🏦🇮🇶 CBI Confirms: No IQD Devaluation & Banking Reforms Enter Final Stage! 📈
Despite recent rumors, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has confirmed that there are no plans to change the official exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar. Government officials also stated that Iraq's monetary policy remains stable and coordinated with the CBI. ✅💵
Recent fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate were attributed to market rumors and temporary conditions, not to an official devaluation of the IQD. Officials expect those fluctuations to ease as market conditions stabilize. 📊
Even more encouraging, the CBI announced that the reintegration of banks previously restricted from conducting U.S. dollar transactions is now in its final stages. This is another important milestone in Iraq's banking reform program. 🏛️
The Central Bank continues working with international financial institutions to strengthen monetary stability, modernize the banking sector, enhance financial transparency, and further integrate Iraq into the global financial system. 🌍🤝
While this is not an RV announcement, it represents continued progress in the financial reforms many investors have been watching closely.
MNT GOAT: Did the Iraqi dinar really devalue last week?
Another issue that came forth in my last Newsletter dated June 23, 2026 was about the intentional devaluation of the Iraq dinar as they talked about increasing the value of the dollar in Iraq, which we all should know by now would undermind the dinar and thus cause a devaluation of it. So, did the CBI really devalue the dinar by announcing a new official rate of around 1650 from 1320 as many economists told us would happen? Or was is all just speculation and rumors?
😊 In an article today we learn from the CBI that is DID NOT devalue the dinar and thus did not change the official rate. See article titled “THE GOVERNMENT SETTLES THE DEBATE OVER THE DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE.” When the CBI talks, I listen.
Government spokesman Haider al-Aboudi confirmed that “neither the government nor the central bank intends to change the exchange rate of the dollar against the Iraqi dinar” . Al-Aboudi said in a televised interview followed by Al-Sa’a Network that “there is no intention to raise the exchange rate of the dollar against the Iraqi dinar,” indicating that “the monetary and financial policy between the government and the Central Bank is proceeding in an integrated and regular manner .”
We also find out in a recent article the rise in the dollar was temporary and will soon end it is titled “SALMANIYA CURRENCY MARKET: RUMORS BEHIND DOLLAR FLUCTUATIONS… WE EXPECT IT TO DECLINE THIS WEEK” So no worries! Again, I say we must caution our assumptions since we must remember the dinar is solely still pegged to the dollar and that is a large part of the problem for the dinar. Every little hiccup in the middle east causes the dollar to increase since it is still a strong, safe currency and everyone wants it, especially the terrorists.
The spokesman for the dollar market in Sulaymaniyah, Jabbar Goran, confirmed on Saturday that the fluctuation in the value of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar during the past few days was a result of the circulation of incorrect rumors, while he expected the exchange rate of the dinar to improve during the current week.
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😊 More good news in the article titled “CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ: REINTEGRATION OF DOLLAR-DENOMINATED BANKS IS IN ITS FINAL STAGES”.
The Central Bank of Iraq confirmed on Monday that the process of reintegrating banks restricted from dealing in US dollars in foreign transfer operations has reached its final stages, while reiterating its commitment to meeting the demand for dollars in accordance with the approved regulations and standards.
The bank stated in a statement received by (Mawazin News) that it continues to implement its reform program in coordination with the relevant international institutions, with the aim of strengthening monetary and financial stability, developing the banking sector and raising its level of integration into the global financial system.
The United States has resumed some air shipments of US dollars to Iraq, months after suspending them as part of efforts to pressure Baghdad to distance itself from Iran and prevent dollars from reaching Tehran through illicit channels, The New York Times reported, citing two aides to Iraq's prime minister.
The New York Times, citing Iraqi government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi, reported that US dollar shipments to Iraq have resumed after a months-long suspension, with al-Aboudi saying "the problem has been resolved." Financial adviser Mudhar Mohammed Salih also confirmed the move.
