Saturday, December 20, 2025

🇮🇶 Iraq After the 2025 Elections: Political Power Shifts, Reform Challenges & What Comes Next

 📌 Introduction: A Critical Turning Point for Iraq

Following Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections, the country finds itself at a decisive crossroads.
An expert panel hosted by Joshua Yaf at the Center for the National Interest examined the political, economic, and structural realities shaping Iraq’s future.

While the elections were conducted peacefully—an achievement in itself—the aftermath reveals deep-rooted systemic challenges, shifting power dynamics, and mounting socio-economic pressures that will define Iraq’s trajectory for years to come.


🗳️ Election Results & Power Distribution

Key Outcomes

  • Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s coalition

    • Officially won 46–47 seats

    • Directly controls fewer than 16 seats

  • Pro-Iranian / anti-Western factions

    • Expanded dramatically

    • From ~17 seats in 2021 to 80–90 seats in 2025

  • Coordination Framework (Shia alliance)

    • Remains the dominant political force

    • Likely to select the next prime minister

What This Means

Parliamentary influence is fragmented, while real power remains concentrated within elite political alliances, reducing accountability and limiting genuine reform.


🏛️ Government Formation & the Muhasasa System

Iraq’s political system continues to operate under the Muhasasa system, an informal sectarian power-sharing framework.

Characteristics of the System:

  • Ensures inclusion of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish blocs

  • Diffuses responsibility and accountability

  • Encourages patronage over performance

According to panelists:

  • The next prime minister is likely to function as an “employee” of the coordination framework

  • Structural reform is constrained by elite resistance

  • Political competition has shifted from inter-sectarian to intra-sectarian rivalries


🟨 Kurdish Political Crisis

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) faces its own internal turmoil:

  • Ongoing divisions between:

    • Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)

    • Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

  • Delays in:

    • KRG formation

    • Federal government formation

  • Weakening of traditional Kurdish power-sharing agreements

These divisions risk undermining:

  • Kurdish leverage in Baghdad

  • The Kurdish-held Iraqi presidency

  • Long-term regional stability


⚠️ Reform, Accountability & Public Disillusionment

Marginalization of Reform Movements

  • Post-2019 protest movements (e.g., Tishreen) have been:

    • Co-opted

    • Neutralized

    • Politically sidelined

Structural Barriers

  • Entrenched elites resist reform

  • Elections avoided serious debates on:

    • Economic restructuring

    • Fiscal discipline

  • Public expectations for jobs and services continue to rise


💰 Economic & Fiscal Challenges

Iraq faces mounting economic pressure:

Core Issues

  • Lack of short-term and long-term economic planning

  • Repeated fiscal crises (2014, 2020) met with populist responses

  • Continued reliance on:

    • Oil revenues

    • Public-sector employment

Consequences

  • Shrinking fiscal space

  • End of “unlimited spending”

  • Strong public resistance to austerity measures


🌍 Emerging Existential Challenges

Climate & Water

  • Climate change and water scarcity threaten:

    • Agriculture

    • Rural livelihoods

    • Food security

Demographics

  • ~60% of Iraq’s population is under 20

  • High demand for:

    • Jobs

    • Education

    • Public services

  • Failure to meet expectations risks instability

Energy Transition & AI

  • Global energy transition challenges Iraq’s oil dependency

  • Artificial intelligence reshapes labor markets faster than policy adaptation


🌐 Foreign Influence: Iran vs. the U.S.

Iranian Influence

  • Iran retains deep influence through:

    • Militias

    • Political factions

    • Provincial governance

  • Iranian-aligned actors control key security and administrative roles

  • Iraqi elites often rely on Iran during internal crises

U.S. Influence

  • U.S. presence is declining

  • Troop withdrawal expected to complete by end of 2026

  • Kurdish leaders express concern over reduced U.S. engagement


⭐ Featured Snippet: Iraq Post-2025 Snapshot

Iraq After the 2025 Elections

  • Parliament convenes: December 29, 2025

  • Pro-Iranian factions gain major influence

  • Government formation may take up to a year

  • Economic, climate, and demographic pressures rising

  • Reform constrained by sectarian power-sharing


❓ Q&A – Key Questions Answered

Q: Did the 2025 elections change Iraq’s political system?

