Showing posts with label #IraqDevelopment #DevelopmentRoad #IraqiDinar #CBI #MiddleEastEconomy #GlobalTrade #InfrastructureNews #ForexWatch #EconomicReform #EmergingMarkets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #IraqDevelopment #DevelopmentRoad #IraqiDinar #CBI #MiddleEastEconomy #GlobalTrade #InfrastructureNews #ForexWatch #EconomicReform #EmergingMarkets. Show all posts

Saturday, February 14, 2026

FRANK26…..VICTORY FOR SUDANI & US

Arab states restrict US ability to attack Iran's allies in Iraq, Syria: Politico

 Shafaq News/ Some Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates, are increasingly restricting the U.S. from using military facilities on their soil to launch retaliatory airstrikes on Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Politico said in a report. 

The U.S. has long deployed thousands of troops at facilities in the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and elsewhere in the Middle East, and the Arab countries' role in supporting U.S. military activities has come under intensified scrutiny since the Israel-Hamas war that erupted in October.

"The conflict has pitted Arab governments' interests in assuaging their citizens' anger toward Israel against their desire to help Washington fend off Iranian-backed attacks," a Politico report said. The restrictions on U.S. activities on their soil reflect Arab calculations on how supportive they can be — without angering Iran.

Politico said that a U.S. official, a congressional aide, and two Western officials, confirmed the information.

Amid a rising civilian death toll in Gaza, several Arab countries, particularly those "attempting a detente with Iran," are "increasingly restricting" the U.S. and partners from conducting self-defense operations from their soil, according to the U.S. official. This includes limits on retaliatory strikes against attacks in Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea.

President Joe Biden has in recent weeks ordered multiple retaliatory air and missile strikes, some in conjunction with U.S. allies, against Iran-backed threats in the Middle East. Iran-backed militias have attacked U.S. troops in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan using a mixture of drones, rockets, and missiles 170 times since October, killing three U.S. service members and injuring dozens more. Meanwhile, the Houthi group in Yemen has launched 46 attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the campaign started on Nov. 19.

Certain Arab countries are restricting access to basing and overflight for the assets participating in these retaliatory strikes, the official said. It’s not clear how many countries are taking this action.

The reason the UAE in particular is doing this, per one of the Western officials, is "they don't want to appear like they're against Iran and they don’t want to appear too close to the West and Israel for public opinion reasons."

The UAE has in recent years also raised concerns about increasing attacks from the Houthis in Yemen. The Ansar Allah group has previously launched missiles into the UAE.

Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said the U.S. military has" the capability to flow additional assets to the region to support regional deterrence efforts and provide options for a wide range of contingencies" when necessary.

"We also maintain the capability throughout the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility to defend our forces and conduct self-defense strikes at the times and places of our choosing," Ryder said when asked for comment.

In October, U.S. F-16 fighter jets carried out retaliatory strikes against two facilities in eastern Syria used by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other groups. Although the Pentagon at the time did not disclose where the aircraft came from, Al Dhafra is one of the closest facilities in the region that typically hosts F-16s.

One Defense Department official disputed the premise that there is tension between the U.S. and the Emirates over U.S. military basing, pointing out that A-10 attack aircraft and armed MQ-9 drones have recently operated out of Al Dhafra in support of operations to protect shipping in the Arabian Gulf.

But soon after the October strike, the Pentagon stopped publicly disclosing many of the aircraft types used in subsequent retaliatory operations against Iranian proxies.

Meanwhile, strikes on the Houthis since January have been conducted by U.S. Navy F/A-18 fighter jets from the nearby aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, which is in international waters.

And after an Iran-backed proxy attack killed three American soldiers at a small U.S. outpost in Jordan in January, the U.S. flew long-range B-1 bombers from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, the Pentagon said.

"This was yet another demonstration that we maintain global strike capability, which means we can move quickly and flexibly to respond globally at the times and places of our choosing and that we're not limited to just the aircraft that are in Central Command," Ryder said.