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💵🇺🇸 U.S. Resumes Dollar Shipments to Iraq After Months-Long Suspension 🇮🇶
The United States has officially resumed shipments of U.S. dollars to Iraq after a suspension that lasted several months. The pause was part of Washington's broader effort to strengthen financial oversight, prevent illicit dollar transfers, and ensure U.S. currency was not reaching Iran through unauthorized channels. 💼🏦
According to The New York Times, Iraqi government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi confirmed that the shipments have resumed, stating:
"The problem has been resolved."
The announcement was also confirmed by Iraqi financial adviser Mudhar Mohammed Salih, signaling that both governments have reached an understanding that allows these cash shipments to continue.
📌 Why This Matters
The resumption of U.S. dollar shipments suggests improved financial coordination between the United States and Iraq. It also reflects continued efforts by Iraqi authorities to strengthen banking compliance, increase transparency, and meet international financial standards.
For Iraq, maintaining access to U.S. dollars is essential for international trade, supporting the banking sector, and maintaining confidence in the country's financial system.
📈 What It Means for IQD Investors
While this is NOT an announcement of an IQD revaluation or exchange rate change, many investors view stronger financial cooperation between Baghdad and Washington as another positive step in Iraq's ongoing banking and economic reform process.
As Iraq continues implementing financial reforms, improving oversight, and strengthening its institutions, these developments may contribute to greater long-term economic stability and increased investor confidence.
🇮🇶 Every reform alone is not the finish line—but together, they represent continued progress toward a stronger and more transparent financial system.
During a meeting with tribal sheikhs and dignitaries, al-Zaidi emphasized the need to "combat the scourge of corruption that threatens state institutions, and continue to implement plans to restrict arms to state authority in support of the Armed Forces.”
🇮🇶⚖️ Iraq Strengthens State Authority and Expands Anti-Corruption Efforts
During a meeting with tribal sheikhs and community leaders, Prime Minister Al-Zaidi reaffirmed his government's commitment to fighting corruption and strengthening Iraq's institutions. He described corruption as a serious threat to the country and pledged that efforts to eliminate it will continue. 💼
He also emphasized the importance of ensuring that all weapons remain under the authority of the Iraqi state, supporting the Iraqi Armed Forces and reinforcing national security. 🛡️🇮🇶
The Prime Minister thanked Iraq's tribal leaders for supporting the rule of law and encouraged continued cooperation in advancing the country's reform agenda. Strong institutions, improved security, and greater transparency are widely viewed as essential foundations for long-term economic growth and increased investor confidence. 📈
While this announcement does not involve a change in the Iraqi dinar's exchange rate or an RV announcement, it reflects the government's ongoing focus on reforms designed to build a more stable, secure, and economically resilient Iraq.
🇮🇶 Every step toward stronger governance and accountability helps lay the groundwork for Iraq's long-term economic future.
🇺🇸 Bruce's Big Call Update – Tuesday, June 30, 2026
Bruce Says:
📅 Wednesday, July 1 is still considered a possible target date, although some sources believe events may not occur until after July 4.
📢 Bruce says there is potential for announcements, as President Trump is expected to make some type of announcement in the coming days.
💱 According to Bruce's sources:
Exchange rates are now appearing on bank screens, whereas they were previously absent.
Europe reportedly saw rates on their screens yesterday.
U.S. rates are said to be 50% higher than those shown in Europe.
The
Iraqi Dinar (IQD) is reportedly at the contract rate established during President Trump's first term.
The Vietnamese Dong (VND) rate was still being negotiated as of today.
📩 Latest Notification Information
Bruce says the most recent information indicates that ZIM holders are expected to be notified first.
⏰ They may receive notifications 10–12 hours before other participants receive the 800 numbers.
📱 Notifications are expected to be sent by:
SMS (text message)
Email
If your phone number is on file, you may also receive an email. Bruce advises watching both your text messages and email closely.
📅 Current timing suggests ZIM holders in Tier 4B could begin receiving notifications on Wednesday, July 1, during the mid-to-late afternoon.
