SAVAYA OPENS TWO FRONTS: WE WILL PURSUE SENIOR IRAQI OFFICIALS, THEIR FOREIGN PASSPORTS, AND THE GOVERNMENT ON OUR TERMS.
The US President’s envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, confirmed on Tuesday (January 27, 2026) that his team is working on the ground in Iraq to support efforts to form a new government and prevent Iranian-backed militias from coming to power, stressing that preparing to confront the corruption crisis in the country is no less important than the ongoing political and security battle.
In a statement published on his accounts and reviewed by Baghdad Today, Savaya said, “It is of utmost importance, indeed of utmost importance, to prepare to confront the corruption crisis in Iraq,” explaining that the required effort “must go beyond merely tracking the looted funds transferred abroad, to also include determining the final destination of those funds and how they will ultimately be used.”
He added that coordination with other institutions allowed his team to gain a “comprehensive understanding” of the people involved, including “senior government officials and their family members who benefited from corrupt Iraqi funds,” explaining that these funds “were not only used to purchase multiple properties in several countries, but were also used to obtain foreign nationalities and passports, sometimes under similar names, and in other cases under different identities, in order to evade tracking and accountability.”
Savaya added that “the majority of these cases are concentrated within the region, while others extend beyond it through citizenship-by-investment programs offered by some countries,” noting that the information currently available “greatly enhances the ability to pursue accountability, recover stolen assets, and cooperate with international partners to combat corruption at its roots.”
He pointed out that the harm of corruption “is not limited to the Iraqi people and undermining national security, but extends to enabling terrorist groups and fueling their activities in multiple countries,” stressing that he will work “in close cooperation with the US Treasury Department and the Office of Foreign Assets Control to ensure that all those involved are held accountable without exception, that no one is above the law, and that justice is achieved for the Iraqi people.”
It is worth noting that Mark Savaya is an Iraqi-American businessman of Assyrian origin, appointed by US President Donald Trump as special envoy to Iraq in October 2025, in a move described by analysts as part of an attempt to rearrange the relationship with Baghdad and to exert pressure on corruption and uncontrolled weapons.
Since taking office, Savaya has emphasized in several statements that corruption, not the militias themselves, is the “main obstacle” to Iraq’s stability, calling for the dismantling of “corruption networks” that fund armed groups through fictitious salaries, fictitious loans, and fake assets, according to recent reports in international media.
In a related context, Savaya had previously announced that the United States would conduct a “comprehensive review” of suspicious financial records and transfers linked to smuggling and money laundering operations that fund “terrorist activities and smuggling networks,” warning that the results of this review could lead to new sanctions against “malicious actors” inside and outside Iraq.
Trump’s envoy also stressed that the US administration views the corruption file in Iraq as part of a broader battle to curb the influence of armed militias linked to Tehran, noting that reducing the resources of corruption and money laundering networks is, in his view, a prerequisite for the success of any path to rebuilding Iraqi state institutions and consolidating its monopoly on weapons.
Iraq’s political delays are not about confusion—they are about control of $100 billion held at the U.S. Federal Reserve. Leadership choices, CBI reform, and U.S. pressure all determine whether Iraq can safely move forward financially.
Introduction: Follow the Money
When confusion dominates the headlines, one rule never fails:
Follow the money.
According to insights shared by Walkingstick, Aki, and Sandy Ingram, the real reason behind Iraq’s political stalemate isn’t incompetence or chaos — it’s control over $100 billion of Iraqi funds currently held at the U.S. Federal Reserve.
And not everyone is trusted with access to it.
Aki’s Bank-Level Insight: Rebuilding Iraq Starts in the North
Walkingstick relayed a powerful update from Aki, an Iraqi banking insider:
“Your Trump is going to rebuild our country, and he’s going to start in the northern part of Iraq.”
This rebuilding effort, however, comes with conditions.
The Trade-Off:
U.S.-backed reconstruction support
Economic revitalization in northern Iraq
Removal of compromised leadership figures
Aki made it clear:
“It’s not a bad thing to get rid of Maliki or Alaq.”
For Iraq’s long-term financial health, leadership change is seen as necessary, not optional.
CBI Reform: Why the Governor Matters
The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) sits at the heart of currency reform.
Removing figures like Alaq is viewed by many as:
Eliminating legacy corruption
Restoring international confidence
Preparing Iraq for a currency value change
A reformed CBI means controlled access, transparent policy, and global trust.
