📢 Valthor claims that between September 5 and September 7, 2026, a massive release of funds connected to the so-called Tier 4B will take place as part of an alleged global currency revaluation and transition toward a Quantum Financial System (QFS).
💵 According to the information circulating, 847 billion Tier 4B accounts would be unlocked, with funds ranging from $100,000 to $50 million per account
.
💱 Reported currency revaluation rates:
🇮🇶 Iraqi Dinar: $3.22 per IQD 🇻🇳 Vietnamese Dong: $0.47 per VND 🇿🇼 Zimbabwe Dollar: $15.00 per ZWL 🇰🇼 Kuwaiti Dinar: $4.18 per KWD
📅 Reported timeline:
🔹 Sept. 5–7: Asset transfers 🔹 Sept. 8: Alleged closure of the old banking system 🔹 Sept. 10: Alleged full operation of the QFS
⚠️ IMPORTANT: These claims are part of the GCR/QFS narrative and have not been officially confirmed by the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve, Pentagon, IMF, or other recognized international financial institutions.
🔎 At this time, this should be treated as unverified information, not an official financial announcement.
🇮🇶💵 IRAQ’S SMALL-BANKNOTE SHORTAGE: A NECESSARY STEP BEFORE “DELETE THE ZEROS”
📢 NEWS SUMMARY
Merchants and consumers in Kirkuk are reporting growing shortages of 250, 500, and 1,000 dinar banknotes. Many of the notes available are also worn, damaged, or difficult to use.
Interestingly, CBI issuance figures show that the number of these denominations has actually increased since 2022. This means the problem is not simply how many notes have been issued, but how many are actually available and fit for circulation.
🔎 ANALYSIS
This may look like a small problem, but it could be an important piece of Iraq’s broader monetary reform.
Before Iraq can successfully activate a major currency reform such as the “Delete the Zeros” project, the Central Bank of Iraq needs to ensure that the cash system is functioning efficiently.
That means:
🔄 Removing damaged notes from circulation
💵 Replacing them with new, usable notes
🏦 Ensuring banks have adequate supplies
📍 Redistributing denominations to areas experiencing shortages
📊 Monitoring actual cash circulation—not just issuance numbers
This is not necessarily about printing massive amounts of new money. It is about making sure the currency already in the system is usable, properly distributed, and efficiently managed.
And this is where I believe this story becomes much more interesting.
If Iraq is preparing for a significant monetary restructuring, it would make sense to first clean up and strengthen the existing cash infrastructure.
You don't remodel the house before fixing the foundation. 🏠🇮🇶
The small-banknote shortage may therefore be a relatively minor issue on the surface, but resolving it could be an important and even indispensable operational step before any major redenomination is implemented.
👀 As always, we should watch what the CBI actually does next.
One thing is certain: a successful “Delete the Zeros” project would require a banking and cash system capable of supporting the transition.
🇮🇶💵 Step by step, the pieces of the monetary reform puzzle continue to come into focus.
Small banknote shortage causes daily disruption in Kirkuk markets
2026-09-03 10:44
Shafaq News- Kirkuk
Merchants and residents in Kirkuk, northern Iraq, are increasingly struggling to obtain 250-dinar ($0.19), 500-dinar ($0.38) and 1,000-dinar ($0.76) banknotes, with traders reporting shortages of small denominations and growing difficulties using worn or damaged notes in daily transactions.
Abbas Ahmed, a shopkeeper in Kirkuk’s Doctors Street market, told Shafaq News that obtaining the three denominations has become increasingly difficult. “When customers pay with larger notes, some shops ask them to buy another item rather than give them their change.”
Some small-denomination notes reaching shops are also torn, dirty or heavily worn, making merchants and customers reluctant to accept them.
Samer Abdullah, a currency exchanger on Republic Street, noted a sharp increase in demand for small denominations, while supplies remain inconsistent.
