The head of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Abdul Aziz Al-Muhammadawi, and the PMF leadership stressed on Wednesday that the Iraqi army and the PMF are “one force” in confronting attacks, condemning a reported US strike targeting Iraqi army units in Al-Anbar province.
In a statement, Al-Muhammadawi said Iraqi army units were subjected to “a criminal and cowardly US aggression that resulted in casualties,” calling it a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and a direct attack on its military institution.
He added that those killed “represent a continuation of the shared sacrifices between Iraqi army personnel and PMF fighters,” highlighting their joint role on frontlines defending the country. Al-Muhammadawi emphasized that the army and the PMF share a unified national doctrine and would continue to defend Iraq and protect its territory.
In a separate statement, the PMF condemned the “blatant aggression” by US aircraft targeting Iraqi army units in Al-Anbar, noting that the strike constituted “a serious violation of national sovereignty and an unacceptable act against Iraqi security forces.”
“The incident would strengthen national unity and resolve to protect the country’s dignity,” the statement added.
The PMF also expressed full support for Iraq’s armed forces and called for a firm response to safeguard the country’s rights, urging citizens to stand behind state institutions and security forces.
Following the incident, the Iraqi government summoned the chargé d’affaires of the US Embassy in Baghdad and delivered a formal protest note, stating it reserves the right to respond and to submit a documented complaint to the United Nations Security Council over the targeting of the Habbaniyah military medical facility and resulting casualties.
Iraq’s political landscape has been more stable recently, and long‑term budget frameworks have been approved — a sign of improving governance and fiscal planning. These are the kinds of structural foundations that international markets look for before considering major currency changes.
Domestic stability helps build investor confidence and sets the stage for gradual economic reform, which could support a stronger dinar over time.
📈 2. Currency Policy Is Gradually Evolving Toward Stability
The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has been maintaining a stable exchange rate and managing the dinar carefully — an approach that reduces volatility and signals prudence.
While not a dramatic revaluation event yet, this reflects a cautious move toward aligning official policy with broader economic objectives — something that paves the way for future change rather than blocking it.
Iraq still relies on oil for most of its revenues, and oil export receipts and foreign‑exchange reserves provide crucial backing for the IQD. Strong oil fundamentals are a key economic pillar that underpins long‑term currency resilience.
If global oil markets hold up and Iraq continues boosting its production, that stability can indirectly strengthen the dinar’s prospects over time.
🤝 4. International Institutional Engagement Continues
Iraq’s cooperation with global organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral institutions is ongoing, helping encourage fiscal discipline and transparency — important prerequisites for any future currency rethink.
These engagements don’t immediately revalue the dinar, but they signal that Iraq is working to meet international economic standards, which investors and policymakers often view as positive.
📊
Why Some Holders Still Feel Hopeful
🌱 Progress Is Incremental (Not Instant)
✔️ Iraq has moved toward more predictable fiscal planning and budget continuity — a strong economic signal. ✔️ Currency policy is being managed to avoid sharp shocks. ✔️ Oil export strength continues to sustain foreign reserves. ✔️ International engagement lays groundwork for deeper reform.
Even though a dramatic revaluation hasn’t happened yet, these developments are exactly the types of fundamentals that historically must improve before a currency can appreciate meaningfully — whether through redenomination, floating rate, or stronger official valuation.
🧭 Important Context for Future Revaluation Hope
Here’s the realistic timeline picture that keeps many people cautiously positive:
⚙️ Phase 1 — Domestic economic strengthening: Iraq is steadily building more predictable public finance and macroeconomic stability.
🤝 Phase 2 — Institutional reform and market confidence: Continued partnership with global financial institutions increases credibility.
📈 Phase 3 — Market recognition and currency policy shift: Once Iraq meets enough economic and institutional benchmarks, central bank policy could evolve toward a freer and more market‑driven dinar exchange regime — an environment where appreciation becomes more realistic.
No one knows exact timing, but these phases reflect substantive progress rather than stagnation.
