🇮🇶 IRAQ: ARMED FACTIONS, US COMPANIES & WEAPONS CONTROL
A major round of talks is reportedly being prepared in Baghdad involving Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, armed faction leaders and representatives of the Shiite Coordination Framework.
🔫 The main issue: how to formally control, manage and store faction weapons as the U.S.-led Coalition’s military mission in Iraq is scheduled to end on September 30.
🇺🇸 Washington is also seeking security guarantees for more than 40 U.S. companies expected to enter Iraq and launch investment projects across several sectors. The concern is that these companies could become targets of attacks by armed factions.
🤝 The talks are expected to address:
🔐 Formal control and management of faction weapons.
⚖️ A possible legal framework regulating those weapons.
🪖 The possible integration of faction members into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
🏢 Security guarantees for U.S. companies investing in Iraq.
🇮🇶 The future relationship between the Iraqi state and armed factions.
📜 According to a faction representative cited by Shafaq News, several faction leaders have asked Parliament to pass legislation establishing a formal legal framework for weapons control while preserving the rights of the factions under a unified designation within the PMF.
🇮🇷 An Iranian representative is also expected to attend the talks, highlighting the broader regional dimension of the negotiations.
💡 The bigger picture: Iraq is trying to address the weapons issue while simultaneously strengthening its economic relationship with the United States. The outcome could affect Iraq’s security structure, U.S. investment, the PMF and Baghdad’s relations with both Washington and Tehran.
EXCLUSIVE: Iraq faction talks to address safety of US firms
Shafaq News- Baghdad
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi is expected to chair a key meeting with armed faction leaders after returning from Washington to discuss formal arrangements for controlling and managing their weapons and guarantees against attacks on more than 40 US companies expected to enter Iraq, an informed source told Shafaq News on Saturday.
The meeting will bring together a four-member committee from the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) and faction leaders reluctant to surrender their weapons, with Iran’s ambassador or a representative also expected to attend, the source said.
Washington has asked Al-Zaidi for guarantees that the US companies, which are expected to launch investment projects in several sectors, will not be targeted by armed factions, according to the source.
The talks are also expected to address the formal regulation, storage and management of faction weapons following the scheduled end of the US-led Coalition’s military mission in Iraq on September 30.
Al-Zaidi has asked CF leaders, particularly the four-member committee negotiating with the factions, to intensify talks aimed at reaching final understandings over the weapons issue, the source said.
The meeting will also discuss integrating faction members into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within three months. The source said faction leaders currently oppose the proposal but could reconsider their position during the negotiations.
Read more: Iraq factions resist disarmament as coalition exit nears
Abdul Rahman Al-Jazairi, a senior member of Al-Qasam Movement within former premier Nouri Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, told Shafaq News that four faction leaders involved in the negotiations had asked parliament to pass legislation governing the control, management, and regulation of weapons. The factions want the legislation to provide a formal legal framework and preserve the rights of those factions under a single designation within the PMF, he explained, adding that the weapons issue had become directly linked to Iraqi-US relations rather than remaining solely a domestic matter.
🇮🇶 IRAQ: ARMS, POLITICS AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE CONTROL
Iraq is moving toward a process aimed at placing weapons under state control, but it faces a complex political reality: some armed factions also have parliamentary representation and influence within the government.
⚖️ Iraq’s Constitution prohibits militias outside the armed forces, while the 2015 Political Parties Law also prohibits political parties from maintaining military or paramilitary structures or links to armed forces.
🏛️ However, several factions linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are active in politics and hold seats in Parliament.
🔫 Some groups have announced steps toward placing their weapons under state control, while others have tied the process to broader demands, including the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the departure of Turkish forces from northern Iraq, and other political and security conditions.
🇺🇸 The United States continues to press Baghdad to ensure that weapons are held under state authority.
📅 What was initially discussed as a process with an earlier deadline has evolved into a gradual plan with a target of June 30, 2027.
💡 The challenge for Iraq is not simply collecting weapons. It is also determining whether political parties linked to armed groups can effectively separate their political structures from their military ones, and whether Iraqi institutions can enforce existing laws against actors who are themselves part of the political system.
