MP: THE 2026 BUDGET WILL BE THE MOST COMPLEX COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS
MP Mohammed al-Bayati confirmed on Monday that there is still no set date for the 2026 budget to be presented, noting that it will be the most difficult and complex compared to previous budget cycles.
Al-Bayati told Al-Maalouma, “As of now, there is no specific date for the Council of Ministers to present the 2026 budget and send it to the Finance Committee in the House of Representatives for review before proceeding with the first and second readings and then voting on it.”
He added, “
If presented, the budget will be the most difficult and complex compared to previous years, due to the financial and economic challenges, as well as the repercussions of what is currently happening in the Arabian Gulf.”
He pointed out that “Iraq has lost the ability to export more than 90% of its crude oil, which is the main source of revenue for the state treasury,” indicating that “the country’s financial situation is difficult by all measures.”
(Mnt Goat: My sources in Iraq tell me this simply is not true. Almost all of Iraqi oil is being exported as usual. They are trying to put pressure to move to a more diversified economy.)
Al-Bayati explained that “there is anticipation for a roadmap that the government is preparing in coordination with the Council of Representatives, in order to proceed with financial and economic reforms that will contribute to correcting many errors and formulating paths that ensure the securing of operational expenses, especially salaries, during the next phase.”
He concluded by saying that “despite the Ministry of Finance’s assurances that salaries are secured, the current phase requires real measures that contribute to creating a state of financial stability.”
❤️ Thank you for being part of this community. If you enjoy my content, please consider liking, commenting, and sharing this post. These simple actions help the algorithm reach more people and allow this information to be seen by a wider audience.
Article: “Sulaymaniyah hosts the Delphi International Economic Conference with wide Iraq and international participation.”
This is scheduled for the 6th and 7th of June.
I have a couple sources in government in Iraq who says participants include the “Who’s Who” of economic figures from Iraq, Kurdistan and number of other countries will be there.
My Finance Ministry contact is of the absolute, concrete belief that they plan on announcing their value changes at the end of this thing which is Sunday...I am hopeful this is accurate but take it a “RUMOR” and stay calm.
Comment: ...banking leaders from all over are headed to the U.S. and being told to raise their rates...
MarkZ: Probably 20+ are already here in the US and already working on that. Iraq is already here with some key folks. Almost the whole global south that are friendly with the US are being pressured to raise their exchange rates in order to balance the playing field for trade.
I have mentioned this before that the US is trying to pressure Vietnam to raise their exchange rate as it is way to artificially low.
❤️ Thank you for being part of this community. If you enjoy my content, please consider liking, commenting, and sharing this post. These simple actions help the algorithm reach more people and allow this information to be seen by a wider audience.
❤️ Thank you for being part of this community. If you enjoy my content, please consider liking, commenting, and sharing this post. These simple actions help the algorithm reach more people and allow this information to be seen by a wider audience.
🇮🇶 PMF UPDATE – MY OPINION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
In my opinion, these developments are some of the most significant signals yet that Iraq is moving toward stronger state authority and a gradual reduction of influence from armed factions operating outside full government control. 🇮🇶⚖️
The reports suggest that Washington’s position has become much firmer, and the space for delaying a resolution on the PMF issue is narrowing quickly. At the same time, Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to distance the Peace Brigades from his movement adds further pressure on other factions to adjust to a changing political reality.
What stands out is that the discussion is no longer about if change will happen, but rather how and when it will take place. The push to bring all weapons under the authority of the Iraqi state could represent an important turning point for Iraq’s sovereignty, security, and long-term stability. ⚖️🛡️
I also see the ongoing dialogue between the United States and Iran as a key factor. As long as diplomatic channels remain open, there is still room for negotiated solutions rather than escalation.
Overall, I view these developments as positive for Iraq. A stronger central government, improved security, and a more stable political environment are essential foundations for economic growth, foreign investment, and successful reforms.
