🇮🇶 PMF UPDATE – MY OPINION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
In my opinion, these developments are some of the most significant signals yet that Iraq is moving toward stronger state authority and a gradual reduction of influence from armed factions operating outside full government control. 🇮🇶⚖️
The reports suggest that Washington’s position has become much firmer, and the space for delaying a resolution on the PMF issue is narrowing quickly. At the same time, Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to distance the Peace Brigades from his movement adds further pressure on other factions to adjust to a changing political reality.
What stands out is that the discussion is no longer about if change will happen, but rather how and when it will take place. The push to bring all weapons under the authority of the Iraqi state could represent an important turning point for Iraq’s sovereignty, security, and long-term stability. ⚖️🛡️
I also see the ongoing dialogue between the United States and Iran as a key factor. As long as diplomatic channels remain open, there is still room for negotiated solutions rather than escalation.
Overall, I view these developments as positive for Iraq. A stronger central government, improved security, and a more stable political environment are essential foundations for economic growth, foreign investment, and successful reforms.
The RV of the Iraqi Dinar is just waiting for this issue to be finally resolved!📈🇮🇶
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THE FRAMEWORK IS IN DISARRAY… AND THE SPECTER OF DISBANDING THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES LOOMS OVER THE NEGOTIATIONS.
Signals from Petraeus: No further deadline for the factions, and the dollar is Washington’s card.
According to information obtained by Al-Mada, the first American signals regarding the message conveyed through retired US General David Petraeus have reached Baghdad, but they did not carry what the Shiite forces, seeking to buy time, were hoping for.
Political sources describe these responses as “unreassuring,” while reinforcing the impression within the “Coordination Framework” that Washington has finalized its position on the issue of armed factions, and that the room for maneuver that Baghdad tried to open up in recent weeks appears narrower than previously thought.
At the very moment when some factions within the “Framework” were searching for political solutions to resolve the weapons issue in exchange for maintaining their influence within the new government, Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Shiite National Movement (Sadr Movement), surprised his rivals with a preemptive move, announcing the disassociation of the “Peace Brigades” from the movement. This has placed the remaining factions before a reality they can no longer easily postpone.
While al-Sadr is making progress on the weapons issue, other Shia forces appear to be taking one step forward and then another back, amidst clear confusion about how to deal with escalating American pressure and fears that the disarmament process could shift from a mere reorganization of factions to a broader course that might ultimately redefine the Popular Mobilization Forces’ position within the state.
During the recent Eid holiday, Shia circles were preoccupied with reviewing their options amidst leaks suggesting disagreements regarding the mechanisms for dismantling armed headquarters, the form of integration within security institutions, and which entities would refuse to comply with any new settlement. Political sources close to the “Coordination Framework”
told Al-Mada that “categorical and non-negotiable” American messages were delivered to Iraqi political leaders following Petraeus’s visit to Baghdad. These messages included an explicit rejection of any figure affiliated with armed factions assuming ministerial portfolios in the new government.
According to the sources, Washington linked this stance to sensitive economic and financial matters, including dollar shipments and Iraqi assets, as well as considerations related to American, regional, and Gulf interests.
Sources add that some political leaders preferred to keep the content of those messages secret for fear of triggering a new crisis within the “coordination framework.” Meanwhile, alternative options are being discussed, involving the appointment of figures described as “independent technocrats” to head the contentious ministries, in an attempt to avoid a political clash that could negatively impact the economic situation.
In the first American comment on the controversial visit, a US State Department official told Al-Mada that David Petraeus is “a private citizen and does not play any official role with the US diplomatic mission in Iraq.”
The American position came after a report published by Al-Mada last week about Petraeus’s appearance in Baghdad for the first time in nearly two decades, amid reports of an Iraqi initiative aimed at securing a lull of several months before making final decisions regarding the armed factions.
Although sources denied that Petraeus was an official envoy of US President Donald Trump, they confirmed that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi used his old relationship with the American general, dating back to the “Awakening” years between 2006 and 2007, to try to find an indirect channel of communication with Washington and reduce the chances of confrontation with the factions.
According to this account, Petraeus carried an Iraqi message requesting that Baghdad be given a three-month grace period to place the factions under strict control. The government would commit to immediately canceling any agreements if attacks against Erbil, embassies, or vital installations resumed.
This information could not be independently verified. In a move that disrupted the calculations of his rivals within the Shia political establishment, Muqtadaal-Sadr, leader of the Shia National Movement, announced the disassociation of the Peace Brigades from his movement. He also announced the transformation of its civilian formations into official institutions, stripped of weapons, headquarters, and organizational titles, emphasizing that the decision stemmed from “the public interest.”
Sadr did not stop at relinquishing the movement’s military wing; he called on the remaining Popular Mobilization Forces factions to distance themselves from partisan and sectarian frameworks, fully integrate under state authority, and surrender their weapons. This vision is based on consolidating weapons under government control and regulating the activities of armed groups according to specific legal and time-bound frameworks.
Observers viewed this move as an attempt to preempt internal and external pressures related to the weapons issue and to present the remaining factions with a similar obligation that they may find difficult to ignore in the future.