A: No. They reinforced the existing sectarian power-sharing structure.

Q: Who really controls government formation?

A: The Shia-led coordination framework, not parliament alone.

Q: Why is reform so difficult?

A: Elite resistance, patronage systems, and public opposition to painful economic reforms.

Q: Is foreign influence decreasing?

A: It is shifting—less direct U.S. influence, continued strong Iranian leverage.


🔍 Timeline of Key Events

  • Nov 17, 2025 – Supreme Federal Court limits Sudani’s powers (caretaker role)

  • Dec 29, 2025 – New parliament convenes

  • 2025–2026 – Lengthy government formation process

  • By end of 2026 – Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal


🧠 Key Insights

  • Power-sharing prevents domination but limits accountability

  • Pro-Iranian factions are stronger than ever

  • Economic and environmental crises are accelerating

  • Kurdish disunity weakens national influence

  • Iraq’s future depends on internal political maturity


🏁 Final Thoughts

The 2025 elections highlight both progress and fragility. While Iraq avoided widespread violence at the polls, the post-election reality underscores enduring structural weaknesses.

True stability will not come from external actors, but from:

  • Accountability

  • Merit-based governance

  • Economic realism

  • Inclusive national dialogue

Iraq’s challenge is no longer just survival—but evolution.


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Summary: Iraq Since the 2025 Elections – Political Dynamics and Challenges

This expert panel discussion, hosted by Joshua Yaf at the Center for the National Interest, focuses on the aftermath of Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections, the government formation process, and the broader political and socio-economic challenges facing Iraq. The Supreme Federal Court recently certified the election results, with the new parliament slated to convene on December 29, 2025. The government formation process is expected to be lengthy and complex.


Key Political Developments and Dynamics

  • Election Outcomes and Power Distribution:

    • Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s coalition officially won about 46-47 seats, but he effectively controls fewer than 16 seats directly.
    • Pro-Iranian and anti-Western factions gained a significant presence, increasing their parliamentary seats from about 17 in 2021 to 80-90 in 2025, marking a major shift.
    • The coordination framework (a Shia political alliance) remains dominant and will likely select the next prime minister, reducing the parliament’s direct influence.
  • Government Formation and Muhasasa System:

    • The Muhasasa system—a sectarian power-sharing arrangement—continues to shape Iraqi politics, emphasizing inclusion but diffusing accountability.
    • The next prime minister will likely serve as an employee of the coordination framework rather than an autonomous leader, limiting reform potential.
    • Political competition is increasingly intra-community (within Shia, Sunni, Kurdish blocs) rather than inter-community, complicating governance.
  • Kurdish Political Crisis:

    • Internal divisions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) remain unresolved, delaying both the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) formation and national government formation.
    • The traditional Kurdish power-sharing arrangement is weakening, raising questions about future influence and representation, including the Kurdish-held Iraqi presidency.
    • Kurdish parties are significant beneficiaries of the power-sharing system but face challenges maintaining unity.
  • Challenges to Reform and Accountability:

    • Reform-minded groups and the youth-driven protest movements post-2019 (e.g., Tashin movement) have been marginalized or co-opted.
    • The entrenched political elite resist structural reform, and the absence of strong economic policy debates during elections reflects public reluctance to confront painful economic adjustments.
    • Fiscal constraints are mounting, ending the era of unlimited government spending, clashing with growing public demand for jobs and services.