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💡 Progress is real: Iraq isn’t frozen in time — it’s stabilizing politically, working with international institutions, and managing its currency more carefully.
💡 Conditions are improving: Stable exchange rates, fiscal frameworks, and a strong oil basis are concrete building blocks.
💡 Hope is not based on rumors: It’s built on economic fundamentals getting stronger, which is what investors actually watch before a currency can change its valuation.
While no official revaluation has been announced yet, the environment is more mature and credible than in years past — and that’s genuine progress toward any future currency evolution.
Good morning, Dinarians! The excitement surrounding the Global Currency Revaluation (RV) continues to grow, with enthusiasts worldwide closely watching for any signs of movement. In recent updates, MarkZ (MZ) shared his insights on currency developments, redemption center operations, bond rumors, and international financial factors that could affect RV timing.
This comprehensive post explores the latest discussions, key Q&A highlights, and actionable insights from MZ’s updates. Whether you are a seasoned Dinari or new to the community, this guide will clarify the current state of the RV and what may unfold in the coming weeks.
Redemption Centers & Wealth Management Updates
One of the most common questions from Dinarians is about the readiness of redemption centers. MarkZ shared:
MarkZ revealed promising updates from both bond and banking contacts:
Most bond contacts expect completion between now and April 2, 2026.
Banking and group sources anticipate RV events between April 2–15, 2026.
Rumors suggest the Vatican may be acquiring historic assets, possibly preparing for fiat currency instability.
This indicates that asset-backed currencies may take priority for currency holders, separate from funds used for historic bond settlements.
International Financial Insights
Key international updates discussed include:
Iraq: Post US-Iran conflict, Iraq faces financial pressures, but leadership changes may align with US expectations.
Al Sudan & UN missions: International coalition operations in Iraq remain on track, with most personnel already withdrawn.
Argentina: Newly discovered copper, gold, and silver deposits could strengthen national currency over time.
Q&A Highlight: Q: “Will Iran become a financial partner to Iraq?” A: “It could be a positive partnership if the right government is in place.” – MarkZ
US Financial Status & Implications
MarkZ also discussed the US Treasury’s insolvency declaration (covered by Fortune Magazine), outlining possible implications:
Insolvency → Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy → Reorganization
Reorganization → Potential asset-backed monetary system
This chain of events may support the global currency revaluation Dinarians have been anticipating.
What Dinarians Are Asking
Here are recurring questions from the community, with MarkZ’s responses:
RV Timing:“Is the Golden Age starting soon?”
Redemption Centers:“Are they ready?”
Banking Activity:“Are new Chase and J.P. Morgan centers preparing?”
Rates:“When will currency holders know their value?”
MarkZ Response: Exact rates won’t be known until currency holders reach redemption centers. However, April 2026 is highlighted as a key period.
Key Takeaways
Redemption centers and wealth managers are preparing behind the scenes.
Bonds may finalize by early April; banking contacts anticipate mid-April RV events.
International asset shifts (Vatican acquisitions, Argentina’s mineral deposits) suggest a move toward asset-backed currencies.
US financial system stress supports the case for a global currency revaluation.
April 1 marks the start of the second quarter and could be pivotal.
Q&A: Quick Insights for Dinarians
Q1: When will currency holders see the RV? A1: Likely between April 2–15, 2026.
Q2: Are redemption centers operational? A2: Yes, staff are ready but many are temporarily working in wealth management.
Q3: How does US insolvency affect the RV? A3: It may accelerate the transition to an asset-backed currency system.
Q4: What about international assets? A4: Vatican purchases and Argentina’s mineral deposits may influence currency values and stability.
Conclusion
The latest MarkZ updates provide hope that the long-awaited Global Currency Revaluation is approaching. While exact dates remain uncertain, April 2026 appears pivotal. Dinarians should stay informed, monitor redemption center activity, and actively engage with community discussions for real-time insights.
MarkZ Disclaimer: All updates reflect personal opinions. For complete context, watch full call recordings. Always consult a financial professional for investment decisions.