Residents and merchants often turn to exchange shops for smaller notes, but the quantities available fluctuate. Some notes brought in for exchange are already damaged and need to be replaced rather than returned to circulation.
Small-denomination notes change hands more frequently than larger ones, making them more vulnerable to wear and tear, Abdullah explained.
Describing the shortage as a daily problem, Hamza al-Jubouri, a wholesaler in Kirkuk’s Citadel Market, told Shafaq News that small amounts of change are often needed in wholesale and retail transactions, leaving merchants with limited options when the required denominations are unavailable.
Some traders hold on to 250-dinar, 500-dinar, and 1,000-dinar notes rather than spend them, fearing they will be unable to replace them later. This further reduces the number of these notes circulating in the market.
Shafaq News’ review of currency issuance data shows that the number of 1,000-dinar notes rose from 718 million in 2022 to 775 million in 2026. The number of 250-dinar notes increased from 795 million to 818 million, while 500-dinar notes fell slightly from 147 million to 145.4 million.
Together, the three denominations accounted for about 1.738 billion notes in 2026, compared with roughly 1.660 billion in 2022, an increase of about 78.4 million notes.
The figures do not indicate how many of those notes are physically available in shops or remain in good enough condition for daily use. They reflect issuance data rather than the number of notes actually circulating or the proportion that has become damaged.
The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) continues to list 250-dinar, 500-dinar and 1,000-dinar notes among the country’s officially circulating denominations. It has also stated that older notes remain legal tender alongside newer issues.
In an interview with Shafaq News, Economist Ali Khalil said the availability of small denominations should be measured not only by the number of notes issued but also by the number that remain fit for circulation.
Frequent handling makes small-denomination notes particularly vulnerable to damage, meaning some of the issued supply may have been removed from circulation or require replacement.
Khalil pointed out that the existence of more than one billion notes across the three denominations does not necessarily indicate a surplus in the market. “Damaged notes may no longer be usable even if they remain part of the official issuance figures.”
He called for stronger mechanisms to replace damaged notes, ensure a steady supply of new notes and monitor the movement of cash through banks, exchange shops and merchants.
The CBI has procedures for handling damaged banknotes, including criteria for their replacement depending on the type and extent of damage. An electronic service is also available through the Ur platform to submit requests for the replacement of damaged banknotes.
In 2020, the central bank reinstated penalties related to shortages of 1,000-dinar, 500-dinar, and 250-dinar notes, effective Oct. 1 of that year, under rules governing the circulation and replacement of banknotes and their counting and sorting.
Office worker Suhad Ibrahim told Shafaq News that consumers are among those most affected because they have little control over the availability of small denominations when making everyday purchases.
Customers who pay more than the price of an item sometimes do not receive their full change or are asked to buy another item to avoid losing the remaining amount.
The shortage is particularly noticeable in shops, markets and public transportation, where small cash payments are common.
Despite their low face value, 250-dinar, 500-dinar and 1,000-dinar notes remain an important part of Iraq’s cash-based economy. While official figures show an increase in the number of 250-dinar and 1,000-dinar notes since 2022 and a slight decline in 500-dinar notes, merchants in Kirkuk continue to report difficulty obtaining small denominations in usable condition.
Article: "Sources told Al-Mustaqilla that the plan to remove zeros from the Iraqi currency is entering advanced stages, with a plan to replace the currency in early 2027"
Quote: "The discussions are currently focused on developing a clear implementation plan for the replacement process, the transitional period during which the two currencies will be traded...
as well as the procedures related to bringing the largest possible amount of cash ...into the formal financial system...If it is decided...then renaming...could make every thousand dinars of the old currency equivalent to one dinar of the new currency...
The Iraqi public is waiting for any official announcement in the coming days that could move one of the most sensitive financial issues in the country from the stage of studies and discussions to the stage of decision and implementation."
---
🇮🇶🔥 IRAQ’S CURRENCY REFORM: IS THE DINAR BEING PREPARED FOR A NEW MONETARY PHASE? 💵🌎
There are several pieces of information surrounding Iraq’s currency reform that become much more interesting when viewed together.
