My friend talked to Patriot Rod Steel today and confirmed he talked to some title agents and they received funds.
More Rod details: "I was told paperwork has just been completed and the Admiral will release all Monday."
Rod continues: "The Iraqi government will release the new 'lower denomination' banknotes this week and then publish the new exchange rate (4+) which will be published in the Official Gazette on Sunday and then move to FOREX next Monday 22 April 1024.
My very close friend reviewed this information with two other contacts. Someone ver
y close to the Admiral, who works alongside him daily. And the second gentleman is very close to those on the Bond side who are regularly aware of the details.
Both are also online with Rod's news, which is extremely encouraging. We also know Mark is listening to similar stories.
More from Ginger: I can't give details because I swore to secrecy, but I can say the documents were signed by people we know and others heard good news from the leaders of their groups on the T3 Bond side.
I personally don't know anyone in T3 who has cash to spend so far, but I'm very pleased with all the news we're getting. I am firm and steady, being optimistic.
Greetings
Hernán
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translate spanish
domingo 14 de abril de 2024
Varilla de acero: Él dice.
Mi amigo habló con Patriot Rod Steel hoy y confirmó que habló con algunos agentes de títulos y recibieron fondos.
Más detalles de Rod: "Me dijeron que se acaba de completar el papeleo y que el almirante saldrá en libertad todo el lunes".
Rod continúa: "El gobierno iraquí publicará los nuevos billetes de 'menor denominación' esta semana y luego publicará el nuevo tipo de cambio (4+) que se publicará en el Boletín Oficial el domingo y luego pasará a FOREX el próximo lunes 22 de abril de 1024.
Mi amigo muy cercano revisó esta información con otros dos contactos. Alguien muy cercano al Almirante, que trabaja a su lado a diario. Y el segundo caballero es muy cercano a aquellos del lado de Bond que regularmente están al tanto de los detalles.
Ambos también están en línea con las noticias de Rod, lo cual es extremadamente alentador. También sabemos que Mark está escuchando historias similares.
Más de Ginger: No puedo dar detalles porque juré guardar el secreto, pero puedo decir que los documentos fueron firmados por personas que conocemos y otros escucharon buenas noticias de los líderes de sus grupos en el lado del Bond T3.
Personalmente no conozco a nadie en T3 que tenga efectivo para gastar hasta ahora, pero estoy muy contento con todas las noticias que estamos recibiendo. Soy firme y estable, siendo optimista.
Saludos
hernán
My friend spoke to Patriot Rod Steel today, and he confirmed that he's spoken with some bond people and they have received funds.
More details from Rod: "I was told the paperwork was just completed and the Admiral is going to release everything on Monday."
Rod continues: "The Iraq Government will reveal the new ‘lower denomination’ notes this week and then release the new Dinar Rate (4+) to be published in the Government Gazette on Sunday and then go on FOREX this coming Monday, the 12th". ROD
My very close friend vetted this information with two other contacts. One who is very close to the Admiral - as in working alongside him on a daily basis. And the second gentleman is extremely close to those on the Bond side who are clued into the details regularly. They both are in alignment with Rod's news also - so that's extremely encouraging. We also know that Mark is hearing similar stories.
More from Ginger: I cannot give details because I'm sworn to secrecy, but allowed to say that the papers have been signed by people we know AND others have heard happy news from their group leaders on the T3 Bond side. I personally do not know of anyone in T3 who has liquid, spendable funds as of yet, but I'm extremely pleased with all of the news we're getting. I'm grounded and steady - remaining optimistic. 2.10.24
The business meetings of the Supreme Coordinating Committee between Iraq and the United States began on Monday.
The Prime Minister’s Information Office said in a statement, seen by “Economy News”, that “the business meetings of the High Commission HCC between Iraq and the United States of America, on activating the strategic framework agreement, were launched and headed by the Iraq delegation, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning, Mohammed Tamim, and the US delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Anthony Blinken.”