Socio-Economic and Structural Challenges

  • Economic Planning Deficits:

    • Iraq lacks both short-term and long-term economic planning; repeated fiscal crises (2014, 2020) were met with populist responses rather than sustainable reforms.
    • The rentier state model persists, with heavy reliance on oil revenues and public sector employment, undermining fiscal stability.
    • Public resistance to austerity and reform impedes necessary policy changes.
  • Emerging Critical Issues:

    • Climate change and water scarcity represent existential challenges, particularly affecting rural communities and food security.
    • The impending energy transition and the rise of artificial intelligence pose strategic imperatives for Iraq’s economy and labor market.
    • The youthful demographic (about 60% under 20 years old) amplifies demands for employment and services but also risks instability if unmet.

Foreign Influence and Iraq’s International Relations

  • Iranian Influence:

    • Despite regional setbacks, Iran retains strong influence in Iraq through militias and political factions embedded in local governance.
    • Iranian allies control key security and administrative roles in various provinces, ensuring continued leverage regardless of national government composition.
    • Iraqi political elites often lean on Iran for internal support during crises, reflecting ongoing dependency.
  • U.S. Influence:

    • U.S. presence and influence are waning; troop withdrawal is ongoing, expected to complete by end of 2026.
    • The appointment of Mark Sabaya as U.S. special envoy is seen by Iraqi politicians as lacking political weight and effectiveness.
    • Kurdish parties are particularly anxious about diminishing U.S. engagement, which has historically served as a leverage point.

Institutional and Political System Observations

AspectDescription
Muhasasa SystemInformal power-sharing arrangement distributing government positions among sectarian/ethnic groups; diffuses power.
Parliamentary DynamicsFragmented power with no majority; lack of accountability; political blocs block each other’s initiatives.
Constitutional AmbiguitiesNo clear definition of “largest block”; two-thirds quorum for presidency election institutionalizes power-sharing.
Minority ProtectionsConstitutional safeguards (e.g., two-thirds vote for presidency) aim to prevent majority tyranny but complicate governance.
Electoral Law ImplicationsSeats allocated by province reinforce identity politics; identity-based parties remain dominant.

Panelists’ Key Recommendations and Conclusions

  • Need for Accountability and Reform:

    • Iraq’s future depends on accountability within political institutions rather than external influence.
    • Merit-based public sector appointments are essential to break spoils-based patronage systems.
    • Political leaders must prioritize national interests over factional and sectarian competition.
  • Importance of Dialogue and Inclusion:

    • Continued dialogue and cultural exchanges are critical to bridging ethnic and sectarian divides.
    • The Kurdish leadership should unite to protect and leverage their position within the power-sharing system.
    • Power-sharing arrangements, while imperfect, are necessary given Iraq’s demographic and political realities.
  • Addressing Economic and Environmental Crises:

    • The government must confront fiscal challenges head-on despite unpopularity.
    • Preparing for energy transition and technological change requires immediate investment in human capital and infrastructure.
    • Climate change mitigation and water resource management are urgent priorities.
  • Foreign Relations Management:

    • Iraq should aim to balance its relationships with Iran and the U.S. to safeguard sovereignty.
    • Reliance on external actors for political stability is unsustainable; internal political maturity is crucial.

Timeline of Notable Events Post-Elections

DateEvent
November 17, 2025Supreme Federal Court limits Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s executive powers, reducing him to caretaker status.
December 29, 2025New Iraqi parliament scheduled to convene.
2025-2026Government formation process expected to unfold, possibly lasting up to a year.
By end of 2026U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq to be completed.

Core Concepts and Terms

TermDefinition / Explanation
Muhasasa SystemSectarian power-sharing framework distributing government roles among groups.
Coordination FrameworkDominant Shia political alliance controlling government formation decisions.
Power-Sharing / ConsociationalismPolitical system designed to share power among ethnic/religious groups to prevent dominance by any single group.
Rentier StateEconomy heavily dependent on resource rents, especially oil revenues.
Two-Thirds QuorumParliamentary requirement to elect the president, institutionalizing minority protections.

