Israeli officials have warned US counterparts that Iran’s ballistic missile program poses an existential threat, signaling that Tel Aviv could act independently if Tehran crosses a red line, the Jerusalem Post reported on Sunday.
Citing Israeli military sources, the newspaper noted that high-level exchanges with Washington have taken place in recent weeks, cautioning that Israel would strike key missile production sites, though it has not yet reached the threshold to take that step.
“We continue to monitor developments in Iran,” the sources said, asserting that Israel will not allow Iran to restore strategic weapons systems at a scale that threatens its existence. “This is a historic opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to Tehran’s missile infrastructure.”
Tel Aviv also raised concern that US President Donald Trump might pursue a limited-strike approach similar to recent US operations against Houthi targets in Yemen, which could leave critical Iranian capabilities intact.
The remarks came after the conclusion on Friday of US-Iran nuclear talks in Muscat, held under Omani sponsorship between a US delegation led by Envoy Steve Witkoff and an Iranian team headed by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The meetings marked the first round of negotiations since the US strikes in June on sites linked to Iran’s nuclear program during the 12-day war between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
Last week, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated that Washington wants the talks to also address Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, support for armed groups across the region, and its domestic governance. Tehran rejected that broader agenda, insisting the negotiations remain confined to the nuclear file, noting that it entered the talks “from a position of strength” to reach a fair and mutually acceptable understanding.
Tehran sees Nouri al‑Maliki’s possible comeback not just as an Iraqi political event, but as a central component of its strategy to maintain influence over Baghdad and Shia political networks.
Al‑Maliki’s long-standing relationships with Iran-aligned factions make him a reliable partner for Tehran in the context of regional competition.
Intra‑Shia Power Dynamics
Iraq’s Shia political bloc, known as the Coordination Framework, is far from unified:
Support for al‑Maliki: Many Iran-aligned parties back him
Opposition: Some Shia leaders resist his nomination, fearing:
This division highlights the complexity of internal Shia politics in Baghdad.
Regional Security & Proxy Leverage
Iran’s broader strategy in the Middle East shapes internal Iraqi politics:
Alignment with militias and diplomatic networks in Iraq
A Maliki-led government could tighten coordination among pro-Tehran factions
Strengthens Iran’s leverage in regional negotiations and confrontations with Washington
Tehran’s stakes are both local and regional.
Impact of U.S. Pressure
The U.S., under President Trump, has made its stance clear:
Threatened to withhold support if al‑Maliki returns
Argues that his leadership would:
Increase Iranian influence
Undermine Iraq’s stability
External pressure complicates negotiations and fuels divisions within the Shia bloc
This shows the delicate balance Iraq must maintain between Tehran and Washington.
Political Impasse & Potential Outcomes
The al‑Maliki nomination is emblematic of Iraq’s broader political stalemate:
Balancing Iranian strategic interests with American geopolitical objectives
Outcome will affect:
Baghdad’s government formation
Iraq’s diplomatic relationships with both the U.S. and Iran
Regional stability in the volatile Middle East
The fight over al‑Maliki is as much about internal politics as it is about international influence.
Featured Snippet: Why Does Iran Support al‑Maliki in Iraq?
Answer: Iran supports al‑Maliki because he is a trusted ally within Shia political networks, aligned with Tehran-backed factions, and his leadership could increase Iran’s influence in Baghdad and across regional negotiations.
Q&A: Key Questions on Iraq, Maliki & Iran
Q: Is al‑Maliki supported by all Shia parties?
A: No. While many Iran-aligned factions support him, significant Shia leaders oppose his nomination to avoid sectarian conflict and U.S. backlash.
Q: How does U.S. pressure affect Iraqi politics?
A: U.S. threats to withdraw support increase divisions within the Shia bloc and complicate government formation.
Q: Could a Maliki government strengthen Iran’s regional leverage?
A: Yes. A pro-Tehran government could coordinate militias and political networks, enhancing Iran’s influence in Iraq and the broader Middle East.
Q: What does this mean for Iraq’s stability?