💥April 15th Iraq PM and his delegation of Iraqi leaders and officials will meet with Joe Biden and key American officials and business leaders
💥Meetings included will be with the U.S Treasury & Federal Reserve
💥Gov of CBI will be in attendance
🚨Meetings will also be with American officials to discuss business development,sanctions , banking reforms , military troop withdrawal and U.S / Iraqi political agreements
Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani embarks on a trip to Dhi Qar governate on Jan. 8, 2024. (Source: IraqiPMO/Twitter/X)
Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani is set to meet US President Joe Biden for the first time on Apr. 15. The purpose of Sudani’s upcoming trip to Washington is to discuss “common priorities and reinforce the strong bilateral partnership,” according to the White House. The visit signals a mutual readiness to forge a new era of cooperation. Indeed, even though costly and increasingly problematic, the Iraqi prime minister’s openness to negotiate new terms for the US presence gives him an upper hand in drawing conditions agreeable to all sides.
Baghdad is hoping for more constructive strategic engagement with the US that does not undermine its relations with Iran. The Kurdistan Regional Government, on the other hand, is anxious about a more modest American commitment that might leave it vulnerable to a political environment that is more favorable for Iran and its allies. As such, while there are no signs of an articulated common strategic framework going forward, a delicate balance also needs to be struck between the interests of Baghdad and Erbil.
Kurdish oil exports
Ahead of Sudani’s arrival, diplomatic maneuvering to guarantee Kurdish energy security has intensified. Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s visit to Washingtonin early March involved pressure on the White House to convince Sudani to resume oil exports through northern Iraq.
In a Sept. 2023 meeting with Sudani, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken underscored Washington’s support for the re-opening of the pipeline to Turkey previously used for oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara shut down oil flows in Mar. 2023 following an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration ruling against it. In parallel, Baghdad and Erbil are reportedly mired in negotiations on matters such as the federal government’s payment of fees to third parties. While the closure of the pipeline has had a significant effect on Iraqi Kurdistan’s finances, only a minor portion of Baghdad’s oil exports have been affected.
The Biden-Sudani meeting thus comes amid mounting anticipation about the efficacy of US efforts to secure Baghdad’s consent to reopening the pipeline. From the perspective of the White House, the pipeline is an energy asset that can increase global oil supply and stabilize a Kurdistan region that it seeks to support as a reliable partner.
Withdrawal of US-led Coalition
The confrontation between Iraqi ‘resistance’ factions and US forces since Oct. 2023 has put the Sudani government in a delicate position. After the Biden administration’s initiation of an escalatory retaliation campaign last November in the face of repeated attacks, public discourse in Iraq began to shift and calls for a US withdrawal resurfaced. Despite Sudani making accommodative statements in support of a withdrawal, he has been vague and refrained from outlining a concrete decision or a timeline.
There is also the lack of a quorum in the Iraqi parliament ahead of a vote to demand the US-led Coalition’s exit from Iraq; the absence of Kurdish, Sunni, and over 100 Shiite Coordination Framework parliamentarians indicated the convergence between Baghdad and Erbil. While the federal and Kurdish regional governments seem in agreement over the demand for an immediate Coalition exit, they are in opposition over the ultimate fate of the US presence.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a senior advisor to the Iraqi government told Amwaj.media that Sudani’s visit to Washington will “mostly” revolve around “the economy and improving the bilateral relation[ship].” The source also explained that “there are no military or security officials among the delegation.” Yet given the possibility of the renewed targeting of US forces in Iraq, it is likely that security will be on the prime minister’s agenda.
In public announcements, Sudani has suggested that the threat of the Islamic State group (IS) has become manageable. In this vein, a detailed assessment of the ability of Iraqi security forces to counter terrorism is expected in parallel with the Iraqi-US political engagement. The Kurdish ruling parties—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—however, are warier of an extremist resurgence and believe any Coalition withdrawal in the medium to long term will likely favor IS.
Yet, the primary US concern remains aligned with both Baghdad and Erbil in terms of ensuring that an exit will not produce a security vacuum and favor an IS resurgence, similar to the 2011 withdrawal scenario. Having said that, the US is likely to uncouple its presence in federal Iraq from the Kurdistan region, finding an arrangement that keeps both sides sufficiently agreeable while maintaining its interests in the region. In this context, the same Iraqi government advisor disclosed to Amwaj.media that the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission will in July 2024 kick-start another round of talks on the Coalition presence.