Sandy Ingram: The $100 Billion Reality
Sandy Ingram distilled the issue to its core:
“$100 billion — Iraq’s funds held at the U.S. Federal Reserve — this is what it’s all about.”
Why This Money Is Locked:
It represents Iraq’s oil revenues
It is protected under U.S. oversight
It prevents misuse or corruption
The big fear?
Maliki gaining control of that money.
Why Maliki Is the Red Line
According to Sandy Ingram:
Trump has publicly denounced support for Maliki
Maliki is seen as a risk to financial transparency
Allowing him access to the $100B could undo years of reform
This is why leadership selection in Iraq is under intense scrutiny.
Media Narrative vs. Reality
Middle Eastern news outlets are portraying a different story:
“Trump is losing control”
“Iraq will do whatever it wants”
“Iraq is fully sovereign and independent”
But as Sandy noted — you and I know that’s not true.
The funds are still at the Fed. The pressure is still real. The leverage hasn’t changed.
Why the Presidential Vote Keeps Getting Delayed
Iraq has now:
Postponed the presidential vote twice
Failed to seat a President
Failed to name a Prime Minister
The Rule Is Simple:
No President = No Prime Minister
And without a complete government, Iraq cannot:
Access protected funds
Finalize reforms
Safely move forward internationally
The delays are not accidental — they are containment measures.
What This Means for the RV Timeline
The RV cannot occur until:
Trusted leadership is installed
The CBI is aligned with reform
International partners are satisfied
The $100B remains protected
This is not about speed — it’s about control and safety.
Q&A Section (SEO Optimized)
Why is Iraq’s $100 billion held at the U.S. Federal Reserve?
To protect Iraq’s oil revenues and prevent misuse by untrusted leadership.
Why doesn’t the U.S. want Maliki back in power?
Because of corruption concerns and fear he could mismanage or divert protected funds.
Is removing the CBI governor a bad sign?
No. Many believe it’s a positive step toward transparency and reform.
Why keep delaying the presidential vote?
To block leadership that could gain access to protected funds.
Does this delay stop the RV permanently?
No. It slows the process to ensure the right people are in place first.
Final Thoughts: Protection Before Prosperity
Iraq’s delays are not signs of collapse — they are safeguards.
Before prosperity comes:
Protection
Accountability
Trusted leadership
Only then can Iraq safely move forward.
Important Disclaimer
All information shared reflects opinion only and is for educational purposes. This content is not intended as financial, legal, or professional advice. Always consult a qualified professional before making financial decisions.
[Iraqi bank friend Aki update]AKI: Your Trump is going to rebuild our country and he's going to start in the northern part of Iraq. In return he wants to remove the CBI governor...It's not a bad thing to get rid of Maliki or Alaq.
Sandy Ingram
$100 billion, Iraq's funds held at the US Federal Reserve - this is what it's all about...They don't want Maliki to get his hands on that $100 billion that's being held in the Federal Reserve.Trump has denounced support of Maliki if elected prime minister again.
There are people in Iraq trying to prevent this...The news in the Middle East is saying Trump is losing control and Iraq is going to do what they want to do and Iraq is in charge and Iraq is this and Iraq is that. You and I know that's not true. They postponed the session to elect the president for the 2nd time. No president, no PM.
A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE IN IRAQ: KHAZALI IS RELIEVED, HAKIM IS RIGHT, AND SUDANI IS PREPARING.
Trump forgets about Iran, and the Dawa Party responds with a verse about tyranny.
Trump’s remarks about Iraq and its prime minister were not just “blatant interference,” as many described it, but a new way of speaking to Iraq as a “great country” and not just an area attached to the Iranian file.
The longest 48 hours since the beginning of the year, from the warning conveyed by the leader of the Wisdom Movement, Ammar al-Hakim, against the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki, to the “dispelling of all doubt” when Trump himself and his tweets descended upon the Iraqi scene and opened fire mercilessly on al-Maliki, who had been celebrating among his supporters hours earlier his imminent return to the palace.
“AL-MALIKI STRUCK AT THE IRANIAN AXIS,” BUT IT WAS TO NO AVAIL.
In the past few hours, Maliki’s team has tried to deal with the intense campaign that followed the American message. Spokespeople for the State of Law Coalition have spread out across the media to emphasize that Maliki is not subservient to Iran, but rather that he “struck the Iranian axis,” as leader Diaa al-Nasiri said, recalling Maliki’s complaint against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but the matter was not useful.