One of the most important questions is not simply whether Iraq will remove the three zeros, but what could come after the currency restructuring.
Could Iraq eventually move toward a more flexible exchange-rate system and allow the dinar to participate more freely in international markets?
The evidence shows that this possibility has already been considered within Iraq’s economic discussions.
📰 🇮🇶 THE 2024 CURRENCY DEBATE: FLOATING THE DINAR
In a May 17, 2024 report, Shafaq News examined Iraq’s exchange-rate volatility, the gap between the official and parallel markets, and the possibility of allowing the Iraqi dinar to float.
At that time, the official rate was approximately:
💵 1,305 IQD per USD for cash sales
💵 1,310 IQD per USD for international remittances
while reports placed the parallel-market rate around:
💵 1,450 IQD per USD
The article explained that some Iraqi economists were proposing a currency “float” as a way to eliminate the gap between the official and parallel markets.
But the discussion was not simply about allowing the dinar to freely float without controls.
Another proposal was a “managed float”, in which market forces would have greater influence while the Central Bank of Iraq would retain the ability to intervene.
Prime Minister’s Financial Advisor Mudher Saleh explained that the CBI is currently the primary institution responsible for managing the supply and demand of foreign currency in Iraq.
He discussed what would happen if Iraq moved toward a floating exchange-rate system.
His warning was significant.
He said that under a full float, nobody would know what the new exchange rate would be.
He also warned that removing the CBI's dominant role in supplying foreign currency could expose Iraq to inflationary pressures and speculation.
In other words, Saleh was not announcing a future RV.
He was explaining the potential consequences of changing the exchange-rate regime.
And that distinction matters.
💡 BUT SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT WAS ALREADY BEING DISCUSSED
Even though the 2024 article was largely cautious about a full currency float, it establishes something important:
🇮🇶 Changing the way Iraq’s exchange rate is determined was already being seriously discussed within the Iraqi economic debate.
The question was not simply:
“Should Iraq keep doing exactly what it is doing forever?”
The discussion included:
🔹 Maintaining the existing exchange-rate structure 🔹 Moving toward a managed float 🔹 Allowing greater market influence 🔹 Addressing the official/parallel-market gap 🔹 Potentially establishing a new exchange-rate point through market mechanisms
This is significant because Iraq's economic circumstances today are not necessarily identical to those of 2024.
📈 WHAT ABOUT “RAISING THE EXCHANGE RATE”?
The same article contains another important detail.
It states that a study by World Bank experts had recommended “raising the exchange rate.”
That does NOT mean the World Bank ordered Iraq to revalue the dinar.
It also does not mean the CBI announced a future RV.
But it demonstrates that the question of a different exchange-rate level has been part of the economic discussion surrounding Iraq.
The article also notes that the IMF had praised the CBI’s efforts to tighten monetary policy and strengthen its liquidity-management framework.
So there was already an ongoing discussion about:
💵 Exchange-rate policy 🏦 Monetary policy 📊 Liquidity management 🌎 International financial integration 💱 The relationship between the official and parallel markets
🇮🇶 NOW LOOK AT WHAT IS BEING REPORTED ABOUT 2027
This is where the newer information becomes especially interesting.
A recent report attributed to Al-Mustaqilla says that the plan to remove zeros from the Iraqi currency is entering advanced stages, with a plan to replace the currency in early 2027.
The report says discussions are focusing on:
🔹 A clear implementation plan
🔹 The currency-replacement process
🔹 The transition period
🔹 A period during which the old and new currencies could circulate together
🔹 Procedures to bring the largest possible amount of cash into the formal financial system
And then comes one of the most important statements.
The article gives the hypothetical example that:
💵 1,000 old dinars could become 1 new dinar.
That is the classic three-zero redenomination concept.