The RV of the Iraqi Dinar is just waiting for this issue to be finally resolved!📈🇮🇶
❤️ Thank you for being part of this community. If you enjoy my content, please consider liking, commenting, and sharing this post. These simple actions help the algorithm reach more people and allow this information to be seen by a wider audience.
THE FRAMEWORK IS IN DISARRAY… AND THE SPECTER OF DISBANDING THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES LOOMS OVER THE NEGOTIATIONS.
Signals from Petraeus: No further deadline for the factions, and the dollar is Washington’s card.
According to information obtained by Al-Mada, the first American signals regarding the message conveyed through retired US General David Petraeus have reached Baghdad, but they did not carry what the Shiite forces, seeking to buy time, were hoping for. Political sources describe these responses as “unreassuring,” while reinforcing the impression within the “Coordination Framework” that Washington has finalized its position on the issue of armed factions, and that the room for maneuver that Baghdad tried to open up in recent weeks appears narrower than previously thought.
At the very moment when some factions within the “Framework” were searching for political solutions to resolve the weapons issue in exchange for maintaining their influence within the new government, Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Shiite National Movement (Sadr Movement), surprised his rivals with a preemptive move, announcing the disassociation of the “Peace Brigades” from the movement. This has placed the remaining factions before a reality they can no longer easily postpone.
While al-Sadr is making progress on the weapons issue, other Shia forces appear to be taking one step forward and then another back, amidst clear confusion about how to deal with escalating American pressure and fears that the disarmament process could shift from a mere reorganization of factions to a broader course that might ultimately redefine the Popular Mobilization Forces’ position within the state.
During the recent Eid holiday, Shia circles were preoccupied with reviewing their options amidst leaks suggesting disagreements regarding the mechanisms for dismantling armed headquarters, the form of integration within security institutions, and which entities would refuse to comply with any new settlement. Political sources close to the “Coordination Framework” told Al-Mada that “categorical and non-negotiable” American messages were delivered to Iraqi political leaders following Petraeus’s visit to Baghdad. These messages included an explicit rejection of any figure affiliated with armed factions assuming ministerial portfolios in the new government.
According to the sources, Washington linked this stance to sensitive economic and financial matters, including dollar shipments and Iraqi assets, as well as considerations related to American, regional, and Gulf interests. Sources add that some political leaders preferred to keep the content of those messages secret for fear of triggering a new crisis within the “coordination framework.” Meanwhile, alternative options are being discussed, involving the appointment of figures described as “independent technocrats” to head the contentious ministries, in an attempt to avoid a political clash that could negatively impact the economic situation.
In the first American comment on the controversial visit, a US State Department official told Al-Mada that
David Petraeus is “a private citizen and does not play any official role with the US diplomatic mission in Iraq.”
The American position came after a report published by Al-Mada last week about Petraeus’s appearance in Baghdad for the first time in nearly two decades, amid reports of an Iraqi initiative aimed at securing a lull of several months before making final decisions regarding the armed factions.
Although sources denied that Petraeus was an official envoy of US President Donald Trump, they confirmed that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi used his old relationship with the American general, dating back to the “Awakening” years between 2006 and 2007, to try to find an indirect channel of communication with Washington and reduce the chances of confrontation with the factions.
According to this account, Petraeus carried an Iraqi message requesting that Baghdad be given a three-month grace period to place the factions under strict control. The government would commit to immediately canceling any agreements if attacks against Erbil, embassies, or vital installations resumed.
This information could not be independently verified. In a move that disrupted the calculations of his rivals within the Shia political establishment, Muqtadaal-Sadr, leader of the Shia National Movement, announced the disassociation of the Peace Brigades from his movement. He also announced the transformation of its civilian formations into official institutions, stripped of weapons, headquarters, and organizational titles, emphasizing that the decision stemmed from “the public interest.”
Sadr did not stop at relinquishing the movement’s military wing; he called on the remaining Popular Mobilization Forces factions to distance themselves from partisan and sectarian frameworks, fully integrate under state authority, and surrender their weapons. This vision is based on consolidating weapons under government control and regulating the activities of armed groups according to specific legal and time-bound frameworks.