However, the coalition leadership has not yet given any indication of surrender. On the contrary, Minister of Youth and Sports Ahmed Al-Mubarraq, a close associate of Maliki, posted a Quranic verse, saying that he would not abandon the “true leader.” The post read: “They plot, and Allah plots, and Allah is the best of plotters. Abu Israa, day after day you prove that you are the true leader in a time of false leaders. We will not abandon you, for you are the right choice. He will continue to support Maliki.”
As for the account of the Dawa Party, it sufficed with another verse that warns against relying on tyrants: “Allah is the ally of those who believe. He brings them out of darkness into light. But those who disbelieve – their allies are tyrants.”
In the past few hours, the message conveyed by Ammar al-Hakim has faced much skepticism, especially within the State of Law coalition led by Maliki. Coalition officials said that the American message warning against Maliki’s nomination was not accurate. Maliki’s team assumed that President Donald Trump had other ways of conveying his ideas to Maliki without the need for “messengers.” The tone of the State of Law was not devoid of skepticism and the belief that the supposed American message was written somewhere inside Baghdad.
The factions and forces opposing al-Maliki’s nomination were led by the Asa’ib movement. The movement’s channel broadcast Trump’s statements in a series of breaking news bulletins on a rotating basis for a long period, while the media of the Hikma movement tried to distance itself and continue its usual programs.
Prior to that, Asaib deputies had hinted at the possibility of Maliki’s withdrawal and said that the movement had dealt responsibly with the American warning message conveyed by Hakim.
“IRAQ… A GREAT COUNTRY WITHOUT IRAN”
Trump’s brief statement was unusual in its context. It is one of the few times that Trump has spoken about Iraq as a “great country” and not as an appendage to the Iranian issue.
Trump’s reasons for not nominating Maliki were not to accuse the man of being an Iranian agent, as many American officials usually do, but rather because “Maliki is a man with crazy policies and ideas that have destroyed Iraq, and therefore he is a bad choice that will make Washington stop supporting Baghdad.”
Most of the forces within the framework were with Maliki in the nomination, including armed factions and long-established parties. Then he received the “blessing” of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamenei, while the leaders of the Wisdom Movement, Ammar al-Hakim, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, continued to send messages and delegations to Tehran to verify Khamenei’s position, which returned identical each time.
(Mnt Goat: of course Iran supports Maliki as he is an agent of Iran and we have known this since his first term. He will destroy Iraq and set them back to 2003.)
“BAGHDAD… LOOK AT DAMASCUS”
The Trump administration, and especially its envoy Thomas Barak, is very interested in normalizing the situation in Syria in the region. If this is part of what Barak is looking for in the next prime minister, then Mohammed Shia al-Sudani may be among those closest to the White House’s mood, especially since al-Sudani was one of the first to initiate rapprochement with Damascus, defying harsh media campaigns from his allies and outside of them. It seems that al-Sudani’s team understood the ideas that Barak’s recent tweet revealed after his call with the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Masoud Barzani, in which the American envoy spoke of Iraq as an area linked to Syria as well. This reveals a shift in the American approach to the situation in Iraq, from considering it merely an Iranian issue to including Iraq within a new arc of ideas that moves over Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, and even Baghdad.
THE SUDANESE TEAM IS OPTIMISTIC
In rapid contacts made by the 964 network during the past hour, the Sudanese team appears optimistic but cautious: “We have done what we had to do. The Sudanese concession was serious and it was not a maneuver as some forces tried to suggest in order to drive a wedge between the Sudanese and Maliki. Now we may be waiting for Maliki to reciprocate the favor and for the rest of the framework forces to understand the reality of the situation and the challenge.”
The framework groups are now discussing the start of preparations for an urgent meeting. Some are considering holding it at the home of Ammar al-Hakim, the man who was right and whose account has been subject to much skepticism, while others are calling for the meeting to be held at al-Maliki’s home “to appease him.”
The “Kuwait Syndrome” explains why Iraq cannot openly signal a currency revaluation before it happens. Final OFAC sanctions must be reviewed quietly, while public instability masks preparations for Iraq’s return to international markets.
Introduction: The RV Was Never Going to Be Announced Ahead of Time
One of the biggest misconceptions in the RV community is the belief that governments will telegraph a currency revaluation before it happens.
According to Jeff, that idea ignores historical precedent — especially what happened with Kuwait.
