THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ CLARIFIES THE MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH THE DOLLAR IN ALL ITS ISSUANCES.
The Central Bank of Iraq, in a directive to licensed banks and non-bank financial institutions, stressed the importance of reducing discrimination in the exchange rate of the US dollar between old and new issues, stressing the need for all banks and financial institutions to adhere to the instructions for trading and exchanging banknotes, in accordance with the approved standards for foreign banknotes, especially the US dollar, in order to ensure the safety of monetary transactions and market stability.
instructions and regulations in force do not adopt any discrimination between the different editions of the US dollar currency, noting that the bank continues to receive these issues and deal with them through all authorized banks, provided that they are within the internationally and locally approved standards and regulations.
This clarification comes within the framework of the Central Bank of Iraq’s commitment to enhancing transparency and discipline in the banking sector, protecting customers, and supporting monetary and financial stability in Iraq.
Central Bank of Iraq, Media Office, February 16, 2026
SHOWDOWN: President Donald Trump (U.S.) vs Nouri al-Maliki (Iraq)
Who Will “Make Iraq Great Again”?
A high-stakes political moment is unfolding in Iraq. With pressure mounting to convene parliament and elect a new president, internal negotiations are intensifying — and international signals are adding another layer of complexity.
At the center of the debate:
Donald Trump
Nouri al-Maliki
But this isn’t just about personalities. It’s about political alignment, constitutional interpretation, and international positioning at a critical moment.
The Coordinating Framework Seeks an Alternative
Reports indicate that Iraq’s Coordinating Framework is exploring an alternative candidate to al-Maliki as discussions continue over forming consensus.
According to statements attributed to leaders within the Hikma Movement, efforts are underway to identify a candidate acceptable to:
Major Shiite blocs
Kurdish factions
Sunni representatives
International stakeholders
The goal: avoid a parliamentary deadlock that could stall the electoral process.
The U.S. Position: A Reported Veto?
Recent commentary suggests that Washington remains opposed to al-Maliki’s return to executive leadership.
While there is no formal public “veto” mechanism in Iraq’s constitutional process, U.S. political influence remains significant. Donald Trump has previously signaled strong interest in Iraqi leadership outcomes, emphasizing that U.S.–Iraq relations are strategically important.
The message being interpreted by some observers: Any candidate must be workable within broader U.S.–Iraq cooperation frameworks.
Constitutional Pressure: Article 72 in Focus
The situation has now shifted to Iraq’s judiciary.
The Federal Supreme Court of Iraq is reportedly being asked to clarify Article 72 / Paragraph Two / Clause (B) of the Iraqi Constitution.
This clause addresses:
The continuation of the President of the Republic in office
The timeline for electing a successor
If ambiguity exists in the interpretation, the court’s ruling could determine:
Whether current leadership continues temporarily
Whether parliament must accelerate elections
Whether the process resets politically
Everyone appears to be waiting for the court’s response.
If no agreement is reached before a vote, the session could falter — potentially prolonging instability.
If a compromise candidate emerges, momentum could shift rapidly.
Featured Snippet: What Is Happening in Iraq’s Presidential Election?
Iraq’s Coordinating Framework is reportedly seeking an alternative to Nouri al-Maliki amid political pressure and reported U.S. opposition. The Federal Supreme Court is being asked to clarify Article 72 of the Constitution, which could determine how and when a new president is elected.
Trump vs. Maliki: What’s Really at Stake?
This is less about a personal rivalry and more about:
Iraq’s international alignment
Internal Shiite bloc unity
U.S.–Iraq strategic relations
Regional balance of power
Al-Maliki remains an influential figure in Iraqi politics. However, controversy surrounding his previous tenure continues to shape debate.
The question being asked in political circles:
Will Iraq choose continuity, compromise, or a completely new direction?
Possible Scenarios
1️⃣ Consensus Candidate Emerges
The Coordinating Framework agrees on a new nominee acceptable to domestic blocs and international partners.
2️⃣ Parliamentary Session Falters
Without prior agreement, voting stalls and negotiations reset.
3️⃣ Court Clarification Reshapes Timeline
The Federal Supreme Court ruling changes procedural timing, giving factions more room to negotiate.
Q&A Section
❓ Is there officially a U.S. veto on Iraqi candidates?
There is no constitutional U.S. veto in Iraq’s system. However, U.S. political influence can impact diplomatic and economic dynamics.
❓ What does Article 72 of Iraq’s Constitution address?
It concerns the term and continuation of the President of the Republic and the timeline for electing a successor.
