Executive Summary
This report assesses the strategic implications for the Islamic Republic of Iran of a potential return of Nouri al-Maliki to the Iraqi premiership, situating this scenario within Iraqi Shia power structures and Iran’s regional security posture.
It evaluates how al-Maliki’s return would affect Iran’s political influence and risk management in Iraq amid intra-Shia competition, US pressure, and regional alignments.
Key Takeaways
- Maliki strengthens Tehran-aligned factions and PMF leverage but increases sectarian tension, Sunni resentment, and regional narrative risk.
- Al-Maliki’s elite-institutional approach contrasts with Sadr’s mass-mobilisation strategy, creating mutually exclusive pathways for Shia dominance and Iranian alignment.
- Najaf’s tacit influence, US economic leverage, and Kurdish cross-border dynamics limit Tehran’s freedom to fully control outcomes, necessitating calibrated, risk-aware engagement.
Information Background
Following the November 2025 elections and the withdrawal of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the Coordination Framework (Iraq’s main Shia parliamentary alliance) reaffirmedsupport for Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Maliki served as prime minister from 2006 to 2014, a period marked by sectarian polarisation, institutional corruption, and security failures.
A senior leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, al-Maliki is closely aligned with Iran-backed factions. Sunni political exclusion characterised his tenure under de-Baathification, demographic engineering in Baghdad, arrests of moderate Sunni leaders, and extensive corruption within state and security institutions. Despite his record, he remains influential within Shia politics, supported by personal networks and loyal armed actors.
The Trump administration previously signalled it would withdraw US support if al-Maliki returned to office, citing concerns over Iran-linked militias and Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) autonomy. US leverage over Iraq remains significant, particularly through control mechanisms linked to Iraqi oil revenues held in US-based financial arrangements.
Iran’s Strategic Assessment of Iraqi Shia Leadership Options
Al-Maliki is a system-internal actor, strongest in periods of institutional gridlock and elite bargaining. His power base is institutional and elite-driven, operating through parties (State of Law), Parliament, courts, and constitutional mechanisms. He relies on state structures rather than mass mobilisation.
Muqtada al-Sadr represents a rival Shia power centre and is system-disruptive. His strength derives from mass mobilisation, street pressure, and religious lineage as the son of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. He leverages institutions tactically rather than viewing them as the primary locus of power.
Al-Maliki treats the state as the main instrument of authority. As prime minister, he centralised power within the Prime Minister’s Office and security institutions, favouring executive dominance. Sadr maintains an ambivalent relationship with the state, alternating between participation, withdrawal, and direct challenge. For Sadr, the state is one arena among several sources of legitimacy.
Al-Maliki maintains embedded ties to Iran-aligned armed groups within the PMF, exercising indirect but structural influence. Still, he does not command it: there are PMF factions loyal to institutions (e.g. Badr) and PMF factions loyal to their own command structures (e.g. Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq). Sadr’s armed capacity, centred on Saraya al-Salam, is more autonomous but comparatively limited and less regionally active.
Strategically, al-Maliki is widely regarded as aligned with Iran. Tehran supported him during his premiership and after 2014, and his interests converge with Iran-aligned Shia factions in preserving the post-2003 order. This alignment is consistent and structural. Sadr’s relationship with Iran is fluctuating: he accepts Iranian mediation but resists overt dominance and frames himself as an Iraqi nationalist. He is neither anti-Iran nor reliably pro-Iran.
Electorally, al-Maliki’s legitimacy is coalition-based and procedural; he remains relevant through blocking power and post-election bargaining. Sadr has repeatedly led the largest parliamentary blocs but willingly abandons institutional gains if leverage is insufficient, prioritising pressure over formal representation.
Al-Maliki supports collective Shia rule through elite consensus within the Coordination Framework, favouring power-sharing and system preservation. Sadr advocates a majority-government model aimed at marginalising rival Shia elites and monopolising representation. These models are mutually exclusive: negotiated, Iran-aligned continuity versus populist, nationalist-leaning disruption.
Neither actor has eliminated the other because each thrives under different political conditions: al-Maliki benefits from institutional paralysis, Sadr from institutional delegitimisation.