The Kuwait Syndrome refers to a strategic pattern used when a country is preparing for a major currency value change:
No advance warning
No positive media signals
No public confirmation of readiness
Why?
Because you cannot lift final sanctions or raise a currency value while signaling it publicly.
Jeff was very clear:
“Hell no they’re not going to tell you they’re pulling the final OFAC sanctions.”
OFAC & U.S. Treasury: The Final Gatekeepers
The last remaining sanctions on Iraq fall under:
OFAC
U.S. Treasury
These are the final barriers preventing Iraq from:
Increasing its currency value
Going fully international
What’s Really Happening Right Now?
Behind the scenes:
Iraq is under active review
Authorities are determining if Iraq is worthy of lifting final sanctions
This review is a prerequisite to any rate increase
Publicly:
Media highlights instability
News emphasizes political uncertainty
Security concerns are amplified
This contrast is intentional.
Why the News Looks Negative on Purpose
Jeff explained a critical point many overlook:
“They can’t give you clues the rate is about to go up in value.”
If Iraq were portrayed as:
Stable
Secure
Fully functional
…it would signal currency movement, which is exactly what they must avoid.
Instability in the news = cover, not failure.
Following Actions, Not Headlines
Jeff emphasized that the RV is not understood by headlines, but by actions:
Quiet sanction reviews
Continued international coordination
Central bank readiness
Government formation pressure
When you follow what they do, not what they say, the picture becomes clearer.
Government Formation: Past the Constitutional Deadline
Iraq has now exceeded its constitutional timeline.
Key Facts:
Government formation includes 4 steps
The Presidency vote is Step 2
The constitutional deadline was 30 days
That deadline expired Wednesday the 28th
This puts Iraq officially past its constitutional window — a position that increases external pressure.
Sudani vs. Maliki: Why the Outcome Was Never Random
Jeff has consistently stated:
“Maliki is not going to get this. It will be Sudani.”
Although Maliki was initially portrayed as the top pick, external forces intervened.
The Trump Factor: A Strategic Roadblock
According to Jeff, Donald Trump stepped in directly:
“You put Maliki in and we’re done helping you 100%.”
That message:
Placed a roadblock in front of Iraq
Froze momentum
Threw the process into limbo
This wasn’t political theater — it was leverage.
Why This Matters for the RV
Maliki is widely viewed as:
Anti-reform
Resistant to currency change
A threat to international confidence
Sudani, on the other hand:
Aligns with reform
Keeps international support intact
Maintains the path toward sanction removal
The RV cannot proceed without trust.
Q&A Section (SEO Optimized)
What is the Kuwait Syndrome?
It’s a strategy where governments hide positive currency developments behind negative media to prevent speculation before a revaluation.
Are OFAC sanctions the last ones on Iraq?
Yes. They are the final major sanctions preventing Iraq from increasing its currency value and going international.
Is Iraq past its constitutional deadline?
Yes. The 30-day period to complete the presidential step expired on Wednesday the 28th.
Why won’t Maliki become Prime Minister?
According to Jeff, international pressure—especially from the U.S.—has blocked Maliki due to his anti-reform reputation.
Does political instability mean the RV is dead?
No. Public instability often masks private financial readiness.
Final Thoughts: Silence Doesn’t Mean Failure
The absence of confirmation is not a sign of defeat.
It’s a sign of:
Strategic timing
International coordination
Final-stage preparation
The Kuwait Syndrome only makes sense once you understand it.
Important Disclaimer
All content discussed reflects opinion only and is for general and educational purposes. Nothing shared should be considered financial, legal, or professional advice. Always consult a qualified professional before making financial decisions.
Let's get into the 'Kuwait Syndrome' aspect of this. Can they tell you before the rate changes that they're going to flat out pull the OACT sanctions...? Those are the last, final, remaining sanctions on Iraq...Hell no they're not going to do that...Here's what they're doing.
They're reviewing Iraq right now to make sure they're worthy of lifting the last final remaining OFAC/UNTreasury sanctions so they can increase the currency value and go international. But what they're portraying in the news is instability and insecurity. They can't give you clues the rate is about to go up in value. This is the Kuwait Syndrome...When you follow the facts through the means of their actions you can gauge this so much better and accurately...
They're past their constitutional period right now, the 30-day mark, of voting on and completing the step of the president, which is step two out of four within their government formation. Their constitutional period reached its deadline as of Wednesday the 28th.
