This report assesses the strategic implications for the Islamic Republic of Iran of a potential return of Nouri al-Maliki to the Iraqi premiership, situating this scenario within Iraqi Shia power structures and Iran’s regional security posture.
It evaluates how al-Maliki’s return would affect Iran’s political influence and risk management in Iraq amid intra-Shia competition, US pressure, and regional alignments.
Key Takeaways
Maliki strengthens Tehran-aligned factions and PMF leverage but increases sectarian tension, Sunni resentment, and regional narrative risk.
Al-Maliki’s elite-institutional approach contrasts with Sadr’s mass-mobilisation strategy, creating mutually exclusive pathways for Shia dominance and Iranian alignment.
Najaf’s tacit influence, US economic leverage, and Kurdish cross-border dynamics limit Tehran’s freedom to fully control outcomes, necessitating calibrated, risk-aware engagement.
Following the November 2025 elections and the withdrawal of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the CoordinationFramework (Iraq’s main Shia parliamentary alliance) reaffirmedsupport for Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Maliki served as prime minister from 2006 to 2014, a period marked by sectarian polarisation, institutional corruption, and security failures.
A senior leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, al-Maliki is closely aligned with Iran-backed factions. Sunni political exclusion characterised his tenure under de-Baathification, demographic engineering in Baghdad, arrests of moderate Sunni leaders, and extensive corruption within state and security institutions. Despite his record, he remains influential within Shia politics, supported by personal networks and loyal armed actors.
The Trump administration previously signalled it would withdraw US support if al-Maliki returned to office, citing concerns over Iran-linked militias and Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) autonomy. US leverage over Iraq remains significant, particularly through control mechanisms linked to Iraqi oil revenues held in US-based financial arrangements.
Iran’s Strategic Assessment of Iraqi Shia Leadership Options
Al-Maliki is a system-internal actor, strongest in periods of institutional gridlock and elite bargaining. His power base is institutional and elite-driven, operating through parties (State of Law), Parliament, courts, and constitutional mechanisms. He relies on state structures rather than mass mobilisation.
Muqtada al-Sadr represents a rival Shia power centre and is system-disruptive. His strength derives from mass mobilisation, street pressure, and religious lineage as the son of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. He leverages institutions tactically rather than viewing them as the primary locus of power.
Al-Maliki treats the state as the main instrument of authority. As prime minister, he centralised power within the Prime Minister’s Office and security institutions, favouring executive dominance. Sadr maintains an ambivalent relationship with the state, alternating between participation, withdrawal, and direct challenge. For Sadr, the state is one arena among several sources of legitimacy.
Al-Maliki maintains embedded ties to Iran-aligned armed groups within the PMF, exercising indirect but structural influence. Still, he does not command it: there are PMF factions loyal to institutions (e.g. Badr) and PMF factions loyal to their own command structures (e.g. Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq). Sadr’s armed capacity, centred on Saraya al-Salam, is more autonomous but comparatively limited and less regionally active.
Strategically, al-Maliki is widely regarded as aligned with Iran. Tehran supported him during his premiership and after 2014, and his interests converge with Iran-aligned Shia factions in preserving the post-2003 order. This alignment is consistent and structural. Sadr’s relationship with Iran is fluctuating: he accepts Iranian mediation but resists overt dominance and frames himself as an Iraqi nationalist. He is neither anti-Iran nor reliably pro-Iran.
Electorally, al-Maliki’s legitimacy is coalition-based and procedural; he remains relevant through blocking power and post-election bargaining. Sadr has repeatedly led the largest parliamentary blocs but willingly abandons institutional gains if leverage is insufficient, prioritising pressure over formal representation.
Al-Maliki supports collective Shia rule through elite consensus within the Coordination Framework, favouring power-sharing and system preservation. Sadr advocates a majority-government model aimed at marginalising rival Shia elites and monopolising representation. These models are mutually exclusive: negotiated, Iran-aligned continuity versus populist, nationalist-leaning disruption.
Neither actor has eliminated the other because each thrives under different political conditions: al-Maliki benefits from institutional paralysis, Sadr from institutional delegitimisation.
Geopolitical Scenario
US President Donald Trump explicitly linked opposition to al-Maliki to concerns over Iranian influence in Baghdad. However, Washington does not currently favour Sadr either, as the Sadrist movement boycotted recent elections and withdrew from institutional politics.
Al-Sudani attempted to balance US and Iranian interests rather than align decisively with Tehran. His Reconstruction and Development Coalition prioritised pragmatic governance over militia-linked activism. Within Iran-aligned structures, his second term was blocked partly due to fears he might emerge as an autonomous power centre.
