Shafaq News / On Saturday, the Syrian Observory for Human Rights reported that Iran-backed groups launched missile strikes on the largest US base in Al-Omar oil field in Syria, “targeting it three times within an hour.”
The Observory added, “Ground defences attempted to intercept the attacks unsuccessfully, with no information about human casualties.”
Notably, this targeting comes after an attack on the Koniko gas field base a few hours ago, where Iran-affiliated armed groups attacked the base twice;first with a drone and then with a barrage of missiles.
On Friday, armed factions in Iraq announced the resumption of their military operations against US bases. In a statement issued by the armed factions, aka Islamic Resistance in Iraq, they granted the "occupying forces an opportunity to exit sacred lands as a lifeline," recalling the previous resistance that compelled the withdrawal of occupying forces in 2011.
The statement emphasized that "recent events exposed the fact that the occupying enemy does not leave due to weariness or deceit, understanding only the language of arms.
This was evident in their recent attacks on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters in Al-Qaim, Akashat, and other locations." The factions condemned the assassination of the prominent leader Abu Bakr Al-Saadi in Baghdad, considering it "a breach of all rules of engagement."
The factions highlighted their "profound knowledge of the cunning nature of their enemy and the battlefields of confrontation." They reaffirmed their commitment "to their responsibilities toward their people, country, and nation under any circumstances."
The factions called on their brethren in jihad to "join the ranks of the resistance actively," urging them to "prepare for effective participation in expelling the occupation during this historical stage for Iraq and the region."
Last Wednesday, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) claimed responsibility for the attack targeting Kata'ib Hezbollah leader Abu Baqir al-Saadi in al-Mashtal area east of the capital Baghdad, stating that he was responsible for attacks targeting its forces in the region.
CENTCOM stated, "At 9:30 p.m. on Feb. 7, CENTCOM forces conducted a one-sided strike in Iraq in response to attacks on US service members, resulting in the death of the Kata'ib Hezbollah commander responsible for direct planning and participation in attacks on US forces in the region. There are no indications of collateral damage or civilian casualties at this time."
“Determining the Timing” – Wolvie & Adam Stephens on Donnie’s Show
On February 12, 2026, Wolvie and Adam Stephens joined Donnie’s show to discuss what they describe as increasing global movement toward a potential RV (Revaluation). According to notes shared from the broadcast, multiple regions — including Asia, Europe, and South America — are reportedly seeing activity tied to pending instructions.
Let’s break down the key claims, timelines, and institutional references discussed.
Instructions vs. Notifications
Adam Stephens stated that, based on contacts in Asia and Europe, “instructions” could arrive Thursday. He clarified:
Instructions are not notifications.
Instructions set the path toward notifications.
Notifications could follow afterward.
This distinction is important in RV discussions, where terminology often causes confusion. “Instructions” typically refer to backend coordination, while “notifications” are said to alert participants that exchanges or redemptions may begin.
February 17 Target Date?
Wolvie suggested Tuesday, February 17, as a possible RV date, citing:
A reported sign-off requirement by Donald Trump
Alleged coordination with the United States Department of the Treasury
Activity across South America, particularly Brazil and Colombia
He also mentioned that redemptions reportedly cannot begin before Tuesday due to required authorization steps.
It was further noted that Monday is Presidents’ Day in the United States — a federal holiday that creates a three-day weekend, which some speculate could influence timing.
The IMF’s Role in the Announcement
According to commentary shared by one of Donnie’s admins, any RV would require sign-off not only from U.S. leadership and the military but also from the International Monetary Fund.
The claim suggests that:
The IMF would be the entity to formally announce the RV.
International coordination would be required before public release.
It’s important to clarify that historically, sovereign currency revaluations are announced by the country’s central bank, sometimes in coordination with international institutions — but the IMF does not typically “approve” or trigger RVs in the manner described in online discussions.
Black Cards & Bond Holder Activity
Another topic discussed was the distribution of so-called “Black Cards” to private bond holders, allegedly:
Pre-loaded with funds
Accessible via password
Connected to digital wallet systems
While these claims circulate frequently in RV-related communities, there is no official public documentation from recognized financial institutions confirming such a program.
Mentions of movement in Zurich and Europe were also noted, suggesting positive sentiment among certain financial circles.
Digital Wallet Access
Wolvie expressed hope that digital wallets would be created to allow immediate access to redeemed funds.
Globally, digital financial infrastructure is expanding rapidly, but no confirmed public program currently ties wallet activation to a currency revaluation event.