Iraq Security and Political Highlights – Potential Implications for the Dinar
Disbanding Armed Factions Easing After September 2026 Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stated that dismantling armed factions will become more feasible after the international coalition ends its mission and foreign troops withdraw. Factions currently see foreign forces as an “occupation,” and Iraqi security forces have been actively countering attacks while hoping for the return of U.S. military trainers.
Defense Weaknesses Exposed by Regional Conflict Recent Iran–U.S.–Israel tensions revealed that Iraq cannot enforce its own sovereignty. Missile and drone strikes across Iraqi territory went largely unchallenged, exposing a lack of integrated air defense systems, command coordination, and operational readiness. Despite a $21.6 billion defense budget, Iraq remains reliant on foreign systems, hampered by political fragmentation and external pressures.
Fragmented Political and Military Structure Iraqi forces struggle with internal coordination and consensus on national security, leaving the country unable to respond effectively to external threats.
Strategic Outlook and Dinar Implications The September 2026 foreign troop withdrawal marks a critical point. If Iraq achieves greater political cohesion and begins asserting autonomous security capabilities, investor confidence in national stability could increase. This improved stability is often cited by analysts as a prerequisite for potential appreciation of the Iraqi dinar. Conversely, ongoing fragmentation and defense vulnerabilities may continue to suppress long-term economic confidence.
💡 Bottom Line: Iraq’s path to stronger sovereignty and political unity post-September 2026 could be a key catalyst for renewed investor optimism, which historically factors into speculation about the Iraqi dinar’s potential revaluation.
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Sudanese: Dissolving the factions will be easier after next September, after the end of the international coalition's mission.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani confirmed on Monday that the issue of disbanding Iraqi armed factions will become easier after September 2026, with the end of the international coalition's mission and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq.
In an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, he pointed out that the factions view these foreign forces as an “occupation.”
Al-Sudani added that Iraqi security forces have successfully thwarted numerous attacks, alongside political efforts to curb the activities of these factions, and expressed his hope for the return of American military trainers. link
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How the Iran–US–Israel war exposes Iraq’s defense paralysis
Shafaq News
The expanding confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel has done more than draw Iraqi territory into a regional battlefield. It has laid bare a deeper reality: Iraq currently lacks the structural capacity to enforce its own sovereignty.
Missiles and drones have crossed its airspace and struck sites inside the country without a single confirmed interception from its defense system, while Baghdad has issued no clear military posture or deterrent signal. What this conflict reveals is not a temporary gap, but a systemic failure rooted in how Iraq’s security architecture has been built since 2003.
Some Iraqi officials and political figures argue that this absence of response reflects a deliberate strategy rather than incapacity. In their view, avoiding direct engagement in a confrontation between far more advanced military powers is a rational choice aimed at preventing escalation. Yet this interpretation is difficult to sustain when measured against the operational record. The lack of even symbolic defensive action, no interception attempts, no declared alert levels, no public assessment of damage, suggests not restraint, but an inability to act.
Documented Operational Failure
Since late February, multiple incidents have demonstrated the same pattern. Drones struck radar installations at the Basra Operations Command without any recorded defensive response. Earlier attacks targeted the Taji base near Baghdad and the Imam Ali base in Nasiriyah. In each case, Iraqi authorities neither signaled a shift in military posture nor outlined a response plan.
These incidents point to a critical absence: Iraq does not possess an integrated air defense system capable of detecting, tracking, and intercepting incoming threats. Its current air force inventory, including US-supplied F-16 fighter jets, French Caracal helicopters, and South Korean T-50IQ aircraft, was not designed for sustained airspace control or missile defense. There is no unified command-and-control network linking these assets, and no operational surface-to-air missile system of modern standard.
Political analyst Ahmed al-Hamdani summarized the reality bluntly: “Iraqi military capabilities have no meaningful role in this conflict, because the country possesses neither the aircraft nor the air defense components required to bring down hostile projectiles or enforce its own airspace.” The events of recent weeks have reinforced that assessment.