The remaining participants are expected to receive notifications approximately 10–12 hours later, which could place them in the early hours of Thursday.
Bruce says a high-level source has indicated that ZIM holders should receive notifications tomorrow afternoon.
🏦 Exchange centers are reportedly expected to remain open on:
July 3
July 4
July 5
(Sunday remains uncertain.)
📈 Bruce also mentioned hearing that new exchange rates may be released on Wednesday or Friday, which he believes would be another encouraging sign.
🎆 Bruce believes the goal is for participants to experience financial freedom by the July 4th holiday, with July 1 and July 2 looking especially promising.
🛏️ MedBeds
Bruce says that once exchanges begin, MedBeds are expected to follow shortly afterward.
Individuals with urgent medical needs are encouraged to notify exchange center staff, who will reportedly arrange follow-up contact by phone or email regarding MedBed appointments.
For ZIM holders with urgent medical situations, Bruce says appointments could occur within one week after completing their exchange.
This summarizes Bruce's latest update regarding exchange timing and 800-number notifications.----
El miércoles 1 de julio todavía está en juego... Julio se ve bien. Algunas personas dicen que no sucederá hasta después del 4 de julio.
Bruce dice que hay potencial para anuncios, ya que el presidente Trump hará algún anuncio en los próximos días, de algún tipo. Pero todo lo que estamos recibiendo, que es muy limitado, es que estamos recibiendo el hecho de que hay tasas en pantallas, y las tasas no estaban allí. Europa dijo que las tasas estaban en pantallas ayer, y nuestras tasas serían un 50% más altas que en Europa.
El dinar está en la tasa contractual establecida por el presidente Trump durante su primer mandato. El Dong: Las tasas no estaban hoy, pero las estaban negociando hoy. La información más reciente que tenemos: los titulares de ZIM serán notificados primero. Ya que pueden tener una ventaja de 10 a 12 horas para recibir el correo electrónico del número 800. Cuando se envíen las notificaciones, se enviarán tanto por SMS (texto) como por correo electrónico.
Si tienen su número de teléfono, también puede recibir un correo electrónico. Esté atento a ambos. ¿Cuándo se supone que recibiremos las notificaciones los titulares de ZIM en el Nivel 4B? Hasta ahora, la información que hemos recibido indica que será el 1 de julio, a media tarde o al final de la tarde.
Miércoles. ¿Qué pasa con los demás titulares de ZIM? Se supone que llegarán entre 10 y 12 horas más tarde, así que podría ser la madrugada del jueves, y todos recibirán notificaciones. Una fuente de muy alto nivel nos ha dicho que los titulares de ZIM serán contactados a media tarde o al final de la tarde de mañana. Al comenzar el 1 de julio, sabemos que planean tener centros de canje abiertos el 3, el 4 de julio y el 5 de julio (el domingo es incierto).
Según lo que Bruce ha escuchado, si esto se confirma, lo recibiremos mañana o el jueves. Esa es la información más reciente que hemos recibido hoy y rezamos para que se concrete, ya que todo apunta a ello. También nos enteramos de que están buscando nuevas tarifas que saldrán mañana o el viernes y será una buena señal para nosotros, pero Bruce cree que la idea era que tuviéramos esto, para que tuviéramos algo que celebrar en términos de libertad financiera el 4 de julio, y deberíamos tener independencia financiera para el 4 de julio, sábado.
A Bruce le parece que el 1 y el 2 se ven bien para nosotros. Después de que entremos para los intercambios, Medbeds está muy cerca. Informe al personal del centro de canje que tiene necesidades urgentes y el personal lo notificará por correo electrónico o llamada telefónica sobre cuándo se programará su cita de Medbed. Para los titulares de ZIM con necesidades urgentes debería ser dentro de una semana del intercambio. Esta es la información básica en cuanto a intercambios/números 800.