Featured Snippet: What Is Being Claimed About the RV Timing?
When could notifications happen? Speculation suggests Monday or after, with February 17 mentioned as a potential RV date.
Who must approve the RV? Claims reference U.S. leadership, the Treasury, military coordination, and the IMF.
Are Black Cards confirmed? There is no official documentation publicly verifying a Black Card redemption system.
The discussion also referenced Chinese New Year occurring on February 17, highlighting symbolic “new beginnings.”
However, it is important to note that the official Chinese zodiac Year of the Horse most recently occurred in 2014, with the next in 2026 being the Year of the Fire Horse according to traditional cycles tied to the China lunar calendar.
Symbolism aside, there is no verified monetary policy link between Chinese New Year and sovereign currency revaluations in Iraq or elsewhere.
Reality Check: How Currency Revaluations Actually Occur
Historically, currency revaluations:
Are announced by the country’s central bank
Are reflected immediately in international forex systems
Do not require public “appointments” or special notification tiers
Do not involve secret card distribution programs
For example, any official change in the value of the Iraqi dinar would be declared by the Central Bank of Iraq and reflected across global banking networks.
Q&A Section
Q1: Can an RV happen over a holiday weekend?
Technically, central banks can adjust currency values at any time, but implementation depends on international forex market integration.
Q2: Does the IMF announce sovereign revaluations?
No. A country’s central bank typically announces changes to its currency policy.
Q3: Are “Tier 4b” notifications an official financial term?
No. Tier classifications are community-created terms and are not recognized in formal banking systems.
Q4: Is February 17 confirmed as an RV date?
No official confirmation exists from recognized financial authorities.
Final Thoughts
The February 12 discussion reflects ongoing optimism within certain currency communities, with attention focused on:
February 17
Holiday timing
IMF involvement
South American movement
Black Card distribution claims
However, as of now, there are no official confirmations from recognized central banks, treasury departments, or international financial institutions supporting these specific claims.
As always:
Stay informed. Verify through official sources. Distinguish between community speculation and documented policy action.
“Determining the Timing” – Wolvie and Adam Stephens on Donnie’s Show Highlights
Wolvie and Adam Stephens on Donnie’s show, February 12, 2026
Notes by Ginger D*****
Adam S******* is saying, based on what he is hearing from contacts in Asia and Europe, that the instructions they are awaiting will come today, Thursday. Instructions are not notifications but set the path to notifications.
Wolvie says there is a lot of movement in South America and Brazil. He says it MAY happen this week. A redemption center person who works for the US Treasury wrote that redemptions cannot commence before next Tuesday, because President Trump has to sign off on the RV.
Wolvie says we’re looking at Tuesday, the 17th, for the RV. The Black Cards are being given out to private sector bond holders and they are loaded. These amounts will be posted to individual bond holders and they will be given a password by email to access the funds. A lot of movement in Colombia and Brazil. “Doors are opening.” Wolvie is hoping digital wallets will be created, so people can access their funds immediately.
Notifications can come out any time. Wolvie said it might be Monday.
Adam says there are a lot of happy faces in Zurich/Europe. He points out that Monday is Presidents’ Day.
Wolvie is not tying notifications to any special day or waiting for any event in particular.
He says the White Hats are determining the timing.
Donnie points out that this is a three-day weekend and he thinks that helps the timing, perhaps for something to happen on Tuesday/Wednesday.He says government data has been suppressed and the inflation rate, when it comes out, will be nothing like people expect. Donnie has also heard about the Black Cards being sent out.
Wolvie’s opinion is that there will be news for Tier 4b on Monday, not before then.
Lady Scott, one of Donnie’s Admins, shared that in addition to Trump, the Military and the IMF have to sign off on the RV. “The IMF will be the ones to announce it.”
=====
PS – IMHO –Chinese Elders are still in charge
FYI CHINESE NEW YEAR = TUES./2.17 year of the FIRE HORSE – 1 – New Beginnings
On January 24, 2026, the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF), currently the largest bloc in Iraq’s parliament, named former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki as its nominee for the country’s next premier, reopening one of Iraq’s most consequential political debates. The response was immediate. Debate intensified in Baghdad, regional capitals recalculated their positions, and Washington issued warnings.
Iraq once again stands at a familiar crossroads, this time under heavier internal strain and sharper external scrutiny. The question is not simply whether Al-Maliki is returning, but whether he returns unchanged or as a political figure reshaped by conflict, experience, and years outside executive office.