A: The outcome will shape internal governance, international alliances, and the country’s overall stability in a volatile region.
Conclusion: A High-Stakes Geopolitical Balancing Act
Iran views al‑Maliki’s potential return as strategically vital
The Shia Coordination Framework is divided
U.S. pressure adds complexity and risk
Iraq is at a crossroads, balancing internal politics and external influences
The next weeks will determine not only Iraq’s leadership but also the broader dynamics of U.S.–Iran influence in the region.
🟦 Iran’s Influence Calculus: Tehran sees a potential return of Nouri al‑Maliki to Iraqi leadership as more than an internal political event — it’s central to Iran’s strategy to maintain influence in Baghdad and across Shia political networks in Iraq. Al‑Maliki has longstanding relationships with Iran‑aligned factions and is viewed by Tehran as a reliable partner amid regional competition.
🟦 Intra‑Shia Power Dynamics: Iraq’s Shia political bloc (the Coordination Framework) is not monolithic. While al‑Maliki has backing from many Iran‑aligned parties, there are significant divisions — some Shia leaders oppose his nomination due to fears it would deepen sectarian rifts and provoke international retaliation, including from the U.S.
🟦 Regional Security & Proxy Leverage: Iran’s broader regional posture — particularly its network of militias and diplomatic reach — shapes how Baghdad’s Shia factions position themselves. A Maliki government could tighten coordination among pro‑Tehran groups inside Iraq, potentially strengthening Tehran’s leverage in regional confrontations and power negotiations with Washington.
🟦 Impact of External Pressure: The U.S., under President Trump, has publicly threatened to withhold support if al‑Maliki returns, arguing he will foster deeper Iranian influence and hinder Iraq’s stability. This external pressure complicates internal negotiations and fuels divisions within the Shia bloc.
🟦 Political Impasse & Outcomes: The fight over al‑Maliki’s nomination is emblematic of Iraq’s broader political stalemate — balancing between Iranian strategic interests and American geopolitical aims. The outcome will influence not only Baghdad’s government formation but also how Iraq navigates relationships with both Washington and Tehran in a volatile Middle Eastern environment.
This report assesses the strategic implications for the Islamic Republic of Iran of a potential return of Nouri al-Maliki to the Iraqi premiership, situating this scenario within Iraqi Shia power structures and Iran’s regional security posture.
It evaluates how al-Maliki’s return would affect Iran’s political influence and risk management in Iraq amid intra-Shia competition, US pressure, and regional alignments.
Key Takeaways
Maliki strengthens Tehran-aligned factions and PMF leverage but increases sectarian tension, Sunni resentment, and regional narrative risk.
Al-Maliki’s elite-institutional approach contrasts with Sadr’s mass-mobilisation strategy, creating mutually exclusive pathways for Shia dominance and Iranian alignment.
Najaf’s tacit influence, US economic leverage, and Kurdish cross-border dynamics limit Tehran’s freedom to fully control outcomes, necessitating calibrated, risk-aware engagement.
Following the November 2025 elections and the withdrawal of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the CoordinationFramework (Iraq’s main Shia parliamentary alliance) reaffirmedsupport for Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Maliki served as prime minister from 2006 to 2014, a period marked by sectarian polarisation, institutional corruption, and security failures.
A senior leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, al-Maliki is closely aligned with Iran-backed factions. Sunni political exclusion characterised his tenure under de-Baathification, demographic engineering in Baghdad, arrests of moderate Sunni leaders, and extensive corruption within state and security institutions. Despite his record, he remains influential within Shia politics, supported by personal networks and loyal armed actors.
The Trump administration previously signalled it would withdraw US support if al-Maliki returned to office, citing concerns over Iran-linked militias and Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) autonomy. US leverage over Iraq remains significant, particularly through control mechanisms linked to Iraqi oil revenues held in US-based financial arrangements.
Iran’s Strategic Assessment of Iraqi Shia Leadership Options
Al-Maliki is a system-internal actor, strongest in periods of institutional gridlock and elite bargaining. His power base is institutional and elite-driven, operating through parties (State of Law), Parliament, courts, and constitutional mechanisms. He relies on state structures rather than mass mobilisation.