Researcher and academic Mohammed Naanaa believes that the current situation goes beyond the mere issue of weapons. He told Al-Mada that restricting weapons to the state “is not the sole objective in the state-building process, but merely the primary one, followed by holding the killers and corrupt officials accountable.” He added that what al-Sadr initiated of his own volition “will not be available to others, who will be forced into what they do not want.”
The initiative quickly moved from the level of political pronouncements to the executive branch. Last Friday, the committee appointed by al-Sadr announced that it had held its first meeting to oversee the formal disaffiliation of the Peace Brigades.
Al-Sadr’s office stated that the committee commenced its work in accordance with the directives of the movement’s leader, which stipulated the completion of the procedures for separating the Peace Brigades’ military wing from the Shiite national movement within a maximum period of one week, and the follow-up on the organizational and administrative aspects related to the decision.
Information obtained by Al-Mada indicates that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi intends, during the first 100 days of his government, to establish specific mechanisms for dealing with the six factions listed on the US blacklist, in parallel with reopening several major corruption cases, including that of Noor Zuhair.
According to this information, al-Zaidi held a series of discreet consultations with armed factions during his tenure, within a tripartite committee that also included former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri. The data suggests that these discussions resulted in unannounced understandings that excluded armed groups from ministerial positions in the new government.
Leaks from within the “coordination framework” indicate that al-Zaidi received a “green light” to proceed with measures related to the weapons file during a call he had with Muqtada al-Sadr approximately two weeks prior.
From the early days of al-Zaydi’s appointment, al-Sadr had put forward a clear vision for dealing with the issue, when he called on the prime minister-designate to transform the armed factions into a formation called “Soldiers of Religious Rites” under the supervision of the Hajj and Umrah Authority, or into humanitarian institutions specializing in relief and aid, while considering any party that refuses this as “outlaws.”
Al-Sadr stated at the time, “If they do so, I am prepared to dissolve the Promised Day Brigade and hand over the Peace Brigades to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Everyone should do this as quickly as possible.”
These steps are part of a series of internal reviews that al-Sadr initiated about a month prior, which included removing several leaders, confiscating vehicles and weapons from a number of his followers, and expelling dozens from the movement. Those close to him described this as a process to restructure the organization and reorganize its affairs in preparation for a different political phase.
Regarding Muqtada al-Sadr’s move, data within the “Coordination Framework” indicates a clear division in positions on the issue of weapons. According to Health Minister Abdul Hussein al-Moussawi, a leader in the Virtue Party, five out of seven factions have agreed to proceed with the disarmament process in exchange for guarantees.
Political circles suggest that these factions include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali; the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri; as well as Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Thaar Allah, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.
Multiple sources indicate that al-Amiri is managing the most important part of the negotiations concerning the armed factions, through the committee formed after al-Zaidi’s appointment. This committee is believed to be working in parallel with a proposal by the leader of the Badr Organization to establish a “Federal Security Ministry,” which would encompass the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Rapid Response Forces, the Federal Police, the Border Security Forces, and possibly the Peshmerga as well.
Mahmoud al-Hayani, a member of the Badr Organization, believes this proposal represents the “best solution” for protecting the rights of PMF members and ensuring the armed groups’ subordination to the government’s authority. In an interview with Al-Mada, he pointed to leaks suggesting preliminary approval of the idea from retired US General David Petraeus, despite the absence of any official US position.
However, despite these proposals, the mechanism for dealing with the armed factions remains unclear. According to political sources, the proposed integration or restructuring plans may not be sufficient to convince Washington, nor do they necessarily guarantee the factions positions within the executive branch.
According to political sources, the US veto contributed to the obstruction of the confirmation of nine ministerial candidates, due to Washington’s refusal to grant any positions to figures affiliated with or associated with armed factions.
Meanwhile, some Shia circles view these developments as a prelude to targeting the Popular Mobilization Forces themselves. An official from one of the armed groups told Al-Mada that “disarmament is nothing but a way to circumvent and dismantle the Popular Mobilization Forces under the guise of handing over weapons to the government or enforcing the law in response to American pressure.”
This stance reflects the extent of the skepticism held by some factions regarding the current course of action, especially given the continued refusal of influential groups, such as Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, to discuss any disarmament.
In this context, the so-called “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” announced that it will not lay down its weapons or hand them over to the government “as long as the occupation continues,” according to news outlets.
Abu Mahdi al-Jaafari, spokesman for Saraya Awliya al-Dam, who presented himself as a representative of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” in widely circulated statements, confirmed that the issue of disarmament “is not up for discussion at the present time,” adding: “There will beno talk of laying down or handing over weapons until the injustice and occupation end in Iraq.”
Al-Jaafari criticized those calling for the disarmament of the factions, saying that these parties “used to describe the resistance as heroes during the war, but they forget the names of those who defended Iraq when peace returns.”
Between factions that have expressed a willingness to participate in state arrangements and others that still refuse even to discuss the issue, it seems that the battle over weapons in Iraq has not yet moved to the implementation phase. Rather, it remains confined to the realm of understandings and mutual guarantees, amidst increasing American pressure and internal fears that the current trajectory will lead to a reshaping of the Popular Mobilization Forces and their role in the next phase.