Observers viewed this move as an attempt to preempt internal and external pressures related to the weapons issue and to present the remaining factions with a similar obligation that they may find difficult to ignore in the future.
Researcher and academic Mohammed Naanaa believes that the current situation goes beyond the mere issue of weapons. He told Al-Mada that restricting weapons to the state “is not the sole objective in the state-building process, but merely the primary one, followed by holding the killers and corrupt officials accountable.” He added that what al-Sadr initiated of his own volition “will not be available to others, who will be forced into what they do not want.” The initiative quickly moved from the level of political pronouncements to the executive branch. Last Friday, the committee appointed by al-Sadr announced that it had held its first meeting to oversee the formal disaffiliation of the Peace Brigades.
Al-Sadr’s office stated that the committee commenced its work in accordance with the directives of the movement’s leader, which stipulated the completion of the procedures for separating the Peace Brigades’ military wing from the Shiite national movement within a maximum period of one week, and the follow-up on the organizational and administrative aspects related to the decision. Information obtained by Al-Mada indicates that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi intends, during the first 100 days of his government, to establish specific mechanisms for dealing with the six factions listed on the US blacklist, in parallel with reopening several major corruption cases, including that of Noor Zuhair.
According to this information, al-Zaidi held a series of discreet consultations with armed factions during his tenure, within a tripartite committee that also included former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri. The data suggests that these discussions resulted in unannounced understandings that excluded armed groups from ministerial positions in the new government.
Leaks from within the “coordination framework” indicate that al-Zaidi received a “green light” to proceed with measures related to the weapons file during a call he had with Muqtada al-Sadr approximately two weeks prior.
From the early days of al-Zaydi’s appointment, al-Sadr had put forward a clear vision for dealing with the issue, when he called on the prime minister-designate to transform the armed factions into a formation called “Soldiers of Religious Rites” under the supervision of the Hajj and Umrah Authority, or into humanitarian institutions specializing in relief and aid, while considering any party that refuses this as “outlaws.” Al-Sadr stated at the time, “If they do so, I am prepared to dissolve the Promised Day Brigade and hand over the Peace Brigades to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Everyone should do this as quickly as possible.”
These steps are part of a series of internal reviews that al-Sadr initiated about a month prior, which included removing several leaders, confiscating vehicles and weapons from a number of his followers, and expelling dozens from the movement. Those close to him described this as a process to restructure the organization and reorganize its affairs in preparation for a different political phase.
Regarding Muqtada al-Sadr’s move, data within the “Coordination Framework” indicates a clear division in positions on the issue of weapons. According to Health Minister Abdul Hussein al-Moussawi, a leader in the Virtue Party, five out of seven factions have agreed to proceed with the disarmament process in exchange for guarantees.
Political circles suggest that these factions include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali; the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri; as well as Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Thaar Allah, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali. Multiple sources indicate that al-Amiri is managing the most important part of the negotiations concerning the armed factions, through the committee formed after al-Zaidi’s appointment. This committee is believed to be working in parallel with a proposal by the leader of the Badr Organization to establish a “Federal Security Ministry,” which would encompass the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Rapid Response Forces, the Federal Police, the Border Security Forces, and possibly the Peshmerga as well.
Mahmoud al-Hayani, a member of the Badr Organization, believes this proposal represents the “best solution” for protecting the rights of PMF members and ensuring the armed groups’ subordination to the government’s authority. In an interview with Al-Mada, he pointed to leaks suggesting preliminary approval of the idea from retired US General David Petraeus, despite the absence of any official US position.
However, despite these proposals, the mechanism for dealing with the armed factions remains unclear. According to political sources, the proposed integration or restructuring plans may not be sufficient to convince Washington, nor do they necessarily guarantee the factions positions within the executive branch. According to political sources, the US veto contributed to the obstruction of the confirmation of nine ministerial candidates, due to Washington’s refusal to grant any positions to figures affiliated with or associated with armed factions.