🏦🇮🇶 The Banker of Baghdad: A Financial Strategy to Reshape Iraq
One of the biggest takeaways from this analysis is that the battle for Iraq is no longer being fought primarily with military force—it is being fought through the banking system.
💵 Since 2003, Iraq's oil revenues have been held in an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This gives the United States significant leverage because Iraq depends on access to U.S. dollars to fund its government and economy.
🚨 According to the article, Washington has already demonstrated that leverage by delaying a $500 million cash shipment to Iraq and increasing financial pressure on institutions linked to Iran-backed networks.
🏦 The report also explains how Iraqi state-owned banks allegedly processed payments that ultimately benefited Iran-backed militias. As U.S. Treasury oversight increased, those financial channels became a major focus of American policy.
👤 Tom Barrack's mission is presented as using financial pressure—not military action—to:
✅ Strengthen oversight of Iraq's banking system ✅ Restrict U.S. dollar access for suspicious institutions ✅ Disrupt financial networks supporting Iran-backed militias ✅ Help Iraq regain full financial sovereignty
📈 The article argues that greater security, stronger banking oversight, and increased financial transparency could create a more stable environment for foreign investment, economic growth, and Iraq's long-term reform agenda.
💡 Bottom line: The strategy is simple—follow the money. By cutting off illicit financial networks, Iraq can strengthen its institutions, improve stability, and move closer to a stronger economic future.
THE BANKER OF BAGHDAD: HOW TOM BARRACK PLANS TO STARVE IRAN’S MILITIA MACHINE
Washington has found a weapon more precise than any cruise missile — the routing number of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
When President Donald Trump announced on 31 May that Tom Barrack would serve simultaneously as US Ambassador to Ankara, Special Presidential Envoy to Syria, and now Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq, the diplomatic community in Baghdad greeted the news with the mild interest one accords a routine reshuffling. They were wrong. Barrack is not arriving in the Iraqi capital with a briefing book and a handshake. He is arriving with a vault key — and the vault holds Baghdad’s oxygen.
Read this slowly and carefully —–>
Since 2003, Iraq’s hydrocarbon revenues have been deposited into a dedicated account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. When Baghdad needs hard currency, the Treasury arranges for physical dollar banknotes — sometimes as much as $13 billion in a single year — to be flown on cargo planes from New Jersey to the Central Bank of Iraq. It is an arrangement born of post-invasion necessity, designed to shield Iraq’s new government from Saddam-era creditors and reparation claims. It has since become something else entirely: the master switch of Iraqi political economy, controlled from lower Manhattan.
In April, the Trump administration quietly demonstrated just how absolute that control is. The Treasury blocked a cargo-plane delivery of nearly $500 million in US banknotes — proceeds from Iraqi oil sales — and simultaneously suspended security cooperation programs with the Iraqi military.
A senior Kurdish official, speaking to Fox News, offered the most frank assessment heard in months: “The dollar pause is the nuclear option in the Treasury Department’s arsenal, and the Americans have always been reluctant to leverage it.” Barrack’s appointment signals that the reluctance is over.
“The balance of power around which the United States operates works best when allies become more self-reliant and share the burden — always within a framework that preserves American influence, stability, and alignment with core US interests.” — Tom Barrack, Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq, June 2026.
To understand what Barrack is up against, one must first understand the architecture of Iran’s position in Iraq, because it is not a foreign occupation in any conventional sense. It is an inside job. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella of some 238,000 fighters drawing $3.6 billion in annual state funding, was enshrined into Iraqi law in 2016 under Law No. 40. Its most powerful components — Kataib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba — were IRGC-Quds Force proxy formations long before they were absorbed into the Iraqi state payroll. In Tehran’s strategic calculus, the PMF is the Hezbollah model, replicated on a state budget.
“Tom Barrack, who has done an outstanding job, will advance our strategic cooperation with the Governments of Syria and Iraq. Our relationship with them continues to grow!”