🔎 The broader issue: Iraq is attempting to move toward a system where the state has exclusive authority over weapons, while navigating the complicated relationship between politics, security institutions and armed factions.
Arms and ballots: Iraq's armed factions test constitutional boundaries
2026-09-26 12:57
Shafaq News
Iraq has around 340 licensed political parties, but real power rests with 10 to 15 parties and coalitions, and more than half of those are tied, directly or indirectly, to armed factions or security formations with political loyalties. The overlap blurs the constitutional boundary between armed institutions and political activity just as Baghdad moves ahead with efforts to bring faction weapons under state control.
Parties linked to armed groups hold ministries and parliamentary seats and help decide who governs. Iraq's legal framework, meanwhile, prohibits militias outside the armed forces and restricts political parties from maintaining links to armed formations. The challenge for Iraqi lawmakers, and for Washington, which has pressed Baghdad to bring weapons under state control, is whether the state can enforce those rules on political actors that are themselves part of the governing system.
From One Party To Hundreds
Before 2003, Iraq was a one-party state. The Baath Party of Saddam Hussein controlled political life and allowed no real competition. The US-led invasion that toppled Saddam in April 2003 opened the field, and the 2005 constitution established a multiparty system built on the peaceful transfer of power.
The sectarian shape of Iraq's armed politics has roots in the Baath era. Shia Muslims, who make up most of Iraq's population, were largely excluded from power, and their opposition movements were driven underground or into exile. When Shia-led uprisings swept southern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, government forces crushed them with large-scale atrocities against civilians, according to Human Rights Watch. Several of today's factions grew out of that opposition.
The Badr Organization began in the early 1980s as the Iran-based armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, then the main exiled Shia opposition party. That history helps explain why Shia factions form the largest and most visible part of Iraq's armed politics. It does not, however, resolve their status under the constitution and the parties’ law, neither of which distinguishes between communities.
Legal expert Faisal Rikan told Shafaq News that the abrupt shift from single-party rule to open pluralism produced a flood of new movements and parties. In the years that followed, it also produced armed wings.
“Some parties kept fighters to protect themselves and spread their ideas,” Rikan said, even though the constitution clearly prohibits militias outside the armed forces.
What the Law Says
Article 9 of the constitution requires the armed forces and security services to reflect Iraq's communities without discrimination, places them under civilian authority, and states that they shall not be used to suppress the Iraqi people, interfere in political affairs, or play any role in the transfer of power. Its second clause states: “The formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is prohibited.” Another provision restricts members of the armed forces from running for political office or campaigning for candidates while preserving their right to vote.
The Political Parties Law No. 36 of 2015 goes further. Article 8(3) stipulates that a party's founding and activity “shall not take the form of military or paramilitary organizations,” and that a party may not be linked “to any armed force.” The law also provides mechanisms for legal action against parties that engage in military or paramilitary activity or use violence in politics.
Rikan said those provisions have not been effectively enforced against the major political forces associated with armed factions.
When the Factions Entered Parliament
Political researcher Muhannad al-Janabi traces the problem to the earliest years after 2003, when armed groups that had opposed Saddam were absorbed into the new order, followed by a period of proliferating factions and militias. Al-Janabi rejects the idea that this is a passing irregularity, calling it “a dilemma in the Iraqi political system.”
He identifies the 2018 elections as the turning point. Factions tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded umbrella of mostly Shia armed groups formed in 2014 to fight ISIS and later incorporated by law into Iraq's security structure, entered parliament through political fronts while retaining armed formations.
That, al-Janabi told Shafaq News, created a major constitutional and legal problem.
The PMF's legal status makes the issue particularly complex: its formations operate within a state-recognized security institution, while political organizations associated with some of those formations compete in elections and hold parliamentary seats.
The November 2025 elections cemented the pattern. Five Shia factions with armed wings now hold roughly 61 seats in the 329-member parliament, nearly a fifth of the chamber. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, sits through its Sadiqoon bloc with 27 seats, and one of its lawmakers, Adnan Fayhan, serves as first deputy speaker. The Badr Organization of Hadi al-Amiri holds 18 seats. Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, Hoqooq, holds six. Kataib Imam Ali, led by Shibl al-Zaydi, sits through its Khadamat bloc with five, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, led by Abu Alaa al-Walai, holds about five through its Montasiroun list, which runs inside former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition.