❓ Why is consensus so important before a parliamentary vote?
Without prior political agreement, sessions risk failing due to lack of quorum or bloc opposition.
❓ Could this impact Iraq’s broader reforms?
Political stability is foundational for economic, institutional, and international reforms. Leadership decisions can influence momentum across sectors.
No Rumors. No Hype. No Opinions.
The developments described above are based on reported political positioning and public procedural actions.
Key facts:
The Coordinating Framework is seeking broader agreement.
The Hikma Movement confirms alternative discussions.
The Federal Supreme Court is being asked for constitutional clarification.
THE COORDINATING FRAMEWORK IS LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO MALIKI. As pressure mounts to convene a parliamentary session to elect a new president, an Iraqi parliamentarian warned that the process could falter without a prior political agreement. Meanwhile, with the US vetoing Nouri al-Maliki's candidacy remaining in place, a leader in the Hikma Movement revealed that the coordinating body is working to identify a new candidate acceptable to all parties. Meanwhile the Federal Supreme Court to request clarification regarding Article (72)/ Paragraph Two/ Clause (B) of the Constitution, which relates to the continuation of the President of the Republic in his duties and setting a date for the election of his successor, stressing that everyone
is waiting for the court's response. This could be a pivotal week for the elections.....
Their words not mine..... No Rumors, No Hype, No Opinions ,....
Nouri Al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, rejected reports of a possible withdrawal from the race for Iraq’s premiership, as the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) intensifies internal deliberations over its nominee, sources told Shafaq News on Monday.
A source close to the former premier described the claims of an imminent retreat as “politically motivated rumors,” stressing that no meeting of the CF, the largest parliamentary bloc which had previously nominated Al-Maliki, was scheduled Monday to announce or formalize any decision.
Meanwhile, senior figures within the Framework have held consultative meetings to reassess the nomination. A CF source revealed that leaders who oppose Al-Maliki’s return sought to unify positions within the Shiite political house and discussed the possibility of selecting an alternative from a previously proposed list of candidates.
The source cited mounting domestic crises, regional instability, and external pressure as key factors shaping the debate, adding that some factions fear that accumulated challenges could trigger public backlash against the broader political process. “The final decision remains in the hands of the Framework.”
Naseem Abdullah, a member of the political bureau of the Eqtadar Watan Movement within the CF, underlined that the alliance would consider “the challenges facing the country and the issue of national consensus” before resolving the matter, emphasizing that a unified decision is the objective.
Under Iraq’s post-2003 power-sharing arrangement, the presidency is traditionally held by a Kurd, the premiership by a Shiite, and the speakership by a Sunni Arab. Parliament must elect a president by a two-thirds quorum before the head of state can task the largest parliamentary bloc with forming a government. Previous attempts collapsed after divisions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) prevented quorum.
Political tensions have further escalated following a warning by US President Donald Trump that Washington could reconsider its dealings with Iraq if Al-Maliki were to return as prime minister. A CF source also disclosed that caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani received a written proposal to extend the caretaker government’s mandate for one year with reduced powers as a possible way to ease the impasse.
The conversation surrounding Iraq’s monetary reform continues to intensify. Political commentary, strategic messaging, and financial reform signals are all moving in parallel. But despite the mounting speculation, several critical elements have NOT been officially announced.
Let’s break down exactly what is missing — and why it matters.
What Has NOT Been Officially Announced?
According to multiple analysts following developments closely, three major announcements are still absent:
1️⃣ The New Exchange Rate
Despite ongoing discussions about monetary reform and closing economic gaps, no official new exchange rate has been released by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI).
If Iraq were to formally adjust its currency value to reflect broader economic reforms, it would require:
A public CBI declaration
Official documentation
Publication across recognized financial channels
Until that happens, the exchange rate remains unchanged in official capacity.
What has not been officially announced? #1 the new exchange rate to fill in the gap of all this [monetary reform] they're talking about. #2 A reinstatement or international float. #3 A public statement that the dinar is now globally traded. Those require a formal CBI announcement and they haven't issued that yet...The wiring is done. The switch hasn't been flipped.
Clare
Article: "Trump comments on the coordinating framework candidate: We have some options" Quote: "Days after his blog post, in which he spoke of not cooperating with Iraq if Nouri al-Maliki were chosen as prime minister, US President Donald Trump returned with a new statement...Trump, in response to a question from a Rudaw Network reporter about whether he had a veto on Nouri al-Maliki, said: 'We are looking at a prime minister, we will see what happens, we have some ideas on the subject, in the end everyone needs the United States."