Overflight access in the region has been mired in problems in recent years because of the fighting in Yemen. The Federal Aviation Administration previously issued a warning about operating aircraft over the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The U.S. military, along with several international partners, has stepped up its activities in the Middle East as the Israel-Hamas war's consequences have reverberated across the region. The war is now in its fifth month and Israel's daily attacks in the Gaza Strip have killed more than 28,000 Palestinians, many of them civilians.

The rising Palestinian civilian death toll in Gaza has infuriated the populations of many Arab countries, worrying the autocrats who run them. But many of the same governments also despise Hamas and Iran. At the same time, they are reluctant to get into an all-out fight with Iran and have in recent years sought to mend fences with that country.


MILITIAMAN: Iraq Development Road Project Gains Global Support as CBI Maintains Strategic Silence

Iraq’s Development Road Project: Global Momentum & Strategic Silence from the CBI

Militia Man recently highlighted an important article titled:

“International and Regional Efforts to Support the Development Road Project”

According to his analysis, the evidence strongly suggests that Iraq’s Development Road Project is not only advancing — it is actively attracting global and regional investors.

Let’s break down what this means for Iraq’s economic future and why the Central Bank’s quiet posture may be intentional.


What Is the Development Road Project?

The Development Road Project is Iraq’s ambitious infrastructure initiative designed to connect the Persian Gulf to Europe through:

  • Rail corridors

  • High-speed transportation routes

  • Logistics hubs

  • Trade gateways

The project aims to position Iraq as a strategic transit hub linking Asia to Europe.

Major regional stakeholders, including Turkey and Qatar, have shown interest in infrastructure partnerships tied to this corridor strategy.

This initiative aligns with Iraq’s broader efforts to diversify beyond oil dependence and stimulate long-term private sector growth.


Why Global Investor Interest Matters

When international and regional investors engage in large-scale infrastructure projects, it signals:

  • Confidence in long-term political stability

  • Belief in economic modernization

  • Commitment to cross-border trade integration

  • Expectation of regulatory reform

Such developments strengthen Iraq’s case for deeper integration into the global financial system.

The more Iraq becomes a logistics and trade connector, the more it must align with international banking standards and transparent financial mechanisms.


Integration into the Global Financial System

Militia Man emphasizes that these infrastructure developments support Iraq’s transition toward global financial integration.

That process typically involves:

  • Banking sector modernization

  • Digital payment systems

  • Anti-corruption compliance

  • Customs reform

  • Strengthened central banking transparency

The Central Bank of Iraq plays a central role in guiding monetary policy, managing reserves, and maintaining exchange rate stability during this transformation.


The “Hush” from the CBI: Strategic or Suspicious?

Militia Man argues that the CBI’s silence is intentional — especially when it comes to sensitive reforms.

In monetary policy, certain topics are inherently sensitive:

  • Exchange rate adjustments

  • Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) metrics

  • Reserve strategy

  • Currency supply management

Central banks worldwide often avoid pre-announcing specific timing, amounts, or implementation dates related to exchange rate changes.

This is not unique to Iraq. Controlled communication helps prevent:

  • Market speculation

  • Capital flight

  • Currency manipulation

  • Premature positioning

When financial systems are undergoing structural reform, information is often released only when operational readiness is achieved.


Featured Snippet: Why Would a Central Bank Stay Quiet?

Why doesn’t the Central Bank announce exchange rate changes in advance?
Because early disclosure can trigger speculation, destabilize markets, and create financial imbalance.

Is controlled communication normal?
Yes. Central banks frequently manage sensitive information carefully to protect economic stability.

Does infrastructure growth support financial reform?
Yes. Large-scale international projects often require stronger banking systems and regulatory alignment.


The Generational Impact of the Development Road

If fully implemented, the Development Road Project could:

  • Create tens of thousands of jobs

  • Expand private sector opportunities

  • Increase transit revenue

  • Position Iraq as a regional trade hub

  • Boost GDP diversification

This kind of infrastructure shift is generational — meaning its economic impact could extend decades into the future.

With major neighbors like United Arab Emirates investing heavily in logistics and trade corridors, Iraq’s participation in regional connectivity becomes strategically critical.


Is There “No Turning Back”?

From an infrastructure standpoint, once:

  • Contracts are signed

  • International investors commit capital

  • Engineering begins

  • Trade agreements form

Momentum becomes difficult to reverse.