Key Insights

  • Iraq’s political landscape remains deeply influenced by traditional sectarian power-sharing, limiting reform and accountability.
  • The rise of pro-Iranian factions represents a significant shift in parliamentary power, with implications for Iraq’s foreign relations and internal policy.
  • Economic and environmental crises are mounting, but political incentives and public expectations hinder meaningful policy responses.
  • Internal Kurdish divisions and unresolved regional governance issues pose additional obstacles to stable government formation.
  • Foreign influence from Iran and the U.S. continues but with diminished direct control; Iraq’s sovereignty and political maturity are pivotal for future stability.
  • Despite challenges, the peaceful conduct of recent elections marks a positive, if fragile, step in Iraq’s democratic trajectory.

Conclusion

The 2025 elections in Iraq have reaffirmed the entrenched sectarian power-sharing system, with the coordination framework and pro-Iranian factions strengthening their grip on power. Political fragmentation, intra-communal rivalries, and institutional ambiguities hinder effective governance and reform. Meanwhile, Iraq faces critical socio-economic challenges, including fiscal constraints, climate change, and a youthful population demanding jobs and services. Foreign influence, particularly from Iran and the U.S., remains significant but is waning in direct impact. The path forward requires Iraq’s political actors to balance power-sharing with accountability, prioritize economic and environmental reforms, and foster inclusive dialogue to navigate the country’s complex realities.

Ultimately, Iraq’s future depends on internal political maturity and the ability of its leaders to transcend sectarian divides and external dependencies while addressing urgent domestic challenges.

🚨 TNT Tony Intel Update | December 23 RV Talk, Bank Screens & Iraq Rate Rumors

📌 Introduction: High Activity, Heavy Rumors

According to TNT Tony, there is currently a massive amount of activity, rumors, and conflicting informationcirculating behind the scenes.

This update, dated December 19 (Notes by Ginger Doucet), reflects what Tony says he was told through:

  • Bank contacts

  • IMF conversations

  • Calls from Iraq

  • Unofficial confirmations during the call itself

As always, this information is shared as commentary and rumor, not as verified fact.


🏦 Wells Fargo & IMF Conversations

Tony reported that early in the morning:

  • He spoke with Wells Fargo

  • They advised him to:

    • “Stay by your phone”

    • Noted the IMF had information

Tony then contacted the IMF, who allegedly stated:

  • “Memos went out.

  • Banks were expected to call with 800 numbers

  • Timing suggested: before 4:00 PM EST

Tony described both conversations as excited and upbeat, even being told:

“Tell Ray to get excited!”


🇮🇶 Iraq Reports: Zeroes, Mosques & Kurdistan Claims

Later that day, Tony received calls from contacts in Iraq claiming:

  • News was spreading:

    • On television

    • In mosques

  • Claims included:

    • Dropping one zero

    • Dropping additional zeroes over the weekend

    • Completion by December 23

    • An international rate by that date

One claim stated that:

  • The rate had already changed in Kurdistan

  • Reported rates mentioned:

    • $3.86

    • 1:1 exchanges allegedly occurring

Tony noted that despite these claims:

  • Nothing changed on Forex at that time


💻 Bank Screens & Rate Visibility Claims

Tony later stated he received another call from Wells Fargo indicating:

  • A rate appeared on internal bank screens

  • Reported values mentioned:

    • $3.81

    • Previously $4.00 earlier in the week

  • The banker allegedly stated:

    • She had seen the rate days earlier

    • The screen updated around bank closing time

Tony speculated fluctuations could relate to oil price movement.


📅 December 23: A Repeated Date

December 23 appeared repeatedly throughout this update:

  • Iraq contacts allegedly referenced it

  • IMF reportedly wanted things “done” by then

  • Tony suggested:

    • This may align with a Christmas timing

    • A “gift” narrative was mentioned

Tony also said:

  • Banks allegedly received memos

  • Exchanges could run all next week

  • Some banks might even operate on Christmas Day


🌍 Other Geopolitical Commentary

Tony also shared opinions and speculation regarding:

Venezuela

  • He believes the Bolivar may not be included

  • Cited:

    • Political instability

    • Alleged military actions (unconfirmed, not reported in mainstream news)

  • Suggested Venezuela may be:

    • Removed

    • Delayed

    • Or placed into a different “basket”

These remarks were clearly Tony’s interpretation, not official statements.