Pragmatism over Pride
Sovereignty once defined Al-Maliki’s political vocabulary. During his two terms between 2006 and 2014, he projected a sharp, defiant posture, frequently framing his leadership as resistance to foreign interference, particularly from the United States. His second term (2010–2014) in particular unfolded amid visible tension with Washington, reinforcing the image of a leader intent on consolidating national authority despite mounting political costs.
The environment in 2026 differs markedly. US President Donald Trump has openly warned against Al-Maliki’s return, signaling the possibility of severe measures. Speaking to Shafaq News, political analyst Ahmed Youssef referred to Washington’s explicit objection, noting that Trump described Al-Maliki’s reappointment as a path that could return Iraq to “poverty and comprehensive chaos,” invoking the period when ISIS seized major provinces before Iraq declared victory in 2017.
The implications extend beyond rhetoric as Iraq’s economy remains structurally vulnerable. Its banking channels, oil revenue mechanisms, and access to international financial systems remain deeply intertwined with global institutions. Any US sanctions or reduction in support would carry tangible domestic consequences, affecting currency stability, military cooperation, and reconstruction financing. “A confrontation with Washington today would not be confined to speeches; it would seep into Iraqi daily life,” Youssef warned.
Inside Iraq, reactions have been defensive. Aref Al-Hammami, a senior figure in the State of Law Coalition (SLC) headed by Al-Maliki, described any retreat from the candidacy under foreign pressure as “a political setback affecting all components of the country,” underscoring that Iraq is a sovereign state.
The message was direct: external objections should not determine internal political decisions.
The caution, however, is more visible across the broader political arena.
Abdulrahman Al-Jazaeri, head of the political bureau of the Tribal Movement in Iraq, pointed to a subtle but important shift within the CF. The next prime minister, he argued, should enjoy “regional acceptability,” citing reservations expressed by major figures within the Framework, including the Al-Hikma Movement led by Ammar Al-Hakim and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq headed by Qais Al-Khazali.
Al-Maliki’s own rhetoric reflects that recalibration. Faced with Trump’s warnings, he has avoided confrontation. Rather than revive the language of resistance, he has focused on “stability,” “investment,” “job opportunities,” and “completing reconstruction.” The shift appears calculated —an effort, as Ahmed Youssef assessed, to reassure external actors while navigating domestic contestation.
‘’Al-Maliki still represents a period rejected by segments of both the Iraqi public and parts of the international community,’’ he observed, noting that even though the language may be softer, the structural constraints remain.
Arming the State
If sovereignty defines one axis of scrutiny, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) —inseparable from Al-Maliki’s political legacy— define another.
Formed in 2014 following a fatwa by top Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani amid an unprecedented security collapse, the PMF played a decisive role in confronting ISIS. Its membership stands at around 200,000, comprising about 70 factions from various religious and ethnic backgrounds, though it remains predominantly Shiite.
The Iraqi parliament later formalized these factions under the PMF Law, designating the force as a supporting body alongside the Iraqi Armed Forces, both under the authority of the prime minister as commander-in-chief.
Al-Maliki emerged as one of the PMF’s most prominent political defenders, and his previous tenure became closely associated with its rise as an influential actor within Iraq’s security architecture. After the 2025 parliamentary elections, however, his language shifted. He now refers to “restricting arms to the state” and ensuring “one army comprising all components under the command of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.” At the same time, he rejected reports of dissolving the PMF, maintaining that any development should preserve its strength and reinforce its combat readiness rather than weaken it.
Speaking to Shafaq News, Aref Al-Hammami portrayed this framing as national and reassuring, arguing that it does not target any specific group. Discussions over weapons held by factions, he added, fall within an “internal, fraternal relationship” that can be addressed domestically.
Meanwhile, political observer Abu Mithaq Al-Massari interpreted the adjustment not as a reversal but as an elevation of state-centered rhetoric suited to a sensitive political phase. Al-Maliki has not distanced himself from the PMF; he has repositioned the discussion.
For international partners, domestic rivals, and an Iraqi public fatigued by overlapping chains of command, the weapons file remains central. Any incoming government will be assessed by its ability to assert coherent security authority. The shift, therefore, is not a retreat from the PMF but an effort to embed it more clearly within the framework of centralized state power.
Realpolitik on Rails
Syria presents another test of tone and approach. In earlier years, Al-Maliki’s position toward Ahmad Al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammad Al-Julani when he led Haya’at Tharir Al-Sham, was unequivocal. He labeled him a terrorist, reflecting Iraqi anxieties over Al-Sharaa's previous role within ISIS in Iraq, the cross-border militancy, and the spillover of Syria’s conflict into Iraqi territory.