For example:
💵 1,000 old IQD → 1 new IQD
💵 10,000 old IQD → 10 new IQD
💵 25,000 old IQD → 25 new IQD
The important point is that this would be a redenomination of the currency unit.
It should not automatically be interpreted as a 1,000-times increase in economic purchasing power.
🏦🔥 THE CASH ON THE STREETS MAY BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PIECES
This part of the report deserves special attention.
The plan reportedly includes procedures to bring as much cash as possible back into the formal financial system.
Why would that matter?
Because if Iraq is preparing to replace its currency, authorities would need to know where a substantial portion of the physical currency is and bring it into a controlled banking environment.
That could help Iraq:
🏦 Increase deposits in the banking system
🔎 Improve financial transparency
💵 Identify and capture old banknotes
🔄 Facilitate conversion from old to new denominations
📊 Improve control over the money supply
🚨 Reduce informal financial activity
💸 Combat money laundering
This makes the “cash coming off the streets and into the banks” portion of the report particularly significant.
It is not simply about collecting banknotes.
It could be part of the operational preparation for a currency-replacement process.
🌎💵 AND THEN COMES THE FOREX QUESTION
This is where all of these pieces begin to connect.
The 2024 article demonstrates that greater exchange-rate flexibility and even a floating or managed-floating system were already being considered.
The newer report discusses:
currency replacement + removal of zeros + lower denominations + formalization of cash.
And according to information previously reported by
Mnt Goat, contacts described to her from the CBI have also indicated that the longer-term objective is for the Iraqi dinar to move toward a more internationally tradable position after the monetary reforms.
That information should be treated as reported contact information rather than an official public CBI announcement, but it is notable because it points in the same general direction as the broader monetary-reform discussion.
So the potential sequence becomes increasingly interesting:
🇮🇶 Currency reform
⬇️
💵 Remove the three zeros / restructure denominations
⬇️
🏦 Bring more physical cash into the formal banking system
⬇️
🔄 Replace old currency with new denominations
⬇️
🌎 Increase integration with the international financial system
⬇️
💱 Greater exchange-rate flexibility / possible future international trading
⬇️
📈 Potential change in the dinar’s exchange-rate value
The final steps remain dependent on actual CBI decisions and official announcements.
🚨 THE BIG DISTINCTION: REFORM VS. REVALUATION
This is where the discussion needs to remain very clear.
Removing the zeros does not automatically equal a 1,000-times revaluation.
A redenomination changes the numerical unit.
A revaluation changes the exchange value of the currency.
They are separate decisions.
However, if Iraq were simultaneously restructuring its currency, strengthening its banking system, formalizing cash, improving financial compliance, integrating more deeply with international markets, and eventually changing its exchange-rate regime, then the monetary transformation would be considerably broader than simply replacing banknotes.
And that is exactly why the current discussion deserves attention.
🔥 WHAT MAKES THE CURRENT SITUATION DIFFERENT?
The economic environment in 2024 was not necessarily the same as the environment Iraq is facing today.
The 2024 debate showed that Iraqi economic officials and analysts were already considering different approaches to the exchange-rate system.
Today, we are seeing additional discussion surrounding:
🏦 Banking-sector modernization
💵 Currency reform
🔄 Possible replacement of existing denominations
💰 Bringing cash into the formal banking system
🌎 International financial integration
📊 Liquidity management
🚨 Anti-money-laundering and compliance measures
And now there is reported information pointing toward early 2027 as a possible timeframe for currency replacement.
Taken together, these developments make it reasonable to ask whether Iraq is gradually preparing the financial infrastructure for a larger monetary transition.
🇮🇶💥 THE BIGGER PICTURE
The story may therefore be bigger than simply:
“Will Iraq delete the zeros?”
The more important question may be:
What monetary system is Iraq preparing to have AFTER the three zeros are removed?
If the currency is replaced…
If lower denominations are introduced…
If large amounts of cash are brought back into the banking system…
If the banking sector becomes increasingly integrated with international standards…
If Iraq continues strengthening its financial infrastructure…
And if the possibility of a different exchange-rate regime remains part of the economic discussion…
then the post-redenomination exchange-rate policy becomes one of the most important questions to watch.