However, long-term success still depends on:

  • Political stability

  • Transparent governance

  • Regulatory reform

  • Consistent monetary policy

Economic momentum and financial reform must move together.


Q&A Section

Q1: Does infrastructure development automatically change a currency’s value?

No. Infrastructure strengthens fundamentals over time, but exchange rate policy is determined by central bank decisions and macroeconomic conditions.

Q2: What is a Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)?

REER measures a country’s currency value relative to a basket of other currencies, adjusted for inflation. It reflects competitiveness rather than just nominal value.

Q3: Is silence from a central bank unusual?

No. Controlled communication is common when discussing sensitive monetary policy issues.

Q4: Does global investment guarantee financial integration?

It supports it — but integration requires regulatory alignment, banking modernization, and political coordination.


Final Thoughts

The Development Road Project appears to be gaining regional and international support. If executed successfully, it could reshape Iraq’s economic trajectory for decades.

At the same time, the Central Bank’s measured communication strategy reflects the reality that monetary policy — especially exchange rate matters — is among the most sensitive aspects of national economic management.

Infrastructure momentum is visible.

Monetary policy remains controlled.

As always, watch official announcements, not speculation.


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Militia Man   

 Article:  "INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT ROAD PROJECT

It provides strong evidence that the Development Road project is actively attracting global investors...The project is a generational game-changer that is unstoppable in its momentum and will fuel private sector growth for decades. The Development Road...is advancing rapidly...These are all facts that support Iraq's integration into the global financial system... no turning back.

 The CBI's 'hush' is intentional.  Sensitive reforms advance quietly until the system is ready and the public gatekeepers are prepared.  When they talk about sensitivity, if they're talking about an exchange rate or a real effective exchange rate, that's sensitive information and they're not going to tell you when, how much and what day...The quiet continues to protect them... This is controlled communication.  


NADER FROM MID EAST: 🚀 How Iraq is Fighting Dollarization to Boost the Iraqi Dinar 💵🔥

 

Iran-backed factions target largest US base in Syria

 Shafaq News / On Saturday, the Syrian Observory for Human Rights reported that Iran-backed groups launched missile strikes on the largest US base in Al-Omar oil field in Syria, “targeting it three times within an hour.” 

The Observory added, “Ground defences attempted to intercept the attacks unsuccessfully, with no information about human casualties.” 


Notably, this targeting comes after an attack on the Koniko gas field base a few hours ago, where Iran-affiliated armed groups attacked the base twice;first with a drone and then with a barrage of missiles. 


On Friday, armed factions in Iraq announced the resumption of their military operations against US bases. In a statement issued by the armed factions, aka Islamic Resistance in Iraq, they granted the "occupying forces an opportunity to exit sacred lands as a lifeline," recalling the previous resistance that compelled the withdrawal of occupying forces in 2011. 

The statement emphasized that "recent events exposed the fact that the occupying enemy does not leave due to weariness or deceit, understanding only the language of arms.

This was evident in their recent attacks on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters in Al-Qaim, Akashat, and other locations." The factions condemned the assassination of the prominent leader Abu Bakr Al-Saadi in Baghdad, considering it "a breach of all rules of engagement." 


The factions highlighted their "profound knowledge of the cunning nature of their enemy and the battlefields of confrontation." They reaffirmed their commitment "to their responsibilities toward their people, country, and nation under any circumstances." 


The factions called on their brethren in jihad to "join the ranks of the resistance actively," urging them to "prepare for effective participation in expelling the occupation during this historical stage for Iraq and the region." 


Last Wednesday, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) claimed responsibility for the attack targeting Kata'ib Hezbollah leader Abu Baqir al-Saadi in al-Mashtal area east of the capital Baghdad, stating that he was responsible for attacks targeting its forces in the region. 

CENTCOM stated, "At 9:30 p.m. on Feb. 7, CENTCOM forces conducted a one-sided strike in Iraq in response to attacks on US service members, resulting in the death of the Kata'ib Hezbollah commander responsible for direct planning and participation in attacks on US forces in the region. There are no indications of collateral damage or civilian casualties at this time."