Meanwhile, some Shia circles view these developments as a prelude to targeting the Popular Mobilization Forces themselves. An official from one of the armed groups told Al-Mada that “disarmament is nothing but a way to circumvent and dismantle the Popular Mobilization Forces under the guise of handing over weapons to the government or enforcing the law in response to American pressure.”
This stance reflects the extent of the skepticism held by some factions regarding the current course of action, especially given the continued refusal of influential groups, such as Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, to discuss any disarmament. In this context, the so-called “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” announced that it will not lay down its weapons or hand them over to the government “as long as the occupation continues,” according to news outlets.
Abu Mahdi al-Jaafari, spokesman for Saraya Awliya al-Dam, who presented himself as a representative of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” in widely circulated statements, confirmed that the issue of disarmament “is not up for discussion at the present time,” adding: “There will beno talk of laying down or handing over weapons until the injustice and occupation end in Iraq.”
Al-Jaafari criticized those calling for the disarmament of the factions, saying that these parties “used to describe the resistance as heroes during the war, but they forget the names of those who defended Iraq when peace returns.”
Between factions that have expressed a willingness to participate in state arrangements and others that still refuse even to discuss the issue, it seems that the battle over weapons in Iraq has not yet moved to the implementation phase. Rather, it remains confined to the realm of understandings and mutual guarantees, amidst increasing American pressure and internal fears that the current trajectory will lead to a reshaping of the Popular Mobilization Forces and their role in the next phase.
[via PDK] Comment: ...banking leaders from all over are headed to the U.S. and being told to raise their rates...
MarkZ:Probably 20+ are already here in the US and already working on that. Iraq is already here with some key folks.
Almost the whole global south that are friendly with the US are being pressured to raise their exchange rates in order to balance the playing field for trade.
I have mentioned this before that the US is trying to pressure Vietnam to raise their exchange rate as it is way to artificially low.
❤️ Thank you for being part of this community. If you enjoy my content, please consider liking, commenting, and sharing this post. These simple actions help the algorithm reach more people and allow this information to be seen by a wider audience.
❤️ Thank you for being part of this community. If you enjoy my content, please consider liking, commenting, and sharing this post. These simple actions help the algorithm reach more people and allow this information to be seen by a wider audience.
🇮🇶 MNT GOAT OPINION: A HUGE FINANCIAL SURPLUS… BUT NO REAL SERVICE IMPROVEMENT — WHAT HAPPENED?
According to the perspective shared by Mnt Goat and referenced CBI-related commentary, Iraq’s recent economic narrative has been widely misunderstood, especially regarding claims of financial crisis versus actual state revenues.
From this viewpoint, the idea that Iraq is facing a true financial crisis is rejected outright, and instead is described as a constructed narrative or political pressure strategy rather than an accurate reflection of Iraq’s fiscal reality.
Mnt Goat emphasizes that Iraq, particularly during periods of strong oil prices, experienced significant financial inflows and surpluses, especially when oil traded at elevated levels per barrel. During these periods, Iraq continued exporting oil at high value, and revenues flowing into the state treasury were described as substantial and stable.
🛢️ “No Financial Crisis” Interpretation
According to this view, the narrative of financial collapse or urgent crisis is considered misleading or politically motivated, intended—directly or indirectly—to influence public perception and create pressure on the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) and monetary policy decisions.
Mnt Goat argues that despite external claims of instability, Iraq’s financial position was supported by:
Strong oil revenues
Continued global demand for Iraqi crude
Operational state funding capacity
And steady inflows into government accounts
From this standpoint, the idea of a systemic financial breakdown is challenged as inconsistent with revenue conditions.