That stance aligned with a broader security-first posture shaped by the aftermath of 2011 and the rise of armed groups operating across porous borders.
Following the 2025 elections, the tone shifted. Al-Maliki signaled openness toward engagement with regional actors, including Syria.
The adjustment does not abandon security concerns. Rather, it reflects recalculation shaped by geography and necessity. The Iraqi–Syrian border remains a zone of vulnerability, where infiltration risks, energy corridors, oil routes, and humanitarian transit converge.
Iraqi officials indicated that Baghdad seeks strategic stability that preserves internal sovereignty while enabling structured dialogue with Damascus based on national interests. The regional environment has also evolved. Some Arab states, particularly Gulf countries, have recalibrated their posture toward Syria, while US priorities shifted during the Trump phase. At home, pressure favors border stabilization over rhetorical confrontation, steering policy from individual labeling toward state-to-state management.
Al-Maliki has long been viewed as maintaining close ties with Tehran, particularly during the ISIS occupation of large parts of Iraq, when security coordination intensified.
Iranian officials have signaled support for any candidate agreed upon within the CF without publicly endorsing a specific name, effectively offering political cover without overt sponsorship. As Al-Maliki’s recent public messages concentrate more on institutional stability and state authority —and place less visible emphasis on external alliances— the recalibration appears deliberate.
Openly foregrounding ties with Tehran risks amplifying domestic polarization and complicating relations with Sunni and Kurdish factions, as well as Washington. Strategically, the approach suggests balance rather than rupture. The relationship with Iran remains intact, but it is conveyed with greater discretion.
A Return Shaped by Experience
Al-Maliki is not an emerging political figure testing authority. He governed for eight years and left office during one of the most turbulent chapters in Iraq’s modern history. The collapse of provinces, the war against ISIS, and years of internal polarization defined his tenure.
He now seeks not to consolidate authority for the first time, but to restore political legitimacy —a distinction that carries weight. In his second term, he spoke from the position of incumbent authority. Today, he operates as a candidate navigating objections: domestic fragmentation, Shiite hesitation, American warnings, and speculation about sanctions.
The experience of power and the cost of crisis appear to have reshaped his tone. Confrontation carries consequences. Institutional paralysis carries consequences, and economic rupture definitely carries consequences.
His recent discourse reflects a political actor more attentive to balance than confrontation. This is not a declared ideological revision, but a recalibrated method. Whether that recalibration signals a deeper transformation or merely strategic repositioning remains the defining question.
What is clear is that 2026 is not 2012. Al-Maliki’s path back to power runs not through the vocabulary of his past, but through careful management of Iraq’s present.
Sandy Ingram recently addressed growing concerns over Iraq’s political gridlock, pointing out that months after elections, Iraq still has no fully formed government. For many observers, this raises a serious question:
What is Iraq doing — and what does this mean for its economic future?
Let’s break it down strategically, economically, and realistically.
Three Months After Elections — Still No Government
Iraq has historically faced prolonged government formation negotiations following elections. Coalition politics, factional influence, and regional pressures often lead to extended stalemates.
As Sandy points out, when conditions are not aligned in Iraq’s favor, the country tends to:
Stall negotiations
Pause forward movement
Avoid committing to major structural changes
While frustrating for investors, this pattern is not new in Iraq’s political landscape.
Billions of Dollars at Stake
Iraq reportedly holds over $100 billion in reserves — funds critical to stabilizing the economy and supporting its currency.
The Central Bank of Iraq has repeatedly emphasized strong foreign currency reserves, which serve as a buffer against economic shocks.
Protecting these reserves requires:
Political stability
Controlled spending
International cooperation
Confidence from global markets
Without a seated government, long-term fiscal planning becomes more complicated.
The Development Road Project: A Strategic Game-Changer
One of the most ambitious initiatives underway is Iraq’s Development Road Project — a massive infrastructure plan designed to connect the Persian Gulf to Europe through Iraq via railways, highways, and logistics hubs.
This project aims to:
Transform Iraq into a global trade corridor
Compete with alternative regional trade routes
Diversify revenue beyond oil
Attract foreign direct investment
Major regional players such as Turkey and United Arab Emirates are closely watching infrastructure expansions across the Middle East.
For Iraq to fully capitalize on this opportunity, political clarity is essential.