That does not guarantee a future RV.
But it does show that the concept of changing Iraq’s exchange-rate framework has already been considered, while the newer currency-replacement reports suggest that the redenomination discussion may be moving toward a more practical stage.
🇮🇶💵 The next major piece of the puzzle would be an official announcement from the CBI or the Iraqi government confirming the currency-replacement timetable, the transition mechanism, the new denominations, and—most importantly—what exchange-rate policy will accompany the new monetary structure.
🔥 That is where the real significance of this developing story could ultimately be revealed.
🇮🇶🚨 IRAQ’S WEAPONS ISSUE: ARE WE REALLY GOING TO DELAY THIS AGAIN?
📢 NEWS SUMMARY
According to a report published by Shafaq News on September 3, negotiations between Iraq’s ruling Shiite Coordination Framework and several armed factions are reportedly making progress toward bringing weapons under state control.
The discussions come ahead of September 30, when the U.S.-led Coalition’s military mission in Iraq is scheduled to end.
A three-member political committee consisting of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri has reportedly been meeting with armed factions in recent days.
The committee is supporting Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s efforts to bring weapons under the authority of the Iraqi state.
According to political officials, the discussions have been described as positive, with the goal of reaching a solution through dialogue rather than triggering an escalation that could destabilize Iraq.
The September 30 date is being described as an important turning point. After that date, Iraqi state institutions are expected to move forward with measures aimed at strengthening sovereignty, preventing attacks on neighboring countries from Iraqi territory, and ensuring that decisions concerning war and peace remain under government authority.
However, there is still significant resistance.
Several Iran-aligned armed groups, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, have resisted surrendering their weapons. These groups have linked any potential move to foreign troop withdrawals and security guarantees against external attacks.
And here comes the part that deserves our attention:
Officials have already clarified that September 30 does NOT necessarily mean that all weapons will suddenly be handed over to the government on that exact day.
Instead, the process of bringing weapons under state control could continue gradually after September 30.
🔎 DEEPER ANALYSIS
And honestly... ay bendito!! 😅🇮🇶
Here we go again.
I completely understand that this is an extremely sensitive issue. Iraq has lived through years of war, terrorism, political instability, foreign intervention, and competing centers of power. Nobody wants to see a confrontation between the Iraqi government and powerful armed factions that could potentially destabilize the country.
Dialogue is absolutely preferable to conflict.
But there is also a point where dialogue has to produce results.
Iraq has been discussing the issue of weapons outside state institutions for years. The terminology may change — “regulating,” “containing,” “managing,” or “organizing” weapons — but the fundamental question remains the same:
🇮🇶 Who has the final authority over weapons and decisions of war and peace inside Iraq?
A sovereign government cannot permanently operate alongside independent armed groups capable of acting outside the state's authority.
That is not simply an Iraqi political issue. It directly affects Iraq's sovereignty, security, relations with its neighbors, foreign investment, economic stability, and the credibility of its institutions.
And this is why September 30 matters.
It should not necessarily be viewed as a magical date when everything is suddenly solved.
Realistically, completely integrating or bringing armed factions under state authority could take time.
But there needs to be a clear roadmap.
There needs to be accountability.
There needs to be a defined chain of command.
And most importantly, there needs to be a clear understanding that the Iraqi government — not individual militias, political factions, or outside powers — ultimately controls the country's security decisions.
⚠️ THE BIG QUESTION: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 30?
This is where I believe we need to pay close attention to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi.
The government appears to be trying to walk a very difficult line.
On one side, Baghdad needs to demonstrate that it is serious about establishing state authority.
On the other side, moving too aggressively could provoke resistance from factions with significant military and political influence.
That is why the government's approach appears to be based on gradual integration and negotiation rather than immediate forced disarmament.
