance soon.
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