They're now past that...When the formation of the government started, I told you Maliki is not going to get this. It will be Sudani...They stated [Maliki] is the top pick but Trump's got some big cojones and came forward saying, 'Hey, Iraq, you put Maliki in and we're done helping you 100%.' ...Trump put a roadblock right in front of them...and it's in limbo.
A HARSH MESSAGE FOR IRAQIS: THE TIME FOR WARNINGS IS OVER… IRAQ’S ECONOMY IS “OUT OF CONTROL” AND HAS ENTERED “THE EYE OF THE STORM”.
For months, Baghdad Today has treated Iraqi economic indicators as early warning signs of more dangerous phases looming on the horizon: successive jumps in the parallel market exchange rate, inflationary budgets, a growing deficit, a rapidly depleting reserve, and increasing pressure on the salaries of employees and vulnerable groups. With every economic report and investigation, the central warning was clear: if radical and swift solutions are not implemented, the country is heading toward a breaking point from which no palliative measures will suffice.
Today, economist Manar Al-Obaidi describes this moment with stark clarity: we are no longer in the stage of warning or forecasting, but rather “in the eye of the storm”; in a “real hurricane vortex,” as he says, where things have spiraled out of control, and talk of a financial crisis is no longer just an analytical luxury, but an existential question: What comes after the hurricane?
From monitoring indicators to acknowledging the “hurricane”
During the past period, the economic affairs department of “Baghdad Today” monitored an escalating path of all economic and financial crises: the parallel dollar exchange rate, which jumped to around 157,000 dinars per 100 dollars, then declined slightly without returning to comfortable levels; the pressure of imports through outlets that are not fully subject to the new mechanisms; the increasing reliance on the parallel market to finance trade with Turkey and Iran; and waves of increases in the prices of basic commodities, coinciding with talk of new or stricter taxes and fees.
In parallel, discussions about non-oil revenues revealed the extent of tax and customs losses, and the size of the gap between what can be collected theoretically and what actually enters the public treasury, under a dilapidated collection system, overlapping political, partisan and commercial interests, and a division in the management of ports between the center and the region.
According to Al-Ubaidi, these indicators are no longer mere harbingers of crisis, but rather signs that we have indeed entered a new phase. He says: “There has been much talk recently about the economic crisis and the financial situation, but reality compels us to move from describing the crisis to confronting what comes after it. We are no longer in the stage of warning or forecasting, but rather in the eye of the storm itself, where any patchwork solutions or temporary remedies are no longer effective.
Things, quite simply, have spiraled out of control, and Iraq today is in the vortex of a real hurricane.” This description is consistent with what “Baghdad Today” warned against in previous reports: that insisting on postponing reform, and relying on short-term solutions to buy time, turns the crisis from a situation that can be contained into a “hurricane” whose extent of losses is difficult to predict.
A crisis deeper than the numbers: a collapse of trust between the state and its citizens.
The danger of the current moment lies not only in the size of the deficit, the exchange rate, or the inflation rate, but also in the state of trust between the state and its citizens. Al-Ubaidi puts his finger on this very point when he links the depth of the crisis to the limits of the official institutions’ ability to address it alone: ”The reality indicates that the crisis has exceeded the capacity of official institutions alone to contain and resolve it, and has become a shared responsibility that falls on all influential parties in society. The fundamental reason for this is the loss of trust between the state and its citizens, which is the greatest challenge facing any genuine reform process.”
Today, as he points out, the only remaining link between the citizen and official institutions is the ability to meet immediate financial obligations: the monthly salary of the employee and retiree, payment of dues, financing of the ration card if it exists, and immediate response to any liquidity crisis.
Any talk of deep structural reforms, or “surgical operations” in the structure of the budget and public spending, will – logically – face widespread popular rejection, because the trust that allows society to bear the painful cost of any reform has not yet been restored.
This situation leaves the state essentially “captive” to a single option: continuing to deplete current and future resources to maintain a semblance of social stability by securing salaries at any cost, calming markets by any means, and postponing confrontation with major issues, from corruption to the budget structure. However, as Al-Ubaidi points out, this approach is nearing its end.
“Continuing with this approach—based on depleting current and future resources to secure this fragile thread of stability—is nearing its end. The ability to continue in this manner has reached its final stages.”
Between Ramadan, the dollar, and taxes… double the pressure on living standards.