All five belong to the Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shia parties that has dominated government formation since 2022, and all five field brigades inside the PMF. Their fighters draw state salaries through the PMF, while their political representatives sit in the legislature that sets the institution's budget and legal framework.
The Framework itself is not uniformly armed: the State of Law of Nouri al-Maliki, the al-Hikma Movement of Ammar al-Hakim, and the Reconstruction and Development Coalition of former prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani have no armed wings, yet they govern alongside faction-linked political forces.
A further group sits outside the formal political system. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, led by Akram al-Kaabi, along with Saraya Awliya al-Dam and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, operate as armed factions with no registered political wing. That places them outside the direct reach of provisions in the parties law governing registered political organizations, leaving their armed status to be addressed through the wider constitutional and security framework.
The result, in al-Janabi's analysis, is a class of political actors that combines parliamentary influence with armed power. He argues that sovereignty can be eroded from within as well as from outside once armed groups can shape official decisions on security and politics.
“How freely can the commander-in-chief of the armed forces decide the fate of formations associated with parties in his own governing coalition?” he questioned.
Beyond One Community
The pattern is not confined to Shia factions. The PMF also absorbed Sunni tribal forces, known as the Tribal Mobilization, along with Christian, Turkmen, Shabak, and Yazidi units. The Babylon Movement, led by Rayan al-Kildani, controls the PMF's 50th Brigade and won four of the five parliamentary seats reserved for Christians in 2021; in the 2025 elections, the group dominated Christian quota seats. Much of its fighting force and voter base comes from Shia communities rather than Christian ones, and the Chaldean Catholic Church has publicly distanced itself from the group.
In the Kurdistan Region (KRI), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) historically maintained Peshmerga forces organized largely along party lines. The Kurdistan Regional Government has since moved to bring those forces under the unified command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, formally announcing completion of that process in September 2026. The Peshmerga also differ legally from militias outside the state structure because the Iraqi constitution recognizes the KRI's security forces.
Shia factions nevertheless account for the most significant intersection between faction-linked political representation and the PMF itself, where several Iran-aligned groups have maintained substantial influence.
The Vocabulary of Retreat
Al-Janabi points to a quieter shift in how the issue is discussed. The official Arabic formula, usually translated as “confining weapons to the state,” once implied full disarmament. In his reading, the political conversation has since drifted toward “regulating weapons,” a lower ceiling that leaves the arms in place and changes only who supervises them.
“Iraq needs disarmament, not merely the confinement of weapons,” he said.
The distinction matters because recent pledges fit both readings. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, sworn in on May 14, 2026, made state control of arms a central commitment. After Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr dissolved his Saraya al-Salam armed group and placed it under state control, other factions followed. Asaib Ahl al-Haq said it would leave the PMF and place its weapons under state control, as Kataib Imam Ali had done. If implemented, those moves would end the dual status of both factions' fighters.
Others were less clear. Kataib Hezbollah said it supported handing over weapons to the state but attached conditions, including the complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraqi territory and airspace, guarantees against their return, an end to “American influence” over the country's political and economic decisions, the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Iraq, and the dissolution of the Peshmerga.
Those conditions make any immediate disarmament contingent on demands extending well beyond the government's weapons initiative. Al-Nujaba rejected the initiative outright.
Both positions illustrate al-Janabi's point: “handing over” and “disarming” are not the same act.
Economic Reach
Political researcher Abdul Qader al-Nayel argues the problem has moved beyond legal violations into the character of the political system itself. The system, he told Shafaq News, breaches the parties’ law in practice, and two decades of tolerance have produced what he calls “statelets” with military, economic, political, and media power of their own.
He attributes this to weak state institutions and the leverage armed groups hold over political and economic decisions. His prescriptions reach beyond the weapons: closing the “economic offices” run by armed parties, some of which are accused of pressuring merchants, contractors, and business owners; addressing foreign armed groups operating on Iraqi soil; and requiring the Independent High Electoral Commission to bar any party proven to have an armed wing from running for office.