Overall, US strategy resists Iranian influence but lacks a reliable Shia interlocutor: Sadr is outside institutions, while al-Sudani was not aligned with US objectives. Iran’s core interest remains sustaining influence through allied parties and PMF networks while avoiding intra-Shia fragmentation. Tehran therefore calibrates support toward actors acceptable to broad Shia constituencies.
Al-Maliki’s profile, ties to Iran-aligned factions, and nomination through the Coordination Framework suggest Tehran would benefit from his return. US pressure against him reinforces this assessment. Some unconfirmed sources report that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khameneiencouraged al-Maliki’s nomination, not as a directive but as a political signal that Tehran views him as capable of managing regional turbulence.
Iran considers Iraq central to its regional security architecture and the maintenance of a Shia-aligned corridor. Supporting figures like al-Maliki aligns with this objective, but this preference is instrumental, not ideal: the leader is an asset but also a risk amplifier. In fact, Maliki is polarising even within Shia ranks, he is a mobilising figure for Sunni resentment and provides the US and Gulf states with a clear narrative hook. For Tehran, Maliki is useful in the short term, but costly in terms of Iraqi legitimacy, the long-term stability of Shia rule, and regional optics.
Al-Maliki has also publicly emphasised Iraqi sovereignty and resistance to foreign “projects,” including those of Iran, indicating an effort to balance national legitimacy with external partnerships.
The Coordination Framework’s support for al-Maliki reflects calculations about parliamentary weight and internal stability, not solely Iranian influence. Al-Maliki frames his leadership claim as constitutionally grounded, arguing that internal alliances outweigh foreign vetoes.
Any Iranian calculus regarding Iraq must also account for the position of the Najaf marjaΚΏiyya(the supreme religious authority for Twelver Shia Muslims).While Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistanimaintains strategic silence, Najaf has historically resisted excessive centralisation of power and remains wary of personalised rule associated with figures such as al-Maliki.
Tehran is therefore constrained from overtly backing any prime minister who lacks Najaf’s tacit tolerance, as clerical disapproval—even implicit—can undermine Shia legitimacy and limit the durability of Iran-aligned political arrangements.
Kurdish opposition activity in western Iran, partly involving US-trained elements, could generate cross-border security dilemmas. Security agreements constrain Iraqi Kurdish authorities with Iran, creating a tension between regional autonomy and Baghdad’s priorities under al-Maliki. Iran may pressure Baghdad for stricter enforcement against Kurdish groups, while the US may view Kurdistan as a stabilising buffer, producing triangular strategic pressures.
Conclusion
Al-Maliki’s return could reignite sectarian tensions, particularly between Shia and Sunni communities. His governance style emphasises Shia consolidation and loyalty-based patronage, weakening institutional independence and national cohesion.
Under al-Maliki, Iran-aligned PMF militias would likely retain autonomy from US-backed integration efforts, preserving Iran’s leverage in Iraqi security and politics. For Iran, the PMF serve as both a hedge and a strategic safeguard against any Iraqi prime minister who becomes excessively autonomous, politically unstable, or misaligned with Iranian interests — even if initially regarded as a friendly actor.
Conversely, US concerns over Iranian regional influence are likely to clash with Iraqi political dynamics under al-Maliki. Washington may respond through economic leverage or by exploiting sectarian and institutional fractures if Baghdad becomes an increasingly strategic buffer.
Finally, cross-border activity by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and related tensions in northern Iraq could complicate Iran-Iraq coordination, requiring careful management between Baghdad and Tehran. In this context,
Given the ongoing terrorist threat in Iraq, the exacerbation of sectarian violence because of internal political dynamics could enable groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda to exploit the situation, amplifying their propaganda and escalating violent assaults to further destabilise the nation.
High-level banking insiders confirm that Tier 4B ISO 20022 notifications are being prepared for release within hours.
This marks the full-scale transition to the gold-backed financial system, now described as irreversible. Market reactions are immediate, historic, and unprecedented.
Global Markets in Panic Mode
The move to the new system is causing a shockwave through global financial markets:
Historic transactions confirmed in Hong Kong, London, and Dubai
Multiple major banks reporting liquidity shortages
IMF insiders holding urgent, behind-closed-doors meetings
“The end of the central banking cartel is unfolding before our eyes!”
This is the largest coordinated monetary event seen in modern financial history.