Muqtada al-Sadr represents a rival Shia power centre and is system-disruptive. His strength derives from mass mobilisation, street pressure, and religious lineage as the son of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. He leverages institutions tactically rather than viewing them as the primary locus of power.
Al-Maliki treats the state as the main instrument of authority. As prime minister, he centralised power within the Prime Minister’s Office and security institutions, favouring executive dominance. Sadr maintains an ambivalent relationship with the state, alternating between participation, withdrawal, and direct challenge. For Sadr, the state is one arena among several sources of legitimacy.
Al-Maliki maintains embedded ties to Iran-aligned armed groups within the PMF, exercising indirect but structural influence. Still, he does not command it: there are PMF factions loyal to institutions (e.g. Badr) and PMF factions loyal to their own command structures (e.g. Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq). Sadr’s armed capacity, centred on Saraya al-Salam, is more autonomous but comparatively limited and less regionally active.
Strategically, al-Maliki is widely regarded as aligned with Iran. Tehran supported him during his premiership and after 2014, and his interests converge with Iran-aligned Shia factions in preserving the post-2003 order. This alignment is consistent and structural. Sadr’s relationship with Iran is fluctuating: he accepts Iranian mediation but resists overt dominance and frames himself as an Iraqi nationalist. He is neither anti-Iran nor reliably pro-Iran.
Electorally, al-Maliki’s legitimacy is coalition-based and procedural; he remains relevant through blocking power and post-election bargaining. Sadr has repeatedly led the largest parliamentary blocs but willingly abandons institutional gains if leverage is insufficient, prioritising pressure over formal representation.
Al-Maliki supports collective Shia rule through elite consensus within the Coordination Framework, favouring power-sharing and system preservation. Sadr advocates a majority-government model aimed at marginalising rival Shia elites and monopolising representation. These models are mutually exclusive: negotiated, Iran-aligned continuity versus populist, nationalist-leaning disruption.
Neither actor has eliminated the other because each thrives under different political conditions: al-Maliki benefits from institutional paralysis, Sadr from institutional delegitimisation.
Geopolitical Scenario
US President Donald Trump explicitly linked opposition to al-Maliki to concerns over Iranian influence in Baghdad. However, Washington does not currently favour Sadr either, as the Sadrist movement boycotted recent elections and withdrew from institutional politics.
Al-Sudani attempted to balance US and Iranian interests rather than align decisively with Tehran. His Reconstruction and Development Coalition prioritised pragmatic governance over militia-linked activism. Within Iran-aligned structures, his second term was blocked partly due to fears he might emerge as an autonomous power centre.
Overall, US strategy resists Iranian influence but lacks a reliable Shia interlocutor: Sadr is outside institutions, while al-Sudani was not aligned with US objectives. Iran’s core interest remains sustaining influence through allied parties and PMF networks while avoiding intra-Shia fragmentation. Tehran therefore calibrates support toward actors acceptable to broad Shia constituencies.
Al-Maliki’s profile, ties to Iran-aligned factions, and nomination through the Coordination Framework suggest Tehran would benefit from his return. US pressure against him reinforces this assessment. Some unconfirmed sources report that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khameneiencouraged al-Maliki’s nomination, not as a directive but as a political signal that Tehran views him as capable of managing regional turbulence.
Iran considers Iraq central to its regional security architecture and the maintenance of a Shia-aligned corridor. Supporting figures like al-Maliki aligns with this objective, but this preference is instrumental, not ideal: the leader is an asset but also a risk amplifier. In fact, Maliki is polarising even within Shia ranks, he is a mobilising figure for Sunni resentment and provides the US and Gulf states with a clear narrative hook. For Tehran, Maliki is useful in the short term, but costly in terms of Iraqi legitimacy, the long-term stability of Shia rule, and regional optics.
Al-Maliki has also publicly emphasised Iraqi sovereignty and resistance to foreign “projects,” including those of Iran, indicating an effort to balance national legitimacy with external partnerships.