Strategically, that may be the more realistic path.
But there is a difference between moving carefully and simply postponing the problem.
And that distinction is going to be very important.
If September 30 arrives and the government establishes a credible framework with measurable steps, timelines, and enforcement mechanisms, that could represent genuine progress.
If September 30 arrives and we simply hear that the process will continue “gradually” with no clear deadlines, no concrete implementation, and no meaningful change on the ground...
Then we are essentially back where we started.
⏳ MORE TALKS.
⏳ MORE COMMITTEES. ⏳ MORE DELAYS.
And Iraq cannot remain in that cycle forever.
🇮🇶 WHY THIS MATTERS BEYOND POLITICS
A stronger and more unified Iraqi state would have implications far beyond the weapons issue.
Political stability creates a better environment for economic reforms.
Greater security strengthens investor confidence.
A functioning banking system becomes easier to develop.
Government institutions become more credible.
And Iraq becomes better positioned to determine its own economic and foreign-policy direction.
This is especially important as Iraq continues working on broader economic and financial reforms.
The country needs to demonstrate that its institutions are capable of making and enforcing decisions.
That doesn't mean everything has to happen overnight.
It means the direction has to be unmistakable.
🇮🇶 LET’S SEE WHAT AL ZAIDI DOES
At this point, I think the most important thing is to watch what Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi actually does with this opportunity.
Talking to the factions is one thing.
Getting them to accept a clear state-controlled framework is another.
And implementing that framework is where the real test begins.
Iraq needs stability, but stability cannot simply mean postponing difficult decisions indefinitely.
There comes a moment when the government has to say:
🇮🇶 The state is the state. 🇮🇶 The government is the government.
🇮🇶 And decisions of war and peace belong to the Iraqi state.
So yes, let's hope the negotiations succeed.
Let's hope this is handled peacefully.
Let's hope Iraq avoids another cycle of violence.
But let's also hope that “gradual” doesn't become another word for “not yet.”
Because Iraq has been waiting long enough.
👀 Now we watch.
September 30 could be an important turning point — not because everything will necessarily be finished that day, but because it may show us whether Iraq is finally moving toward a stronger, more unified state or simply preparing for another extension of the same unresolved issue.
Talks between Iraq’s ruling Shiite Coordination Framework and armed factions are making progress toward bringing weapons under state control ahead of the Sept. 30 end of the US-led Coalition’s military mission, a political official told Shafaq News on Thursday.
Khalid Walid, a member of the political bureau of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition led by former PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, said a three-member committee comprising al-Sudani, former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri had held a series of meetings with factions in recent days.
He said the committee supports Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s efforts to bring weapons under state authority and is working under a mandate from the Coordination Framework and the State Administration Coalition, an alliance of political forces representing Iraq’s main communities.
Walid described the talks as positive and said Sept. 30 would mark an important stage in regulating weapons outside state institutions. After that date, he said, state institutions would move ahead with measures aimed at safeguarding Iraqi sovereignty, preventing attacks on neighboring countries from Iraqi territory and ensuring that decisions of war and peace remain under state authority.
Read more: Tension meets dialogue as Iraq approaches September 30
The committee believed dialogue could prevent escalation and ultimately resolve the issue without destabilizing Iraq, according to Walid. Al-Maliki and al-Amiri have favored describing the process as “regulating” or “containing” weapons rather than outright “disarmament,” terminology intended to ease resistance from armed factions. Shafaq News previously reported that Shiite leaders had proposed a “weapons management” formula under which the use of factional arms would fall under the authority of the commander-in-chief.
Several Iran-aligned groups, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, have resisted surrendering their weapons and linked any such move to the withdrawal of foreign troops and security guarantees against external attacks.
Read more: Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions
The State Administration Coalition has said armed activity outside official institutions after Sept. 30 could face action under Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law. However, National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji later clarified that Sept. 30 marks the end of the Coalition mission and that efforts to bring weapons under state control would continue gradually afterward.