Live Currency Updates
According to Judy and insiders on European trading platforms:
Currency
Live Rate
Notes
IQD (Iraqi Dinar)
$8.73
Confirmed LIVE; Contract Rate only at Redemption Centers
VND (Vietnamese Dong)
$5.12
Holding; expected to surge post-announcement
ZIM & Other Currencies
Final adjustments in process
Redemption only at official RCs
Key Point:
Judy emphasizes that Redemption Centers are essential for maximum returns. Banks will offer lower rates and cannot provide contract rates for the IQD or Zim.
Redemption Centers vs Banks: Why It Matters
Bruce, Frank26, and Judy all align on one principle:
Banks: Standard exchange rates, lower yields, limited capacity
Redemption Centers (RCs): Access to contract rates, priority for large transactions, structured for security and maximum efficiency
“You can only redeem Zim at a RC, the Dinar Contract Rate can only be given at a RC. Banks will offer you lower exchange rates than what you can obtain at a RC.”
– Judy
This is especially critical for high-volume holders of IQD, ZIM, and other emerging currencies.
Featured Snippet: What Are Tier 4B Final Triggers?
Answer: Tier 4B final triggers refer to the last notifications and system activations that enable the full-scale transition from the fiat-based banking system to a gold-backed financial system under ISO 20022 standards. This includes updated global currency rates and operational readiness at redemption centers.
Q&A: Your Top Questions Answered
Q: When will the final notifications be released?
A: Banking insiders confirm within hours, meaning very soon.
Q: Will banks provide the best rates?
A: No. Only official Redemption Centers offer contract rates for currencies like IQD and ZIM.
Q: What happens to global markets?
A: Markets are experiencing panic mode as liquidity is redirected into the new system, affecting multiple major banks.
Q: Is this the start of the gold-backed system?
A: Yes. Tier 4B activations signal the irreversible transition to a gold-backed financial system.
Q: Are the IQD and VND rates confirmed?
A: Yes. IQD confirmed at $8.73 and VND holding at $5.12, with further surges expected.
Implications for Investors and Currency Holders
Immediate opportunity for high-value currency exchanges
Potential historic gains for IQD, VND, ZIM, and other eligible currencies
Redemption Centers offer highest security and value
Timing is critical — the activation window is live
Frank26, Bruce, and Judy have all emphasized preparation and vigilance at this critical stage.
Final Thoughts: Prepare, Verify, and Act Strategically
Stay informed through credible channels
Confirm rates and RC access before moving currencies
Avoid banks for IQD/ZIM exchanges to maximize returns
Monitor market signals closely — the system is live and irreversible
This is a pivotal moment for currency holders and global financial systems alike.
CONFIRMATIONS JUST IN: FINAL TRIGGERS ACTIVATED!…Tier4b ISO 20022
High-level banking insiders report that [TIER 4B] notifications are already being prepared for release within HOURS.
The system is moving at an unprecedented speed, with historic transactions now confirmed in Hong Kong, London, and Dubai.
This is the moment we’ve all been waiting for, the full-scale transition to the gold-backed financial system is now irreversible.
GLOBAL MARKETS IN PANIC MODE! The old fiat system is collapsing in real time. Multiple major banks are seeing liquidity shortages as large transfers are being redirected into the new system. Sources from inside the IMF confirm urgent, behind-closed-doors meetings, they know their control is slipping.
The end of the central banking c***l is unfolding before our eyes!
BANK SCREENS LIGHT UP WITH FINAL RATES!
IQD: $8.73 – Confirmed LIVE on European trading platforms! VND: $5.12 – Holding but expected to surge post-announcement. ZIM & other currencies: final adjustments in process
Judy Note: It is advised to exchange/redeem your foreign currency at an official Redemption Center rather than a bank. You can only redeem Zim at a RC, the Dinar Contract Rate can only be given at a RC and banks will offer you lower exchange rates than what you can obtain at a RC. Redemption Centers were set to be open worldwide.
Iraqi traders on Sunday rejected the newly raised customs duties, warning that the measures could disrupt trade and drive up prices.
In a statement, the Iraqi Association of Traders and Importers noted that the imposed tariffs undermine public interest, slow commercial activity, and disrupt the broader economic cycle, cautioning against their potential social repercussions.
Opposing any customs duties above 5%, except for locally produced items that meet domestic demand, the Association criticized the valuation system under the ASYCUDA customs platform, describing it as unfair.