The Coordination Framework’s support for al-Maliki reflects calculations about parliamentary weight and internal stability, not solely Iranian influence. Al-Maliki frames his leadership claim as constitutionally grounded, arguing that internal alliances outweigh foreign vetoes.
Any Iranian calculus regarding Iraq must also account for the position of the Najaf marjaʿiyya(the supreme religious authority for Twelver Shia Muslims).While Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistanimaintains strategic silence, Najaf has historically resisted excessive centralisation of power and remains wary of personalised rule associated with figures such as al-Maliki.
Tehran is therefore constrained from overtly backing any prime minister who lacks Najaf’s tacit tolerance, as clerical disapproval—even implicit—can undermine Shia legitimacy and limit the durability of Iran-aligned political arrangements.
Kurdish opposition activity in western Iran, partly involving US-trained elements, could generate cross-border security dilemmas. Security agreements constrain Iraqi Kurdish authorities with Iran, creating a tension between regional autonomy and Baghdad’s priorities under al-Maliki. Iran may pressure Baghdad for stricter enforcement against Kurdish groups, while the US may view Kurdistan as a stabilising buffer, producing triangular strategic pressures.
Conclusion
Al-Maliki’s return could reignite sectarian tensions, particularly between Shia and Sunni communities. His governance style emphasises Shia consolidation and loyalty-based patronage, weakening institutional independence and national cohesion.
Under al-Maliki, Iran-aligned PMF militias would likely retain autonomy from US-backed integration efforts, preserving Iran’s leverage in Iraqi security and politics. For Iran, the PMF serve as both a hedge and a strategic safeguard against any Iraqi prime minister who becomes excessively autonomous, politically unstable, or misaligned with Iranian interests — even if initially regarded as a friendly actor.
Conversely, US concerns over Iranian regional influence are likely to clash with Iraqi political dynamics under al-Maliki. Washington may respond through economic leverage or by exploiting sectarian and institutional fractures if Baghdad becomes an increasingly strategic buffer.
Finally, cross-border activity by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and related tensions in northern Iraq could complicate Iran-Iraq coordination, requiring careful management between Baghdad and Tehran. In this context,
Given the ongoing terrorist threat in Iraq, the exacerbation of sectarian violence because of internal political dynamics could enable groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda to exploit the situation, amplifying their propaganda and escalating violent assaults to further destabilise the nation.
High-level banking insiders confirm that Tier 4B ISO 20022 notifications are being prepared for release within hours.
This marks the full-scale transition to the gold-backed financial system, now described as irreversible. Market reactions are immediate, historic, and unprecedented.
Global Markets in Panic Mode
The move to the new system is causing a shockwave through global financial markets:
Historic transactions confirmed in Hong Kong, London, and Dubai
Multiple major banks reporting liquidity shortages
IMF insiders holding urgent, behind-closed-doors meetings
“The end of the central banking cartel is unfolding before our eyes!”
This is the largest coordinated monetary event seen in modern financial history.
Live Currency Updates
According to Judy and insiders on European trading platforms:
Currency
Live Rate
Notes
IQD (Iraqi Dinar)
$8.73
Confirmed LIVE; Contract Rate only at Redemption Centers
VND (Vietnamese Dong)
$5.12
Holding; expected to surge post-announcement
ZIM & Other Currencies
Final adjustments in process
Redemption only at official RCs
Key Point:
Judy emphasizes that Redemption Centers are essential for maximum returns. Banks will offer lower rates and cannot provide contract rates for the IQD or Zim.
Redemption Centers vs Banks: Why It Matters
Bruce, Frank26, and Judy all align on one principle:
Banks: Standard exchange rates, lower yields, limited capacity
Redemption Centers (RCs): Access to contract rates, priority for large transactions, structured for security and maximum efficiency
“You can only redeem Zim at a RC, the Dinar Contract Rate can only be given at a RC. Banks will offer you lower exchange rates than what you can obtain at a RC.”
– Judy
This is especially critical for high-volume holders of IQD, ZIM, and other emerging currencies.
Featured Snippet: What Are Tier 4B Final Triggers?