Al-Nayel also proposes a path for the fighters themselves, either reintegration into state institutions or civilian alternatives.
A political source previously told Shafaq News that a government proposal envisaged absorbing around 35,000 faction members into the army, police, and Counter Terrorism Service in exchange for surrendering their weapons. Baghdad also plans to continue its weapons buyback program. The proposed state monopoly bill, as currently drafted, would not affect the Kurdish Peshmerga.
Washington's Timetable
The domestic legal argument now runs alongside external pressure. Al-Zaidi instructed officials in August to draft legislation regulating the possession and use of weapons by state institutions as part of a broader effort to establish a state monopoly over arms.
The timetable has since stretched substantially. What was initially presented as a Sept. 30 deadline has evolved into a staged process that al-Zaidi says should be completed by June 30, 2027.
Meeting US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this week, al-Zaidi renewed his government's commitment to restricting weapons to state institutions. US officials have also continued to press Baghdad over the role of armed factions and weapons outside direct state control.
What the Law Cannot Yet Reach
Every expert who spoke to Shafaq News located the solution in enforcing laws Iraq already has, not simply writing new ones. Rikan warned that any party whose armed wing remains outside the legal framework could face constitutional and legal accountability.
The difficulty lies in applying those provisions to a political system in which faction-linked parties hold parliamentary seats, senior positions and roles in government formation, while armed factions without political wings sit outside the parties’ law altogether.
Weapons handed to the state can be counted, catalogued, and verified. Determining whether a political party has truly severed its relationship with an armed force is harder, and Iraq's institutions will have to make that determination while some of the parties concerned hold seats within those same institutions.
During meetings with U.S. financial institutions, al-Zaidi said Iraq is entering a new phase of economic development and called on American banks to expand their presence in the Iraqi market.
Read more: https://channel8.com/english/news/6
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh Al-Zaidi met with U.S. financial institutions and stated that Iraq is entering a new phase of economic development.
His message was clear: Iraq wants American banks to expand their presence in the Iraqi market as the country works to modernize its financial system, attract foreign investment, and strengthen its integration with the global economy. 🌎🏦💰
📊 WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT FOR IRAQ AND ITS WTO PROCESS?
Iraq’s path toward the World Trade Organization (WTO) is about much more than its natural resources. It requires economic, commercial, regulatory, and financial reforms that allow Iraq to operate under international standards.
And this is where the latest development becomes particularly interesting. 👇
🏦 1. BANKING SYSTEM REFORM
Iraq needs a modern, transparent banking system capable of interacting effectively with international financial institutions.
Expanding relationships with U.S. banks could help Iraq strengthen:
✅ Banking governance ✅ Regulatory compliance ✅ Financial transparency ✅ Correspondent banking relationships ✅ Access to the international financial system
This is especially relevant because Iraq has been working to improve how legitimate international transactions are processed and to bring its banking sector into greater alignment with international standards.
🌎 2. GREATER INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
Iraq's strategy appears to go beyond oil.
The country is working to build an economy capable of attracting:
💵 Foreign investment 🏦 International financial institutions 🏭 Foreign companies 📈 Private capital 🌐 International trade
Greater financial integration can help Iraq participate more deeply in global markets.
📦 3. HOW DOES THIS CONNECT TO THE WTO?
This is one of the most important points.
To advance toward WTO membership, Iraq must align various aspects of its economy, trade policies, and legislation with international trade rules.
Its accession process involves technical work such as trade negotiations, tariff offers, legislative reforms, and other requirements.
That means Iraq's financial and economic reforms are part of a much broader process:
Banking reform → Financial integration → Greater trade & investment → Alignment with international standards → Deeper economic integration. 🌍
💱 4. WHAT COULD THIS MEAN FOR THE IQD?
This is where we need to be very careful.
This development does NOT confirm an IQD revaluation, does not establish a new exchange rate, and does not guarantee a future “RV.”
However, it is an important development to monitor because a currency operates within the broader economic and financial system supporting it.
then Iraq would be building a more integrated and potentially stronger economic foundation.
🔎 MY ANALYSIS
The most interesting part is not one individual meeting.