FRANK26… BANK STORIES

 

Nouri Al-Maliki’s new doctrine for power: Pragmatism over defiance?

On January 24, 2026, the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF), currently the largest bloc in Iraq’s parliament, named former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki as its nominee for the country’s next premier, reopening one of Iraq’s most consequential political debates. The response was immediate. Debate intensified in Baghdad, regional capitals recalculated their positions, and Washington issued warnings.

Iraq once again stands at a familiar crossroads, this time under heavier internal strain and sharper external scrutiny. The question is not simply whether Al-Maliki is returning, but whether he returns unchanged or as a political figure reshaped by conflict, experience, and years outside executive office.

Pragmatism over Pride

Sovereignty once defined Al-Maliki’s political vocabulary. During his two terms between 2006 and 2014, he projected a sharp, defiant posture, frequently framing his leadership as resistance to foreign interference, particularly from the United States. His second term (2010–2014) in particular unfolded amid visible tension with Washington, reinforcing the image of a leader intent on consolidating national authority despite mounting political costs.

The environment in 2026 differs markedly. US President Donald Trump has openly warned against Al-Maliki’s return, signaling the possibility of severe measures. Speaking to Shafaq News, political analyst Ahmed Youssef referred to Washington’s explicit objection, noting that Trump described Al-Maliki’s reappointment as a path that could return Iraq to “poverty and comprehensive chaos,” invoking the period when ISIS seized major provinces before Iraq declared victory in 2017.

The implications extend beyond rhetoric as Iraq’s economy remains structurally vulnerable. Its banking channels, oil revenue mechanisms, and access to international financial systems remain deeply intertwined with global institutions. Any US sanctions or reduction in support would carry tangible domestic consequences, affecting currency stability, military cooperation, and reconstruction financing. “A confrontation with Washington today would not be confined to speeches; it would seep into Iraqi daily life,” Youssef warned.

Inside Iraq, reactions have been defensive. Aref Al-Hammami, a senior figure in the State of Law Coalition (SLC) headed by Al-Maliki, described any retreat from the candidacy under foreign pressure as “a political setback affecting all components of the country,” underscoring that Iraq is a sovereign state.

 The message was direct: external objections should not determine internal political decisions.

The caution, however, is more visible across the broader political arena.

 Abdulrahman Al-Jazaeri, head of the political bureau of the Tribal Movement in Iraq, pointed to a subtle but important shift within the CF. The next prime minister, he argued, should enjoy “regional acceptability,” citing reservations expressed by major figures within the Framework, including the Al-Hikma Movement led by Ammar Al-Hakim and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq headed by Qais Al-Khazali.


Al-Maliki’s own rhetoric reflects that recalibration. Faced with Trump’s warnings, he has avoided confrontation. Rather than revive the language of resistance, he has focused on “stability,” “investment,” “job opportunities,” and “completing reconstruction.” The shift appears calculated —an effort, as Ahmed Youssef assessed, to reassure external actors while navigating domestic contestation.

‘’Al-Maliki still represents a period rejected by segments of both the Iraqi public and parts of the international community,’’ he observed, noting that even though the language may be softer, the structural constraints remain.

Arming the State

If sovereignty defines one axis of scrutiny, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) —inseparable from Al-Maliki’s political legacy— define another. 

Formed in 2014 following a fatwa by top Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani amid an unprecedented security collapse, the PMF played a decisive role in confronting ISIS. Its membership stands at around 200,000, comprising about 70 factions from various religious and ethnic backgrounds, though it remains predominantly Shiite.


 The Iraqi parliament later formalized these factions under the PMF Law, designating the force as a supporting body alongside the Iraqi Armed Forces, both under the authority of the prime minister as commander-in-chief.

Al-Maliki emerged as one of the PMF’s most prominent political defenders, and his previous tenure became closely associated with its rise as an influential actor within Iraq’s security architecture. After the 2025 parliamentary elections, however, his language shifted. He now refers to “restricting arms to the state” and ensuring “one army comprising all components under the command of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.” At the same time, he rejected reports of dissolving the PMF, maintaining that any development should preserve its strength and reinforce its combat readiness rather than weaken it.