⭐ Featured Snippet: TNT Tony Key Points

TNT Tony – December 19 Intel Summary

  • Wells Fargo & IMF allegedly referencing memos

  • 800 number talk before Dec 23

  • Iraq rumors of zero removal and rate change

  • Kurdistan rate claims around $3.86

  • Bank screen rate visibility claimed

  • December 23 repeatedly mentioned

(Rumors and commentary only, not confirmed facts.)


❓ Q&A – Important Clarifications

Q: Are these rates confirmed?

A: No. These are unverified claims shared by TNT Tony.

Q: Did Forex show changes?

A: Tony stated Forex did not reflect changes at the time.

Q: Is December 23 guaranteed?

A: No. It is a repeated rumor date, not an official announcement.

Q: Are banks working on Christmas?

A: Tony claims memos suggested extended schedules, but this is unconfirmed.


⚠️ Important Disclaimer

This post reflects:

  • Rumors

  • Second- and third-hand reports

  • Personal interpretations

Readers are encouraged to:

  • Stay grounded

  • Avoid financial decisions based on rumors

  • Wait for official confirmation from banks or authorities


🙏 Final Thoughts

TNT Tony described the atmosphere as:

“Everything is good… lots of information coming in.”

While the excitement is clear, experienced observers know that only official notifications matter.

Until then:

  • Stay calm

  • Stay prepared

  • Stay patient


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🔥 Hashtags

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TNT

TNT Tony

Notes by Ginger Doucet

Tony says there is a LOT of stuff going on, lots of rumors. Yesterday, at 7:20 a.m., Tony talked to Wells Fargo. They said to stay by his phone, that the IMF has info. Tony called IMF and they said “Memos went out this. You should be getting a call from the banks, with 800 numbers shortly, before 4:00 EST.” They were both excited. They said, “Tell Ray to get excited!”

Yesterday evening, a guy from Iraq called Tony, said it’s all over the news, on TV, in the mosques, that they will drop one zero today, drop zeroes over the weekend, and by Dec 23, this is over! International rate by Dec 23. He said the rate had already changed in Kurdistan when he called. The rate in Kurdistan, as of yesterday, was $3.86. Today, they called Tony, and said they are exchanging 1:1 right now, and the rate is $3.86. Everyone is partying in Iraq! Tony waited until 5:00 and nothing changed on Forex.

Tony just got a call from Wells Fargo, saying he was the last to leave the bank today, and the rate is on the screen at $3.81. They can see the rate on the screen and it came up when the bank closed at 6:30; she had seen it days earlier as well. It was $4.00 on Tuesday. Tony says that makes sense because the price of oil has dropped.

A guy from Iraq said CBI has it and it is in their hands to make the announcement. Supposedly they already told the people it was Dec 23. IMF told us they wanted us to be done by Dec 23 (meaning notifications I believe). Now Tony was just told it was to be released because Trump wants us to have a Christmas gift.

Everything is good! Tony is getting all good information. Everyone is saying Dec 23, that we should see it by then. We could go tomorrow because the banks are working tomorrow; everyone has to be in. They got a memo this evening, saying they will be doing exchanges all next week and will be working on Christmas Day. Tony thinks they will get triple time for working on Christmas!

Venezuela is not going. It wouldn’t make sense. The vote authorized Trump to take action on land; he hasn’t done that yet. It is supposed to happen between Christmas and the 29th, a shock and awe thing.

Tony says that Trump has passed control over the RV back to Iraq, to make the announcement. That is good news, according to Tony. It should be live between now and Dec 23. Tony hopes to get the 800 number tomorrow.

Another guy confirmed Live during the call, that the rate has been changed in Iraq and people he knows who served in Iraq exchanged their currency yesterday and today.