🏦 Surpluses vs. Visible Development
A key question raised in this interpretation is the gap between: high financial inflows vs. limited visible improvement in public services
Even during periods of reported surplus, critics of the system (and Mnt Goat’s referenced source commentary) point out that Iraq did not experience a proportional transformation in:
Infrastructure development
Electricity and water services
Large-scale reconstruction projects
Public sector modernization
Instead, spending is described as being largely absorbed by:
Salaries and government obligations
Operational expenses
Short-term budget management
⚠️ Currency Devaluation Context
This perspective also revisits the 2020 dinar exchange rate adjustment, framing it as a controversial policy decision.
While officially presented as a fiscal necessity, Mnt Goat’s referenced view suggests it was also part of broader economic pressure dynamics affecting purchasing power and internal market stability, rather than purely a reflection of financial weakness.
🧠 “Was It Crisis or Strategy?” Question
A central theme in this interpretation is the question of whether Iraq was truly in crisis—or whether the crisis narrative was amplified.
Mnt Goat suggests that:
High oil prices undermined the idea of insolvency
Revenue flow contradicted panic narratives
And claims of crisis may have been used strategically in political or monetary discussions
From this perspective, Iraq’s situation is described less as financial collapse and more as a management and allocation issue, rather than a lack of funds.
🇮🇶 Conclusion (Mnt Goat Perspective)
In summary, the Mnt Goat viewpoint argues that Iraq did not suffer from a true financial crisis during high-revenue periods, but instead faced a disconnect between:
Strong oil-driven income
Government spending priorities
And limited visible development outcomes
The result, according to this interpretation, is an ongoing debate between those who see Iraq as financially constrained, and those who believe Iraq has had sufficient resources but uneven economic execution.
A HUGE FINANCIAL SURPLUS… AND A SERVICE REALITY THAT HAS NOT CHANGED: WHAT HAPPENED?
(Mnt Goat: This article just reinforces again what my CBI contact told me weeks ago. Yes, more proof….She said THERE IS NO FINANCIAL CRISIS IN IRAQ and that notion is all propaganda in an attempt to put pressure on the CBI from the citizens to devalue the dinar like they did in later 2019. With the price of oil at 90 a barrel as Iraq was selling oil and the articles told us Iran was letting Iraqi oil tankers through the Straight of Hormuz then why the panic? It was all a game. Were you listening to me?)
The era of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has sparked widespread controversy that continues to resurface whenever the issue of managing public funds and oil surpluses is raised, especially in light of talk about huge sums that entered the state treasury during the period of high oil prices, compared to a clear limitation in the size of service and development projects completed on the ground.
While supporters of that phase promote the idea of “financial stability” and crisis management in a difficult economic situation, critics argue that the surpluses that were subsequently achieved did not translate into a real reconstruction boom, and their effects remained limited to covering operational expenses and salaries, without a tangible impact on infrastructure or basic services.
At the heart of this debate stands the most prominent economic decision at the end of 2020, when the exchange rate of the dinar against the dollar was adjusted. The government at the time considered this decision a necessary step to address the financial deficit, while opponents saw it as an influential shift that directly affected the prices of basic commodities and the standard of living, and left a long-term impact on the purchasing power of citizens.
As oil revenues increased in subsequent years, questions grew about the absence of strategic projects commensurate with those revenues, as observers believe that the period did not witness a construction momentum that matched the size of the available resources, with the exception of continued operational spending and covering the state’s financial obligations.
The issue of investment projects also remained controversial, given the failure or absence of a number of announced initiatives, and the increasing voices that spoke of a gap between the amount of money flowing into the country and what was actually achieved in terms of development and services.
On the other hand, supporters of that era still maintain that the government faced complex political, economic and security challenges, and that performance evaluation should take into account the nature of the circumstances in which the country was run.
Between these two narratives, the Al-Kadhimi era remains one of the most controversial economic periods in Iraq, between those who describe it as managing a difficult crisis, and those who consider it a huge financial opportunity that was not invested in the way that could have changed the reality of services and reconstruction.
❤️ Thank you for being part of this community. If you enjoy my content, please consider liking, commenting, and sharing this post. These simple actions help the algorithm reach more people and allow this information to be seen by a wider audience.