Read more: Nouri Al-Maliki’s return rekindles Iraq’s divisions as Iran and the US pull apart

Speaking to Shafaq News, Aref Al-Hammami portrayed this framing as national and reassuring, arguing that it does not target any specific group. Discussions over weapons held by factions, he added, fall within an “internal, fraternal relationship” that can be addressed domestically.

Meanwhile, political observer Abu Mithaq Al-Massari interpreted the adjustment not as a reversal but as an elevation of state-centered rhetoric suited to a sensitive political phase. Al-Maliki has not distanced himself from the PMF; he has repositioned the discussion.

For international partners, domestic rivals, and an Iraqi public fatigued by overlapping chains of command, the weapons file remains central. Any incoming government will be assessed by its ability to assert coherent security authority. The shift, therefore, is not a retreat from the PMF but an effort to embed it more clearly within the framework of centralized state power.

Realpolitik on Rails

Syria presents another test of tone and approach. In earlier years, Al-Maliki’s position toward Ahmad Al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammad Al-Julani when he led Haya’at Tharir Al-Sham, was unequivocal. He labeled him a terrorist, reflecting Iraqi anxieties over Al-Sharaa's previous role within ISIS in Iraq, the cross-border militancy, and the spillover of Syria’s conflict into Iraqi territory.

That stance aligned with a broader security-first posture shaped by the aftermath of 2011 and the rise of armed groups operating across porous borders.

Following the 2025 elections, the tone shifted. Al-Maliki signaled openness toward engagement with regional actors, including Syria. 


The adjustment does not abandon security concerns. Rather, it reflects recalculation shaped by geography and necessity. The Iraqi–Syrian border remains a zone of vulnerability, where infiltration risks, energy corridors, oil routes, and humanitarian transit converge.


Iraqi officials indicated that Baghdad seeks strategic stability that preserves internal sovereignty while enabling structured dialogue with Damascus based on national interests. The regional environment has also evolved. Some Arab states, particularly Gulf countries, have recalibrated their posture toward Syria, while US priorities shifted during the Trump phase. At home, pressure favors border stabilization over rhetorical confrontation, steering policy from individual labeling toward state-to-state management.

Read more: Nouri Al-Maliki: A name that still divides and tests the politics of memory

Quiet Tehran Ties

Al-Maliki has long been viewed as maintaining close ties with Tehran, particularly during the ISIS occupation of large parts of Iraq, when security coordination intensified.

Iranian officials have signaled support for any candidate agreed upon within the CF without publicly endorsing a specific name, effectively offering political cover without overt sponsorship. As Al-Maliki’s recent public messages concentrate more on institutional stability and state authority —and place less visible emphasis on external alliances— the recalibration appears deliberate.

Openly foregrounding ties with Tehran risks amplifying domestic polarization and complicating relations with Sunni and Kurdish factions, as well as Washington. Strategically, the approach suggests balance rather than rupture. The relationship with Iran remains intact, but it is conveyed with greater discretion.

A Return Shaped by Experience

Al-Maliki is not an emerging political figure testing authority. He governed for eight years and left office during one of the most turbulent chapters in Iraq’s modern history. The collapse of provinces, the war against ISIS, and years of internal polarization defined his tenure.

He now seeks not to consolidate authority for the first time, but to restore political legitimacy —a distinction that carries weight. In his second term, he spoke from the position of incumbent authority. Today, he operates as a candidate navigating objections: domestic fragmentation, Shiite hesitation, American warnings, and speculation about sanctions.

The experience of power and the cost of crisis appear to have reshaped his tone. Confrontation carries consequences. Institutional paralysis carries consequences, and economic rupture definitely carries consequences.

His recent discourse reflects a political actor more attentive to balance than confrontation. This is not a declared ideological revision, but a recalibrated method. Whether that recalibration signals a deeper transformation or merely strategic repositioning remains the defining question.

What is clear is that 2026 is not 2012. Al-Maliki’s path back to power runs not through the vocabulary of his past, but through careful management of Iraq’s present.

Read more: Al-Maliki sounds different this time — the worldis not convinced yet

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.