The Multi-Billion Dollar Tourism Opportunity
Iraq also holds untapped tourism potential, including:
Religious tourism
Cultural heritage tourism
Archaeological sites
Regional travel markets
Cities like Najaf and Karbala already attract millions of religious visitors annually.
Stability, security, and diplomatic goodwill are crucial for expanding tourism into a multi-billion dollar industry.
Remaining in good standing with regional and global partners strengthens that opportunity.
External Pressure and Quiet Influence
Sandy suggests Iraq may be facing silent pressure or subtle threats behind the scenes. While specifics are not publicly confirmed, Iraq’s geopolitical position places it between major global and regional powers.
Iraq must balance relationships with:
Western nations
Gulf states
Regional neighbors
Eastern economic powers
Navigating these relationships while forming a government requires careful strategy.
Featured Snippet: Why Doesn’t Iraq Have a Government Yet?
Why does Iraq’s government formation take so long? Iraq’s coalition-based political system often results in extended negotiations between factions before a governing majority is formed.
Does political delay affect the dinar? Political uncertainty can slow economic reform and delay major policy decisions, which may impact currency confidence.
What is at stake for Iraq? Over $100 billion in reserves, large infrastructure projects, and a growing tourism sector depend on political stability.
Why Iraq “Stalls” During Uncertainty
Historically, Iraq slows forward momentum during political uncertainty to:
Prevent rushed decisions
Avoid irreversible commitments
Maintain internal balance
Protect financial reserves
While this can appear as dysfunction, it is often a defensive strategy.
However, prolonged delays can:
Reduce investor confidence
Slow infrastructure rollout
Delay foreign partnerships
Postpone monetary reforms
What This Means for Iraqi Dinar Watchers
Political stability is a key ingredient for:
Currency reform
Exchange rate policy adjustments
International banking integration
Large-scale investment flows
Without a formal government, sweeping economic reforms typically remain on hold.
This does not mean progress stops completely — but major announcements often require political consensus.
Q&A Section
Q1: Can Iraq function without a formed government?
Yes, but only at a limited administrative level. Major reforms and new legislation typically require a seated government.
Q2: Does political delay mean economic collapse?
No. Iraq still maintains oil revenue and foreign reserves. However, uncertainty can slow reform momentum.
Q3: Could the Development Road Project continue without a full government?
Preliminary work and planning can continue, but full-scale execution benefits from political stability and budget approvals.
Q4: Is Iraq aware of what’s at stake?
Iraq’s leadership understands the importance of reserves, international reputation, tourism potential, and infrastructure strategy.
Final Thoughts
Iraq’s political stall is not unusual — but the stakes are higher than ever.
With:
Over $100 billion in reserves
A strategic Development Road Project
Growing regional tourism potential
Increased global attention
The country stands at a pivotal crossroads.
Political formation may take time, but Iraq understands the value of what it has built — and what it risks losing.
For dinar watchers and global observers alike, patience and attention to official developments remain essential.
This morning I woke up, there was still no government...Iraq understands they have over $100 million [billion?] dollars to protect.
We believe Iraq understands the progression and the progress they have worked so hard for and the plans of the development road project and other major projects happening in the Middle East...Iraq understands there is a multi-billion dollar tourism industry with its name on it and the way to take advantage of this is to remain in good favor with all nations...We believe Iraqis understand. We also believe they are being pressured and quietly, silently, threatened. We believe Iraq understands what's at stake.
This morning we all wake up and we wonder what the hell is Iraq doing? I'm here to say to you, Iraq is doing what they always do when things are not right for Iraq. They stall. They shut down. They do not move forward. It has been three months since the election and there is still no government.
Iraq is preparing to export its oil via Türkiye, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia... Syria is on hold.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on Thursday plans for external oil connections with four countries: Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. It noted that work on the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline has been postponed due to the situation in Syria, as the ministry explained that the security situation in Syria prevents Iraq from taking actual steps to restore the pipeline.
The Undersecretary of the Ministry, Hisham Al-Alawi, said in a statement to the official agency, which was followed by the 964 network ,
that “work on the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline has been postponed due to the security situation in Syria, which prevents us from taking actual steps in this direction,” indicating that “Iraq has several alternatives for external oil connections, including through Turkey and Jordan to Egypt, in addition to Saudi Arabia.”
He added that “the Iraqi government has worked over the past years to rehabilitate the oil export pipeline through Turkey, and there are talks with Jordan and Egypt,” noting that “Iraq has adopted the project to link the oil fields through Haditha, and discussions were about implementing a project to complete this link through Jordan to Egypt, but work on that has not started.” link