Structural Constraints, Not Just Neglect
The roots of this deficit are not limited to underinvestment or mismanagement. Iraq’s post-2003 security model was built primarily to address internal threats, particularly insurgency and terrorism, rather than external defense. That design has left the country ill-prepared for conventional or hybrid warfare involving drones and precision-guided munitions.
External constraints have compounded the problem. Security expert Ali al-Maamari points to the 2008 US–Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement as a factor shaping procurement decisions. According to his assessment, Iraq’s defense acquisitions have largely been channeled through US-aligned systems, “limiting diversification and complicating efforts to develop an independent supply chain.”
At the same time, Iranian influence within Iraq’s political and security institutions introduces a parallel constraint. Tehran’s network of allied factions operates within Iraq’s system, creating incentives to prevent the emergence of a fully autonomous Iraqi military posture that could restrict their operational space. Al-Maamari argues that this dual pressure has left Iraq unable to convert its formal sovereignty into effective strategic autonomy.
It could be argued that Iraq’s limitations stem primarily from internal fragmentation, including corruption and institutional inefficiency. These factors are undeniably significant. Yet repeated procurement failures and external veto dynamics suggest that domestic dysfunction alone does not fully explain the scale of the capability gap.
Spending Without Capability
Iraq allocated approximately $21.6 billion to its defense sector in 2024, a figure that raises a more difficult question: how has a budget of that scale failed to produce even a minimal air defense capability?
Political science professor Issam al-Feyli of Al-Mustansiriyah University estimates that, after accounting for salaries, pensions, and maintenance, Iraq’s effective investment in modernization amounts to roughly one percent of the combined military development spending of its immediate surrounding:
Iran, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Each of those maintains integrated air defense systems and, in most cases, domestic production capacity for drones and advanced weapons.
Iraq’s procurement record reflects repeated breakdowns. Efforts to acquire South Korea’s M-SAM-II air defense system were never completed. Other deals with the Czech Republic and Pakistan collapsed. Analysts attribute these failures to a mix of corruption, political interference, and competing external pressures.
Al-Feyli notes that Iraq’s position is uniquely vulnerable: “It exists within a profoundly unstable geostrategic environment, surrounded by states whose military capabilities exceed its own by orders of magnitude, and that are, at their core, competing for influence over Iraq itself.”
Fragmented Decision-Making
The military gap is reinforced by political fragmentation. Security analyst Dr. Ahmed al-Sharifi highlights two interconnected failures: the absence of a clear deterrent posture from civilian leadership, and the inability of military institutions to execute coordinated responses.
This fragmentation became particularly visible when armed factions launched attacks in the Kurdistan Region, where US forces were consolidating ahead of a planned withdrawal. Rather than presenting a unified national stance, segments of Iraq’s political leadership justified the attacks, framing US forces as legitimate targets regardless of the federal government’s agreements.
Al-Feyli observed that this response reflected a deeper problem: “Some parties effectively endorsed the bombardment without acknowledging that those forces were withdrawing under a federal agreement.” The issue, he suggests, is not a policy disagreement but a fundamental lack of consensus on what constitutes Iraq’s national interest.
Capability Versus Perception
According to the 2026 Global Firepower Index, Iraq ranks sixth in the Middle East in terms of military strength. However, this ranking is based on aggregate indicators such as personnel numbers and equipment inventories, not on operational integration or readiness.
Iraq fields approximately 193,000 active personnel and 100,000 paramilitary forces, along with a mix of Soviet-era and Western equipment. Yet the absence of an integrated air defense system, combined with fragmented command structures, significantly reduces the effectiveness of these assets.
Even if Iraq possessed more advanced systems, it is not certain that it could fundamentally alter the outcome of a confrontation involving technologically superior powers. However, the issue is whether Iraq can impose any cost at all or assert basic control over its territory. At present, the evidence suggests it cannot.
Strategic Choices Ahead
As the September 2026 deadline for the withdrawal of US forces approaches, Iraq faces a narrowing set of strategic options. Broadly, three paths are emerging. The first is continued reliance on external security arrangements, particularly those tied to the United States.