Answer: Tier 4B final triggers refer to the last notifications and system activations that enable the full-scale transition from the fiat-based banking system to a gold-backed financial system under ISO 20022 standards. This includes updated global currency rates and operational readiness at redemption centers.
Q&A: Your Top Questions Answered
Q: When will the final notifications be released?
A: Banking insiders confirm within hours, meaning very soon.
Q: Will banks provide the best rates?
A: No. Only official Redemption Centers offer contract rates for currencies like IQD and ZIM.
Q: What happens to global markets?
A: Markets are experiencing panic mode as liquidity is redirected into the new system, affecting multiple major banks.
Q: Is this the start of the gold-backed system?
A: Yes. Tier 4B activations signal the irreversible transition to a gold-backed financial system.
Q: Are the IQD and VND rates confirmed?
A: Yes. IQD confirmed at $8.73 and VND holding at $5.12, with further surges expected.
Implications for Investors and Currency Holders
Immediate opportunity for high-value currency exchanges
Potential historic gains for IQD, VND, ZIM, and other eligible currencies
Redemption Centers offer highest security and value
Timing is critical — the activation window is live
Frank26, Bruce, and Judy have all emphasized preparation and vigilance at this critical stage.
Final Thoughts: Prepare, Verify, and Act Strategically
Stay informed through credible channels
Confirm rates and RC access before moving currencies
Avoid banks for IQD/ZIM exchanges to maximize returns
Monitor market signals closely — the system is live and irreversible
This is a pivotal moment for currency holders and global financial systems alike.
CONFIRMATIONS JUST IN: FINAL TRIGGERS ACTIVATED!…Tier4b ISO 20022
High-level banking insiders report that [TIER 4B] notifications are already being prepared for release within HOURS.
The system is moving at an unprecedented speed, with historic transactions now confirmed in Hong Kong, London, and Dubai.
This is the moment we’ve all been waiting for, the full-scale transition to the gold-backed financial system is now irreversible.
GLOBAL MARKETS IN PANIC MODE! The old fiat system is collapsing in real time. Multiple major banks are seeing liquidity shortages as large transfers are being redirected into the new system. Sources from inside the IMF confirm urgent, behind-closed-doors meetings, they know their control is slipping.
The end of the central banking c***l is unfolding before our eyes!
BANK SCREENS LIGHT UP WITH FINAL RATES!
IQD: $8.73 – Confirmed LIVE on European trading platforms! VND: $5.12 – Holding but expected to surge post-announcement. ZIM & other currencies: final adjustments in process
Judy Note: It is advised to exchange/redeem your foreign currency at an official Redemption Center rather than a bank. You can only redeem Zim at a RC, the Dinar Contract Rate can only be given at a RC and banks will offer you lower exchange rates than what you can obtain at a RC. Redemption Centers were set to be open worldwide.
Iraqi traders on Sunday rejected the newly raised customs duties, warning that the measures could disrupt trade and drive up prices.
In a statement, the Iraqi Association of Traders and Importers noted that the imposed tariffs undermine public interest, slow commercial activity, and disrupt the broader economic cycle, cautioning against their potential social repercussions.
Opposing any customs duties above 5%, except for locally produced items that meet domestic demand, the Association criticized the valuation system under the ASYCUDA customs platform, describing it as unfair.
“We as traders oppose the requirement to pay tax deposits in advance and the mandatory use of quality certification marks,” the statement added, urging Iraqi authorities to delay the implementation of Decision No. 957 for six months. It also called on officials to release goods held at ports, close corruption channels, and ensure regulations are applied consistently across all border points.
Earlier today, protests and market shutdowns began in Baghdad and spread to several central and southern provinces, as traders challenged new tariffs that raised import costs, disrupted supply chains, and pushed up consumer prices. The increases were introduced under Cabinet Decision No. 957 of 2025, part of government efforts to boost non-oil revenues.
Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court has scheduled February 11 to rule on a legal challenge to the tariff hike, lawmaker Mohammed Al-Khafaji noted in a video recorded outside the court building.
