Shafaq News
The recent escalation of strikes targeting Iraqi armed factions may represent more than another episode in the region’s long cycle of proxy confrontations. For the first time since Iran’s leadership transition, the attacks are testing how the Islamic Republic’s network of allied movements in Iraq —known as Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)— will function without the authority of Ali Khamenei, and under the leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei.
As tensions deepen between Iran and its adversaries, Iraqi factions aligned with Tehran have once again moved to the forefront of regional escalation. Yet the current moment differs from previous crises. The transition from Ali Khamenei’s decades-long leadership introduces new questions about how Iran will manage its network of allied movements across the Middle East —and whether Iraqi factions will retain the same strategic role within that architecture.
For more than three decades, Ali Khamenei presided over the gradual construction of the Axis of Resistance, a loose but interconnected network of movements stretching from Lebanon to Yemen and Iraq. Through a combination of ideological guidance, institutional coordination, and military support, the system evolved into one of the Islamic Republic’s most important tools for projecting influence beyond its borders.
Iraq became a central arena within that framework. The rise of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) during the war against ISIS transformed the country into a pivotal pillar of the resistance network, providing Tehran with political allies, armed partners, and geographic depth along some of the region’s most sensitive fault lines.
Ali Khamenei’s authority within this structure rested not only on strategic oversight but also on religious legitimacy. As Supreme Leader, he embodied both political command and clerical authority under the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, allowing him to function as the symbolic patron of movements that viewed themselves as part of a broader resistance project. Mojtaba Khamenei now inherits that system at a moment when it faces one of its most serious regional tests.
In his first public remarks after assuming leadership, Mojtaba Khamenei emphasized that Iran’s regional network remains inseparable from the values of the Islamic Revolution, echoing language frequently used during his father’s rule. The message did not focus specifically on Iraq, but references to resistance fronts in Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere were widely interpreted as reassurance that Tehran’s regional doctrine would continue along the same ideological trajectory.
The speech, delivered amid widening regional confrontation with the United States and Israel, suggests that Iran intends to maintain a coordinated approach across multiple fronts.
“Khamenei referred directly to resistance fronts in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon,” Haitham Al-Heeti, professor of political science at the University of Exeter, told Shafaq News. “What we are witnessing across several arenas at the same time reflects a coordinated effort among members of this axis to manage the conflict.”
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Iran affairs expert Mehdi Azizi believes the rhetoric coming from factions across the region points to a similar narrative. According to him, statements issued by Iraqi armed groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and the Badr Organization indicate that many actors within the Tehran-aligned factions see the current phase as fundamentally different from previous confrontations.
“They view the escalation not simply as a clash between Iran and the United States,” Azizi said, “but as a broader struggle between the Islamic resistance and the Zionist project.”
Reactions inside Iraq suggest that many factions aligned with Tehran have already moved to signal loyalty to the new leadership. The Badr Organization, led by Hadi Al-Ameri, described Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection as “a blessed continuation of the revolution,” while Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali said the transition strengthens the position of the Islamic Republic and preserves the ideological path established under Ali Khamenei.
Some statements were even more explicit. Kataib Hezbollah spokesman Jaafar al-Husseini declared “absolute loyalty to the new leadership,” while Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada leader Abu Alaa al-Walaei said the “line of Wilayat al-Faqih will remain alive and active in the nation,” calling Mojtaba “the best successor to the best predecessor.”
Support has also emerged from Iraq’s political sphere. Ammar al-Hakim, head of the National Wisdom Movement (Al-Hikma), offered condolences to the Iranian people over Ali Khamenei’s death while congratulating Mojtaba on his selection, expressing hope that he would continue his father’s path “in upholding truth and sustaining the course of sacrifice.”
Symbolic expressions of allegiance have appeared beyond official statements. During a funeral procession for fighters from the faction Ansar Allah al-Awfiya who were killed in an airstrike on their headquarters in the Akashat area of western Al-Anbar, mourners carried portraits of Mojtaba Khamenei alongside banners associated with the resistance axis. Similar displays appeared during Quds Day rallies in several Iraqi cities, where demonstrators raised slogans supporting the new Iranian leader.
Still, the response from Iraqi factions reflects more than ideological alignment alone. Hussein al-Sheihani, a member of the Sadiqoon Movement —the political wing of Asaib Ahl al-Haq— told Shafaq News that armed groups in Iraq are closely monitoring regional developments, emphasizing that decisions regarding war and peace are influenced by both national and religious considerations.
A source familiar with Iraqi resistance told Shafaq News, in condition of anonymity, that despite their shared alignment with Iran, the factions do not form a single unified bloc. “Leadership structures, political affiliations, and operational priorities vary widely across Iraq’s armed landscape, creating a network that is simultaneously interconnected and fragmented.”
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The fragmentation has become visible in their responses to the government’s efforts to place all weapons under the authority of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. While some groups reacted with relative restraint, others — most notably Kataib Hezbollah— firmly rejected the proposal. Similar divisions have appeared in the factions’ rhetoric toward the current attacks on the United States sites in Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region. Although the targeting has been claimed under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, the source revealed that not all factions have adopted the same tone: “Some have issued sharply aggressive statements, while others have remained noticeably more restrained.”
These internal dynamics can complicate efforts to maintain unified strategic coordination, particularly during moments of leadership transition in Tehran.
Under Ali Khamenei, ideological authority and institutional links —particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force— helped sustain cohesion across the resistance network. Whether Mojtaba Khamenei will exercise a similar level of influence remains an open question.
Amid these developments, two possible trajectories are beginning to take shape. One scenario suggests that the leadership transition could gradually shift operational authority toward Iran’s security institutions rather than clerical leadership alone. If that dynamic takes hold, coordination among Iraqi armed factions may increasingly rely on military channels and institutional structures rather than on the personal religious authority that long anchored the network under Ali Khamenei.
Another view holds that the Iraqi Resistance may already have evolved beyond dependence on a single figure. In that reading, the network now operates as a strategic framework whose actors share overlapping interests, narratives, and operational ties, enabling it to maintain cohesion even during moments of leadership transition.
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For the Iraqi government, the escalation presents a familiar but increasingly delicate dilemma. Baghdad has repeatedly emphasized that it does not want Iraq to become an arena for regional confrontation. Yet the presence of multiple armed actors aligned with external powers makes that objective difficult to achieve.
Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani recently condemned strikes on Iraqi territory as “blatant aggression,” reiterating that Iraq should not be used to settle regional disputes. At the same time, the government faces internal pressure from factions that view the confrontation with the United States and Israel as part of a broader resistance struggle.
The unfolding confrontation may therefore provide the clearest indication yet of how Iran’s allied movements will function under Iran’s new leadership. If Iraqi factions respond in coordination with other fronts across the region, it suggests that the strategic doctrine built under Ali Khamenei remains intact despite the transition. If divisions emerge —or if Iraqi groups begin prioritizing local considerations over regional alignment— the balance between centralized direction and local autonomy within the network could begin to shift.
For now, the signals remain mixed but revealing. Loyalty declarations from factions and political figures in Iraq suggest continuity, yet the recent wave of airstrikes targeting Iran-aligned factions across Iraq —killing dozens of fighters and damaging several Popular Mobilization Forces sites— may represent more than another episode in the region’s cycle of proxy confrontations. How Iraqi factions respond in the coming months may offer the clearest indication of whether Iran’s resistance network remains a centralized strategic project —or is evolving into a looser alliance of actors navigating their own local realities.
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