The bigger story is the combination of developments taking place.
Iraq is attempting to move from an economy heavily dependent on oil toward a more diversified economy with stronger banks, greater international financial connectivity, increased foreign investment, and deeper participation in global trade.
That direction is consistent with the broader requirements associated with Iraq's WTO accession process.
📌 But we should remain realistic: these developments indicate economic and financial reforms and greater international integration. They do not, by themselves, confirm a future IQD revaluation or any specific exchange rate.
For those following the IQD, the key question is whether Iraq can continue turning these announcements into verifiable reforms and measurable results.
🇮🇶📈 The story worth watching is not only the exchange rate. It is the economic transformation that could ultimately support it.
Addressing the UN, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi announced plans to diversify oil export routes via Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. He highlighted the Development Road connecting Al-Faw Grand Port to Europe as a strategic corridor open to international partnerships.
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🇮🇶 NEWS SUMMARY: IRAQ PLANS NEW OIL ROUTES & A GLOBAL TRADE CORRIDOR 🌍🚢
Speaking at the UN, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh Al-Zaidi announced plans to diversify Iraq’s oil export routes through Türkiye, Jordan, and Syria.
But there is another major part of the announcement: Iraq is promoting the Development Road, connecting the Grand Faw Port to Türkiye and ultimately to Europe. 🇮🇶🚢🇹🇷🇪🇺
Iraq says the project is open to international partnerships and investment, positioning the country as a potential strategic bridge between the Gulf, the Middle East, and European markets.
🛢️ WHY DOES OIL ROUTE DIVERSIFICATION MATTER?
Iraq has historically depended heavily on specific export routes.
Developing additional routes through:
🇹🇷 Türkiye 🇯🇴 Jordan
🇸🇾 Syria
could give Iraq greater flexibility in reaching international markets and reduce dependence on a single export corridor.
More diversified routes can also strengthen Iraq’s position in regional energy and trade networks. 🌎📈
🚢 THE DEVELOPMENT ROAD: THE BIGGER STORY
The Development Road is much more than a highway.
Iraq envisions a strategic economic corridor connecting:
Grand Faw Port 🇮🇶 → Iraq → Türkiye 🇹🇷 → Europe 🇪
🇺
The broader concept involves:
🚢 Ports 🚆 Railways 🛣️ Transportation 🏭 Industry ⚡ Energy 📦 International trade 💰 Foreign investment
The objective is to transform Iraq into a regional transportation and trade hub connecting Asia, the Gulf, the Middle East, and Europe.
🌎 WHY DOES THIS MATTER FOR IRAQ’S ECONOMY?
This strategy fits into Iraq’s broader effort to move beyond an economy heavily dependent on oil.
The country is seeking to increase:
💵 Foreign investment 📦 Non-oil trade 🏭 Industrial development 🚢 Export capacity 🌐 International economic integration 🤝 Strategic partnerships
This could create additional sources of economic activity and strengthen Iraq’s connection to global markets.
📊 WHAT ABOUT IRAQ’S WTO PATH?
This is where the bigger picture becomes interesting.
A stronger trade infrastructure, expanded international commerce, foreign investment, and greater economic integration are consistent with Iraq’s broader effort to align its economy with international trade practices.
However, it is important to make one distinction:
⚠️ The Development Road does NOT mean Iraq has completed its WTO accession process.
It is better understood as part of the broader economic transformation Iraq is pursuing while working toward deeper integration into the international trading system.
💱 AND WHAT ABOUT THE IQD?
This announcement does NOT confirm an IQD revaluation or a specific future exchange rate.
But it does provide another development to monitor.
If Iraq successfully expands its export infrastructure, attracts international investment, develops the Development Road, strengthens its banking system, and continues economic reforms, the country could build a more diversified and internationally integrated economy.
🇮🇶 The bigger story is not simply the exchange rate.
It is the transformation of Iraq into a country with stronger infrastructure, broader trade connections, greater investment opportunities, and deeper integration with the global economy.
📈 Watch the infrastructure. Watch the reforms. Watch the trade. Watch the investment.
The long-term economic story is being built one piece at a time. 🇮🇶🚢🌎