Militia Man
Gatekeepers are getting exactly what they want, a controlled, credible transition to a more market reflective system...They're telling us in full force we're doing these things. The political noise is...the right hand. Left hand, pay attention. [Like a magic trick].
For more than two decades, negotiations between the United States and Iran have followed a familiar cycle: escalation, talks, temporary calm, then renewed confrontation. Despite repeated diplomatic efforts, in Baghdad, Geneva, Vienna, Doha, and most recently Muscat, lasting breakthroughs have remained elusive.
The latest Oman talks may also fit squarely within this pattern. The persistent failure of these negotiations is not rooted in poor diplomacy or lack of channels, but in deeper structural contradictions that repeatedly undermine any progress. At the core of the impasse lies a basic mismatch in how Washington and Tehran define the problem. Washington approaches negotiations with Iran as a “comprehensive security challenge.”
Over time, US demands have expanded well beyond the nuclear file to include Iran’s ballistic missile program, its support for armed groups across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
and Yemen, and, increasingly, its internal governance and human rights record. From the American perspective, these issues are “interconnected” and cannot be meaningfully separated.
Iran, by contrast, views negotiations almost exclusively through the lens of sanctions relief. Iranian officials insist that talks focus solely on the nuclear program, arguing that missiles, regional alliances, and domestic politics fall under national sovereignty and defensive necessity.
This divergence means both sides often enter negotiations with incompatible agendas, reducing talks to crisis management rather than conflict resolution. Iran’s leverage does not primarily rest on its nuclear program, but on capabilities it consistently refuses to negotiate: its missile arsenal and its regional network of allied armed groups. Iran possesses one of the largest ballistic missile inventories in the Middle East, while its regional partners have demonstrated the ability to strike US assets and allies across multiple theaters since 2019. These tools form the backbone of Tehran’s deterrence strategy. From Iran’s perspective, surrendering them in exchange for sanctions relief -which can be reversed- would amount to strategic disarmament.
The calculus explains why Iranian negotiators may have consistently rejected efforts to “broaden” talks. Even when agreements are reached, they suffer from a credibility deficit. The 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated that Iran could meet technical obligations: IAEA monitoring confirmed compliance for nearly three years. Yet the US withdrawal in 2018 reinforced Tehran’s belief that American commitments are subject to electoral cycles, not binding state policy.
The asymmetry is central and seen when Iran is repeatedly asked to make long-term, technically irreversible concessions, while sanctions relief remains politically reversible in Washington. This experience has hardened Iran’s negotiating posture, particularly as US sanctions now number in the thousands, affecting banking, energy exports, shipping, and currency access. Both sides have institutionalized escalation as a negotiating tool. Iran has responded to diplomatic pressure by raising uranium enrichment levels, from the JCPOA cap of 3.67% to levels exceeding 60%, while also regional tensions rise through its allied groups. The United States, meanwhile, has relied on economic sanctions, military deployments, and explicit threats to extract concessions. Over time, this dynamic has normalized brinkmanship.
Talks are often triggered not by trust, but by fear of uncontrolled escalation. Once immediate pressure subsides, incentives to compromise fade. Recent military strikes in the 12-day June 2025 war and explicit threats have further complicated diplomacy. Talks conducted under the shadow of force rarely produce flexibility. Instead, they strengthen hardliners, narrow political space for compromise, and frame negotiations as acts of resistance rather than problem-solving. In Iran’s case, external pressure has reinforced the narrative that “deterrence, not accommodation, guarantees survival.” This framing limits political room for compromise
and turns negotiations into symbols of resistance rather than instruments of resolution.
Confrontation itself serves domestic political purposes on both sides. In Washington, a hard line on Iran signals resolve to allies and voters. In Tehran, sustained external hostility helps justify internal controls, deflect economic grievances, and consolidate power within security institutions. Periods of heightened tension often coincide with greater political influence for security bodies inside Iran.
Peace, by contrast, removes a useful external adversary and introduces domestic political risk. US–Iran talks rarely fail because diplomacy is insufficient. They fail because the underlying conflict remains strategically useful and structurally unresolved. The only period of genuine progress came when negotiations were narrowly focused, regional issues were deferred, and sanctions relief was clearly defined. Absent a fundamental shift -either a willingness by Iran to negotiate its broader power or an ability by the United States to offer lasting economic normalization- talks will continue to manage tension rather than resolve it. In this sense, recurring negotiations are mechanisms designed to prevent confrontation from spiraling out of control, not signs of imminent peace.