The second involves partial realignment toward regional powers, a move that carries its own risks of dependency. The third, and most challenging, is the pursuit of an autonomous deterrence capability built on internal political consensus and institutional reform.
None of these options can succeed without addressing the core issue: Iraq’s strategic problem is the absence of political cohesion and autonomy required to translate those resources into effective power.
The current conflict has exposed these vulnerabilities in real time. Airspace violations without interception, strikes without response, and a fragmented political reaction have together provided a documented record of a state that remains, despite its formal sovereignty, unable to defend its own territory.
Introduction: The Next Steps for Iraq and the Dinar
According to Jeff, the Iraqi dinar is closely tied to political developments. Right now, the world is waiting for the war to finish, a critical prerequisite for Iraq’s government formation and potential currency rate changes.
This post explains the political process, how it affects the dinar, and what Dinarians should watch in the coming weeks.
Step 1: War Conclusion
Jeff emphasizes:
Current delays in rate changes are linked to ongoing conflicts
Once hostilities end, Iraq can focus on completing the government formation
Featured Snippet:
“The Iraqi dinar rate is dependent on political stability. The war must end before government formation and subsequent rate adjustments can occur.”
Step 2: Government Formation
After the war:
Parliament will announce and vote on the new president
The president will appoint a prime minister
The prime minister forms the cabinet
If the current prime minister, Abdullah al-Sudani, is re-elected:
Step 3: Dinar Rate Change
Jeff notes that:
Once the government is officially formed, rate changes for the Iraqi dinar can occur
These changes are crucial for currency holders worldwide
Key Insight:
The rate change is directly linked to political legitimacy and stability. Without a fully functioning government, any adjustment could be delayed.
Step 4: Implementation of 150+ Laws
Post-rate change, the Iraqi government still needs to:
Ensure stability for investors and international partners
This step is essential for long-term currency confidence and economic growth.
Political Timeline Overview
Step
Description
Notes
War Conclusion
Military and conflict resolution
Required before political processes begin
Presidential Vote
Parliament elects the president
Sets the stage for cabinet formation
Prime Minister & Cabinet
PM announces cabinet
If Sudani is re-elected, process is faster
Rate Change
Iraqi Dinar adjustment
Linked to government legitimacy
Legislation
150+ laws implemented
Secures political and economic stability
Q&A: What Dinarians Want to Know
Q1: When will the dinar rate change happen? A: After the government is fully formed and the cabinet is in place. Exact timing depends on political stability.
Q2: Does war affect the dinar? A: Yes, ongoing conflicts delay government formation and subsequent rate changes.
Q3: What happens if Sudani is re-elected? A: Cabinet formation could happen quickly, accelerating the overall timeline.
Q4: Why are 150+ laws important? A: These laws provide the legal framework for economic and financial stability, supporting the new dinar rate.
Key Takeaways
The dinar rate is directly linked to Iraq’s political situation
Government formation follows war conclusion and presidential vote
A quick cabinet formation could speed up rate adjustments
Legislative reforms are necessary for long-term economic stability
Conclusion: Watch Political Developments Closely
Jeff’s update shows that Dinarians should monitor Iraq’s political process closely. The end of conflict, presidential election, and cabinet formation are all prerequisites for a potential dinar rate change. While exact dates are uncertain, these steps provide a clear roadmap of what’s ahead.
Disclaimer
This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Always consult a qualified professional before making investment decisions.
Right now we're waiting for the war to finish. Then when the war finishes, they can finish the formation of the government. Then once the government formation is done the very next step will be the rate change. Then after the rate changes they can do the 150+ laws. After the rate changes they have a lot to do.
Remember they still have to announce the president and vote on him in parliament. Then the new president has to announce the prime minister and the prime minister technically is allocated a period of time to do his cabinet. If it's Sudani, he already has a formed completed cabinet so that could wrap up the government very quickly by reelecting Sudani.