“We as traders oppose the requirement to pay tax deposits in advance and the mandatory use of quality certification marks,” the statement added, urging Iraqi authorities to delay the implementation of Decision No. 957 for six months. It also called on officials to release goods held at ports, close corruption channels, and ensure regulations are applied consistently across all border points.
Earlier today, protests and market shutdowns began in Baghdad and spread to several central and southern provinces, as traders challenged new tariffs that raised import costs, disrupted supply chains, and pushed up consumer prices. The increases were introduced under Cabinet Decision No. 957 of 2025, part of government efforts to boost non-oil revenues.
Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court has scheduled February 11 to rule on a legal challenge to the tariff hike, lawmaker Mohammed Al-Khafaji noted in a video recorded outside the court building.
According to Frank26, this coming Sunday will be critical for the future of Iraq and for those invested in the Iraqi dinar.
“IMO we didn’t come there for the last two months to twiddle our thumbs…You see very well what has happened since we’ve arrived.”
Frank highlights that significant accomplishments have been made at both the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) and the Government of Iraq (GOI), especially efforts to prevent Maliki from even considering a return as prime minister.
Key Accomplishments Over the Last Few Weeks
Since Frank26’s team arrived in Iraq, several major steps have been achieved:
Monetary reform has become clearer and better defined
Progress is not just for Iraqi citizens, but also for the international financial community
Political stabilization efforts, ensuring Maliki’s influence is minimized
Frank emphasizes that these achievements are a direct result of active engagement, not passive observation.
Featured Snippet: What Did Frank26 Say About the Importance of Sunday?
Answer: Frank26 said that this coming Sunday is pivotal because multiple monetary reform actions and political accomplishments could align, marking an “epic” day for Iraq and the Iraqi dinar.
Maliki: Political Challenges and Successes
Frank notes that preventing Maliki from returning as prime minister is a crucial part of these accomplishments:
His potential comeback would destabilize reform efforts
By limiting his influence, monetary and political progress becomes more feasible
This strengthens Iraq’s credibility internationally
This aligns with other updates from Sandy, Trump, and Frank26’s network on U.S. influence and political alignment.
Monetary Reform: A Clearer Path Forward
Frank26 confirms that monetary reform is progressing steadily:
Policies are becoming more defined at the CBI
International observers now have a clearer understanding of Iraq’s plan
Reform includes currency structuring, potential revaluation, and exchange rate stabilization
These steps are essential to prepare Iraq for economic growth and investor confidence.
Q&A: Will Dinar Value Drop After the Event?
A common question asked by investors:
Question:“After the event and the people flood the banks, will that cause the value to drop?”
Frank26 Response:
“No, the opposite. That’s financial friction. Anytime you move, buy, sell, trade with a currency, it only adds value to it. It adds credibility to it. More people use it. It’s called supply and demand. That draws the value upward.”
Key Takeaways:
Increased activity in the currency strengthens it
Public usage improves credibility and adoption
Supply and demand mechanics naturally raise value
Featured Snippet: Why Does Increased Currency Activity Increase Value?
Answer: Frank26 explains that buying, selling, or trading a currency adds value by increasing credibility and usage. Supply and demand dynamics draw the value upward rather than causing it to drop.
Why This Matters for Investors
For those holding Iraqi dinar:
Sunday could mark a turning point in monetary reform
Political stabilization enhances international trust
Activity at banks and redemption centers increases credibility and liquidity
This alignment of politics, banking, and reform is why Frank26 calls the upcoming Sunday “Epic.”
Final Thoughts: Preparation, Patience, and Momentum
Frank26’s update underscores that success comes from:
Active participation in the process
Monitoring both political and financial developments
Understanding how currency dynamics work
The stage is set, and all signals point toward progress, not delay.
This coming Sunday is very pivotal for your success of [Iraq]. IMO we didn't come there for the last two months to twiddle our thumbs and pick our noses. You see very well what has happened since we've arrived.
Some amazing accomplishments have been revealed in the last 2 to 3 weeks because of what we brought over and because of what we are doing at the CBI, let alone at the GOI, by making sure Maliki doesn't even consider he has a chance to be prime minister. The moment we arrived, the monetary reform started to become better defined...not only to the Iraqi citizens but to the rest of the international world...It is my prayer...for us that Sunday we see many things come together...This Sunday is Epic.
Question: "After the event and the people flood the banks, will that cause the value to drop?"
No, the opposite. That's financial friction. Anytime you move, buy, sell, trade with a currency, it only adds value to it. It adds credibility to it, more people use it. It's called supply and demand. That draws the value upward.