Tony divulged that there was some military action already taken in Venezuela that is not in the news yet, two or three days ago, involving quite a few casualties on their side already. This is why Tony doesn’t think the Bolivar is going. That was holding us up, according to Tony. He recommends doing the Bolivar exchange and “then cut them off at the knees!” If they put Venezuela in the second basket there will be thousands more billionaires in the US. So maybe it could happen and the Bolivar could be in the first basket.

Tony got another call from a guy who verified that one zero has been dropped from the IQD in Iraq yesterday. All this should go in effect over the weekend and go live by Tuesday, if not tomorrow.

JEFF: When the rate changes it'll come out somewhere around the $3.80 ra...

US Congress Votes to Repeal Iraq War Authorisations

 The US Congress has voted in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to repeal the 1991 and 2002 Authorisations for Use of Military Force against Iraq, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026.

The repeal is awaiting ratification by President Donald Trump.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq said the decision marks a fundamental shift in the legal framework governing relations between the two countries, reinforcing respect for Iraq's sovereignty and supporting a renewed strategic partnership.

The ministry added that the repeal sends a clear signal to the international community that Iraq has become a stable and secure environment for attracting investment.

Full statement from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs views with great pleasure the historic vote by the US Congress, in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, to repeal the Authorizations for Use of Military Force against Iraq of 1991 and 2002, included within the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, and awaits its ratification by President Donald Trump. 

The completion of the repeal process for the abovementioned Authorizations for Use of Military Force, in place for over three decades, reflects the change in the convictions of U.S. lawmakers due to a set of domestic and external considerations. This repeal also constitutes a fundamental turning point in reshaping the legal nature of the relationship between the two countries and lays the foundation for a new framework of relations based on respect for Iraq's sovereignty and the closure of the legacy of war. It also enhances the framework of the strategic partnership and conveys to the world a message that Iraq has become an environment safe for attracting investment. 

The Ministry considers that the repeal of the Authorizations for Use of Military Force does not damage counterterrorism efforts, because the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, issued in response to the September 11 attacks to address the threats posed by Al-Qaeda and other associated terrorist organizations, remains in force. 

The Ministry also reiterates the commitment of the Government of the Republic of Iraq to strengthening bilateral relations in a manner that contributes to building a long-term partnership, serves the interests of the two friendly countries, and supports stability in the Middle East region.

(Source: Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

MARKZ: 🇮🇶 Iraq Pushes Toward HCL & Monetary Reform | MarkZ via PDK Intel Update

 📌 Introduction: Why Iraq News Matters Right Now

Fresh intel shared by MarkZ (via PDK) is drawing attention to rapid political and monetary movement inside Iraq, particularly as key deadlines approach.

According to MarkZ, Iraq appears to be scrambling to complete unfinished files before Parliament reconvenes on December 29, with strong implications for:

  • HCL (Hydrocarbon Law)

  • Article 140

  • Banking and monetary reform

  • Purchasing power of the Iraqi dinar

Many long-time observers see this as exactly the type of pressure and activity expected before a major financial shift.


🏛️ Article 140, Election Law & Urgent Political Timelines

Article Referenced:

“Article 140 and the Council of the Federation with the amendment of the election law. A delegation from the party to implement the outstanding files with Baghdad”

Key takeaways from MarkZ’s commentary:

  • The Kurdish region is pushing hard to:

    • Finalize agreements with Baghdad

    • Resolve long-standing constitutional and revenue-sharing issues

  • There is urgency to:

    • Complete the government formation

    • Finalize files before Parliament sits again on December 29

According to MarkZ, the motivation is clear:

They want the HCL done so they can get their new rate.

This type of coordinated political pressure is viewed as a strong signal by those tracking dinar reform.


⏳ Why December 29 Is a Critical Date

December 29 keeps coming up across multiple intel sources because:

  • Parliament resumes

  • Outstanding laws must be settled beforehand

  • Monetary and fiscal reforms appear to be entering their final phase

MarkZ emphasized:

There is a massive push… this is what we wanted to see… so this is exciting today.