Banking sanctions
The US has long applied economic pressure on Baghdad over its relationship with Tehran. Measures have involved restrictions on Iraq’s access to its dollar reserves, and efforts to stamp out alleged money laundering said to benefit Iran and Syria. With more than 100B USD in oil export proceeds held in the US, Iraq heavily relies on Washington’s goodwill to ensure that its foreign exchange reserves—and state finances more broadly—do not face US censure.
Against this backdrop, Sudani’s efforts to engage more closely with Washington are intended to persuade US officials to ease sanctions policies targeting Iraq, which have second-order impacts on the Iraqi economy and population. In return, Sudani has adopted accommodative financial reforms to combat alleged money laundering and to restrict illicit flows of US dollars. Speaking to Amwaj.media, the same senior government advisor confirmed that Baghdad is attempting to “find a mutual understanding with the US Treasury to mitigate pressures on Iraqi businesses such as banks or other companies put under sanctions.”
For example, as part of his cooperation with US authorities, Sudani in Jan. 2023 ordered an elite counter-terrorism force primarily tasked with combating IS to crack down on private currency traders allegedly delivering dollars to Iran. The move came only months after the US barred more than 20 Iraqi banks from conducting US dollar transactions.
Recent restrictions, however, have triggered a backlash from Sudani’s political allies, business elites, and the public, which have been hit hard by inflation due to dollar shortages. While the Kurdistan region has been under financial pressure from Baghdad, US restrictions on the Iraqi banking sector have put a strain on ordinary Kurds as well. Therefore, despite the clashes between the KDP and the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, Erbil has an interest in seeing Sudani lessen US restrictions.
Containing armed groups
In an effort to engage with Turkey and to improve ties with the US, Iraq’s prime minister has sought to curb the influence of armed groups—albeit with limited success. For instance, the Coordination Framework—which backs Sudani—has responded to the campaign against US interests by ‘resistance’ factions by alleging that they operate outside the government and urged security forces to stop them.
On the other hand, Iraq on Mar. 14 banned the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a step that Ankara has welcomed. The move is part of the larger power struggle between Baghdad and Erbil, particularly over control of the strategic Sinjar district in northwestern Iraq. Mostly inhabitedby the minority Yazidi community, the area is contested by the Iraqi army, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), the KDP and the PKK.
Importantly, the ban on the PKK may signal that the Sudani government is willing to take action against US-designated terrorist groups. This may increase US pressure on Sudani to also outlaw ‘resistance’ factions. Yet it is doubtful that the prime minister will heed such a demand given his reliance on the Coordination Framework and friendly relations with Tehran.
Ultimately, while the Iraqi prime minister will arrive in Washington with an eagerness and desire to maximize an opportunity to strategically engage on economic, political, and security issues, he must also consider the preferences of his domestic political allies and balance vis-à-vis Iran. Still, the Biden administration has room to make significant progress; both in mediating relations between Baghdad and Erbil, and in guaranteeing US interests in Iraq. To achieve such an outcome, President Biden needs to clear about his priorities—and realistic about the concessions he can extract from his Iraqi guest.
Bureau of Land Management Announcement: The Bureau of Land Management insures that fair taxpayer return and accountability for oil and gas operations are adhered to on public lands. The BLM entered their proposal into a final rule. This final rule goes into the Federal Register and cannot be implemented no sooner than 30 days from its publication. The Final Rule is as follows... * The Fluid Mineral Leases and Leasing Process rule. "This rule reinforces the BLM’s leadership role in energy development by:
1 ensuring responsible leasing and diligent development to minimize conflicts with other resources while ensuring the BLM can continue to manage public lands for multiple uses; 2 implementing key fiscal reforms, including updating royalty rates, rental rates, and minimum bids on BLM-managed public lands; and 3 modernizing bonding requirements for leasing, development, and production to ensure taxpayers do not bear the cost of orphaned wells on public lands."