Geopolitical Scenario
US President Donald Trump explicitly linked opposition to al-Maliki to concerns over Iranian influence in Baghdad. However, Washington does not currently favour Sadr either, as the Sadrist movement boycotted recent elections and withdrew from institutional politics.
Al-Sudani attempted to balance US and Iranian interests rather than align decisively with Tehran. His Reconstruction and Development Coalition prioritised pragmatic governance over militia-linked activism. Within Iran-aligned structures, his second term was blocked partly due to fears he might emerge as an autonomous power centre.
Overall, US strategy resists Iranian influence but lacks a reliable Shia interlocutor: Sadr is outside institutions, while al-Sudani was not aligned with US objectives. Iran’s core interest remains sustaining influence through allied parties and PMF networks while avoiding intra-Shia fragmentation. Tehran therefore calibrates support toward actors acceptable to broad Shia constituencies.
Al-Maliki’s profile, ties to Iran-aligned factions, and nomination through the Coordination Framework suggest Tehran would benefit from his return. US pressure against him reinforces this assessment. Some unconfirmed sources report that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khameneiencouraged al-Maliki’s nomination, not as a directive but as a political signal that Tehran views him as capable of managing regional turbulence.
Iran considers Iraq central to its regional security architecture and the maintenance of a Shia-aligned corridor. Supporting figures like al-Maliki aligns with this objective, but this preference is instrumental, not ideal: the leader is an asset but also a risk amplifier. In fact, Maliki is polarising even within Shia ranks, he is a mobilising figure for Sunni resentment and provides the US and Gulf states with a clear narrative hook. For Tehran, Maliki is useful in the short term, but costly in terms of Iraqi legitimacy, the long-term stability of Shia rule, and regional optics.
Al-Maliki has also publicly emphasised Iraqi sovereignty and resistance to foreign “projects,” including those of Iran, indicating an effort to balance national legitimacy with external partnerships.
The Coordination Framework’s support for al-Maliki reflects calculations about parliamentary weight and internal stability, not solely Iranian influence. Al-Maliki frames his leadership claim as constitutionally grounded, arguing that internal alliances outweigh foreign vetoes.
Any Iranian calculus regarding Iraq must also account for the position of the Najaf marjaΚΏiyya(the supreme religious authority for Twelver Shia Muslims).While Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistanimaintains strategic silence, Najaf has historically resisted excessive centralisation of power and remains wary of personalised rule associated with figures such as al-Maliki.
Tehran is therefore constrained from overtly backing any prime minister who lacks Najaf’s tacit tolerance, as clerical disapproval—even implicit—can undermine Shia legitimacy and limit the durability of Iran-aligned political arrangements.
Kurdish opposition activity in western Iran, partly involving US-trained elements, could generate cross-border security dilemmas. Security agreements constrain Iraqi Kurdish authorities with Iran, creating a tension between regional autonomy and Baghdad’s priorities under al-Maliki. Iran may pressure Baghdad for stricter enforcement against Kurdish groups, while the US may view Kurdistan as a stabilising buffer, producing triangular strategic pressures.
Conclusion
Al-Maliki’s return could reignite sectarian tensions, particularly between Shia and Sunni communities. His governance style emphasises Shia consolidation and loyalty-based patronage, weakening institutional independence and national cohesion.
Under al-Maliki, Iran-aligned PMF militias would likely retain autonomy from US-backed integration efforts, preserving Iran’s leverage in Iraqi security and politics. For Iran, the PMF serve as both a hedge and a strategic safeguard against any Iraqi prime minister who becomes excessively autonomous, politically unstable, or misaligned with Iranian interests — even if initially regarded as a friendly actor.
Conversely, US concerns over Iranian regional influence are likely to clash with Iraqi political dynamics under al-Maliki. Washington may respond through economic leverage or by exploiting sectarian and institutional fractures if Baghdad becomes an increasingly strategic buffer.
Finally, cross-border activity by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and related tensions in northern Iraq could complicate Iran-Iraq coordination, requiring careful management between Baghdad and Tehran. In this context,
Given the ongoing terrorist threat in Iraq, the exacerbation of sectarian violence because of internal political dynamics could enable groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda to exploit the situation, amplifying their propaganda and escalating violent assaults to further destabilise the nation.