📉 Dinar Devaluation Talk: A Familiar Pattern?

Another Iraqi headline raised eyebrows:

Article:

“Iraqi Economist warns of possible dinar devaluation amid fiscal pressure”

MarkZ addressed this directly:

  • Iraq has already stated they would not devalue

  • Similar stories appeared:

    • In Kuwait

    • In China

  • Historically, such articles often surface right before revaluations, not devaluations

This type of media messaging is seen by many as pre-conditioning, not policy direction.


🏦 Central Bank Signals: Monetary Reform Status

Article:

“Monetary Policy Indicators confirm Central Bank first in 2025”

MarkZ interpreted this as highly significant.

According to his analysis:

  • Iraq confirms full access to banking and monetary reform

    • Covering 2023, 2024, and 2025

  • Authorities are signaling that:

    • Major reforms are already completed

    • Remaining steps will be finalized this month

  • The reforms are described as being:

    • Solely designed to lift the purchasing power of the dinar

This aligns closely with long-standing expectations of a structured, multi-year reform plan reaching completion.


⭐ Featured Snippet: Iraq Reform Signals at a Glance

MarkZ via PDK – Key Iraq Developments

  • Kurdish region pushing HCL completion

  • Article 140 and election law amendments underway

  • Parliament reconvenes December 29

  • Banking reforms targeted for completion this month

  • Monetary reform designed to increase dinar purchasing power

(Shared as commentary and interpretation, not official confirmation.)


❓ Q&A – Common Questions

Q: Is Iraq officially announcing a new dinar rate?

A: No. These are political and economic signals, not a formal rate announcement.

Q: Why is HCL so important?

A: HCL is widely viewed as a prerequisite for revenue sharing and economic normalization.

Q: Are devaluation rumors credible?

A: Iraq has publicly stated it does not plan to devalue; similar rumors have historically appeared before RV-related events.

Q: What does “banking reforms completed” imply?

A: According to MarkZ, it suggests infrastructure readiness for increased purchasing power and monetary changes.


🔍 Why This Update Is Significant

What stands out in this intel:

  • Deadlines

  • Political urgency

  • Consistent messaging from Iraq’s financial institutions

  • Historical patterns repeating

For many watchers, this represents alignment rather than coincidence.


🙏 Final Thoughts

Nothing is official until it happens. However, the speed, pressure, and coordination currently visible inside Iraq are exactly what many have waited years to see.

As MarkZ noted, this is:

What we wanted to see.

Stay watchful. Stay grounded. And stay prepared.


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MarkZ   [via PDK] 

  Article:    “Article 140 and the Council of the Federation with the amendment of the election law. A delegation from the “party” to implement the outstanding files with Baghdad” 

  The Kurdish region is scrambling to get the government done before Parliament sits again (Dec 29) they want the HCL done so they can get their new rate. There is a massive push….this is what we wanted to see…so this is exciting today.

Some fun stuff out of Iraq this morning: “Iraqi Economist warns of possible dinar devaluation amid fiscal pressure” 

 This is very similar to what we saw in Kuwait. Iraq has already told us they would not go there. But these are the kind of stories they run before RVs…we saw the same thing in China as well. 

 Article:  “Monetary Policy Indicators confirm Central Bank first in 2025”  

This means they have all the access to banking and monetary reform for the years of 2023 to 2025. They are telling us that they have completed…in 23 and 24 and 2025…that they have completed this massive reform that is solely designed to lift the purchasing power of the dinar. They are telling us they will finish the banking reforms during the rest of this month. 

SANDY INGRAM: Iraqi Dinar vs Zimbabwe – Why Iraq’s Currency Could Follow a Positive Path

Iraqi Dinar vs Zimbabwe – Why Iraq’s Currency Could Follow a Positive Path Introduction While some may compare Iraq’s economy to Zimbabwe’s,...