The worsening crisis coincides with the approach of Ramadan, a period traditionally marked by increased demand for food and basic commodities. With a volatile and high parallel market exchange rate for the dollar, higher import costs, and talk of increased or stricter taxes and fees, any price hikes will be even more burdensome for low-income families.
This means that citizens today face a double burden: on the one hand, the rising cost of imported goods, particularly food, medicine, and basic commodities; and on the other hand, the increasing tax, duty, and customs burdens, both directly and indirectly through higher service costs.
In this climate, any slight disruption in the flow of salaries or delay in funding – as we have seen discussed in some ministries and departments – immediately turns into existential anxiety for a wide segment of society, not only because they depend on the salary, but also because alternatives are almost non-existent, and the private labor market itself is affected by any shock in the exchange rate or the size of aggregate demand.
After the hurricane: Social and security scenarios
Al-Ubaidi goes beyond describing the financial crisis; he links the failure to manage this stage with the possibility of it turning into a comprehensive social and security crisis: “This harsh test will reveal Iraq’s ability to overcome its ordeal. If it manages to maintain its unity and social cohesion, then it is stronger than all the economic and political challenges it faces. But failure to overcome this stage, which is a real possibility, portends a serious social collapse and a disintegration of the national fabric, and may extend – God forbid – to security dimensions.”
This warning is not unfounded; the country carries a heavy memory of past blockades, sanctions, and collapses. The difference today is that the nature of the crisis is different: there are no comprehensive sanctions on a closed state as in the 1990s, but rather a complex web of financial pressures, the risk of sectoral or banking sanctions, a parallel market that holds prices hostage, and an inflationary budget dependent on oil in a turbulent world.
In such an environment, any further disruption could open the door to:
The parallel and unregulated economy has expanded.
Increased social tensions,
-Expanding patterns of financial and market exploitation,
– Opening up security gaps in the most vulnerable areas.
From budget cuts to exposing corruption… what is the way out?
Faced with this bleak picture, Al-Obaidi lays out a clear – albeit difficult – path to escape the “whirlpool of the storm”: “There is no real way out of this vortex except through absolute candor and transparency. Starting with opening the file of public budgets from the first budget after 2003 until today, passing through reopening all corruption files without exception, revealing where public funds were spent and where they went, and holding accountable everyone who was negligent or lax in this regard.”
This means, practically speaking, that any realistic solution requires:
-A complete review of the course of public spending over more than two decades,
-Transparent auditing of budgets, contracts, and fictitious or stalled projects,
-Clear facts before the public regarding the fate of hundreds of billions of dollars that left the state treasuries.
Al-Ubaidi adds an important symbolic dimension: reducing the expenses of senior officials and the privileges granted to them, even if it is not a radical financial solution, because it carries a political and moral message to society: “Reducing the expenses of senior officials and the privileges granted to them – even if it does not constitute a radical financial solution – represents a very important moral step that contributes to reducing the gap between society and authority, and restores some of the lost trust.”
These steps, if coupled with genuine reforms to maximize non-oil revenues, control ports, unify customs tariffs, and rationalize spending, can reshape the relationship between the state and society on new foundations, based on transparency rather than deception.
THE DELAYED BUBBLE: WHEN DENYING THE CRISIS BECOMES MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE CRISIS ITSELF.
Al-Ubaidi’s latest message is very clear, and it aligns with what “Baghdad Today” has been warning against in its economic coverage: “Any attempt to lull the public into complacency, or to suggest that there is no need for real reforms, or to promote the possibility of paying dues in full and on time without cost, is nothing but an inflation of a bubble that is about to burst. Every bubble, no matter how long it lasts, is destined to burst… and then the consequences will be dire and their aftermath will be undesirable.”
In other words, denying the magnitude of the crisis, or being content with a temporary calming of the exchange rate, or a formal reassurance about salaries, without actual reforms in the budget, spending, revenues and fighting corruption, does not mean avoiding the explosion, but rather postponing it while amplifying its effects.
Between the warnings issued over months and the admission today that we are “in the eye of the storm,” Iraq stands before a crucial choice: either to courageously open the difficult files and restore confidence through full transparency and genuine reforms, or to continue managing the crisis with the logic of “patchwork” until the bubble bursts at the expense of the entire society.
At this moment, the question is no longer: Is there a crisis? But rather: Do we choose a painful reform of our own volition, or do we wait for a collapse that imposes prices on us that we cannot afford?