— President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social, 31 May, 2026
The money trail, painstakingly documented by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is darning: the state-owned Rafidain Bank, a downstream distributor of oil revenues held at the New York Fed, was disbursing dollar-converted wages directly to PMF militia fighters until mid-2025. When US Treasury pressure forced Rafidain from processing those payrolls, the PMF simply migrated its salary mechanism to a smaller state-owned lender, Al-Nahrain Islamic Bank — shifting the problem rather than solving it.
Worse, multiple Treasury sanctions between 2024 and 2026 traced diverted Iraqi dollar-auction proceeds through fronts linked to IRGC financiers and networks procuring components for Shahed drones and Iranian ballistic missiles.Washington, in the most literal sense, has been subsidizing its own adversaries.
The war on Iran: Through the lenses of pragmatism and realpolitik:
In Tehran, IRGC commanders have understood precisely what is at stake. According to reporting by Critical Threats, senior IRGC officials briefed President Masoud Pezeshkian that US and Israeli military pressure on Iran had paradoxically unified the population behind the regime, framing the entire confrontation, Iraq included, as a civilizational struggle rather than a policy dispute. That framing serves a purpose: it raises the psychological cost of compliance for PMF factions, as it can be recast as ideological betrayal. In this sense, the IRGC’s most effective weapon in Iraq is not a drone — it is a narrative.
“The United States provides Iraq with more than counterterrorism aid annually, yet instead of using these funds to constrain Iran-backed terrorist organizations, the arrangement has at times channeled resources toward the very groups Washington designates as threats. The choice for Baghdad is simple: reclaim sovereignty from IRGC influence, or lose the financial and military support that sustains the current system.” — Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2026.
Barrack is no career diplomat, and that is almost certainly the point. He is a private equity dealmaker who described Iraq, in an unguarded moment, as a “failed political experiment” — and Lebanon as “a farce.” Translated into policy, those are not insults but diagnostics: Washington no longer views Iraq as a political negotiating partner to be flattered, but as a malfunctioning security file to be restructured. His instrument of choice is the one he knows best — leverage. And the leverage is staggering. Oil export revenues fund an estimated 90 percent of the Iraqi government budget. A prolonged dollar shortage would not merely inconvenience Baghdad’s ministries; it would ignite inflation, destabilize the Iraqi dinar, and hollow out the very state salaries that keep the PMF nominally loyal to Baghdad rather than exclusively to Tehran.
There are early signs the strategy is drawing blood — or at least a strategic retreat. In late May and early June 2026, Muqtada al-Sadr dissolved his Saraya al-Salam militia, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali announced they would hand their weapons over to state control. Barrack’s response on X was carefully calibrated — congratulatory but conditional. He told Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi that the move represents the “nascent foundation for renewed Iraqi self-governance” — and then added the pointed rider: “Prime Minister Al Zaidi’s confidence is well-placed, for this marks only the beginning.” The subtext was unmistakable: the dollar tap remains in American hands.
But the hardest cases remain unmoved. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba — the formations most directly under IRGC command — have declined to disarm. The Middle East Forum has warned that what appears to be a militia shake-up may in fact be an Iranian adaptation: superficial compliance by manageable factions, preservation of the core command-and-control network. On 17 April, the Treasury designated seven senior commanders across four Iran-backed groups for attacks on US personnel — a signal that financial and kinetic pressure will run in parallel. The US conducted 138 strikes inside Iraq in April alone, killing 73 PMF members.
Tom Barrack enters Iraq carrying three portfolios — Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad — and one overarching thesis: that the architecture of Iranian influence in Iraq runs on American dollars, and that architecture can be disassembled the same way it was built, through the banking system. Lebanon took decades and a catastrophic financial collapse before Hezbollah’s model showed its limits. Iraq, with its oil revenues hostage to a New York account number, may face a compressed timeline. The barista who once claimed he was merely “bringing temperatures down and logic back together” in Kurdistan oil negotiations has a different mandate now. He holds the purse. And in Baghdad, the purse is the power.