Nouri Al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, rejected reports of a possible withdrawal from the race for Iraq’s premiership, as the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) intensifies internal deliberations over its nominee, sources told Shafaq News on Monday.
A source close to the former premier described the claims of an imminent retreat as “politically motivated rumors,” stressing that no meeting of the CF, the largest parliamentary bloc which had previously nominated Al-Maliki, was scheduled Monday to announce or formalize any decision.
Meanwhile, senior figures within the Framework have held consultative meetings to reassess the nomination. A CF source revealed that leaders who oppose Al-Maliki’s return sought to unify positions within the Shiite political house and discussed the possibility of selecting an alternative from a previously proposed list of candidates.
The source cited mounting domestic crises, regional instability, and external pressure as key factors shaping the debate, adding that some factions fear that accumulated challenges could trigger public backlash against the broader political process. “The final decision remains in the hands of the Framework.”
Naseem Abdullah, a member of the political bureau of the Eqtadar Watan Movement within the CF, underlined that the alliance would consider “the challenges facing the country and the issue of national consensus” before resolving the matter, emphasizing that a unified decision is the objective.
Under Iraq’s post-2003 power-sharing arrangement, the presidency is traditionally held by a Kurd, the premiership by a Shiite, and the speakership by a Sunni Arab. Parliament must elect a president by a two-thirds quorum before the head of state can task the largest parliamentary bloc with forming a government. Previous attempts collapsed after divisions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) prevented quorum.
Political tensions have further escalated following a warning by US President Donald Trump that Washington could reconsider its dealings with Iraq if Al-Maliki were to return as prime minister. A CF source also disclosed that caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani received a written proposal to extend the caretaker government’s mandate for one year with reduced powers as a possible way to ease the impasse.
The conversation surrounding Iraq’s monetary reform continues to intensify. Political commentary, strategic messaging, and financial reform signals are all moving in parallel. But despite the mounting speculation, several critical elements have NOT been officially announced.
Let’s break down exactly what is missing — and why it matters.
What Has NOT Been Officially Announced?
According to multiple analysts following developments closely, three major announcements are still absent:
1️⃣ The New Exchange Rate
Despite ongoing discussions about monetary reform and closing economic gaps, no official new exchange rate has been released by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI).
If Iraq were to formally adjust its currency value to reflect broader economic reforms, it would require:
A public CBI declaration
Official documentation
Publication across recognized financial channels
Until that happens, the exchange rate remains unchanged in official capacity.
What has not been officially announced? #1 the new exchange rate to fill in the gap of all this [monetary reform] they're talking about. #2 A reinstatement or international float. #3 A public statement that the dinar is now globally traded. Those require a formal CBI announcement and they haven't issued that yet...The wiring is done. The switch hasn't been flipped.
Clare
Article: "Trump comments on the coordinating framework candidate: We have some options" Quote: "Days after his blog post, in which he spoke of not cooperating with Iraq if Nouri al-Maliki were chosen as prime minister, US President Donald Trump returned with a new statement...Trump, in response to a question from a Rudaw Network reporter about whether he had a veto on Nouri al-Maliki, said: 'We are looking at a prime minister, we will see what happens, we have some ideas on the subject, in the end everyone needs the United States."
Militia Man
Gatekeepers are getting exactly what they want, a controlled, credible transition to a more market reflective system...They're telling us in full force we're doing these things. The political noise is...the right hand. Left hand, pay attention. [Like a magic trick].
For more than two decades, negotiations between the United States and Iran have followed a familiar cycle: escalation, talks, temporary calm, then renewed confrontation. Despite repeated diplomatic efforts, in Baghdad, Geneva, Vienna, Doha, and most recently Muscat, lasting breakthroughs have remained elusive.
The latest Oman talks may also fit squarely within this pattern. The persistent failure of these negotiations is not rooted in poor diplomacy or lack of channels, but in deeper structural contradictions that repeatedly undermine any progress. At the core of the impasse lies a basic mismatch in how Washington and Tehran define the problem. Washington approaches negotiations with Iran as a “comprehensive security challenge.”
Over time, US demands have expanded well beyond the nuclear file to include Iran’s ballistic missile program, its support for armed groups across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
and Yemen, and, increasingly, its internal governance and human rights record. From the American perspective, these issues are “interconnected” and cannot be meaningfully separated.
Iran, by contrast, views negotiations almost exclusively through the lens of sanctions relief. Iranian officials insist that talks focus solely on the nuclear program, arguing that missiles, regional alliances, and domestic politics fall under national sovereignty and defensive necessity.
This divergence means both sides often enter negotiations with incompatible agendas, reducing talks to crisis management rather than conflict resolution. Iran’s leverage does not primarily rest on its nuclear program, but on capabilities it consistently refuses to negotiate: its missile arsenal and its regional network of allied armed groups. Iran possesses one of the largest ballistic missile inventories in the Middle East, while its regional partners have demonstrated the ability to strike US assets and allies across multiple theaters since 2019. These tools form the backbone of Tehran’s deterrence strategy. From Iran’s perspective, surrendering them in exchange for sanctions relief -which can be reversed- would amount to strategic disarmament.
The calculus explains why Iranian negotiators may have consistently rejected efforts to “broaden” talks. Even when agreements are reached, they suffer from a credibility deficit. The 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated that Iran could meet technical obligations: IAEA monitoring confirmed compliance for nearly three years. Yet the US withdrawal in 2018 reinforced Tehran’s belief that American commitments are subject to electoral cycles, not binding state policy.
The asymmetry is central and seen when Iran is repeatedly asked to make long-term, technically irreversible concessions, while sanctions relief remains politically reversible in Washington. This experience has hardened Iran’s negotiating posture, particularly as US sanctions now number in the thousands, affecting banking, energy exports, shipping, and currency access. Both sides have institutionalized escalation as a negotiating tool. Iran has responded to diplomatic pressure by raising uranium enrichment levels, from the JCPOA cap of 3.67% to levels exceeding 60%, while also regional tensions rise through its allied groups. The United States, meanwhile, has relied on economic sanctions, military deployments, and explicit threats to extract concessions. Over time, this dynamic has normalized brinkmanship.
Talks are often triggered not by trust, but by fear of uncontrolled escalation. Once immediate pressure subsides, incentives to compromise fade. Recent military strikes in the 12-day June 2025 war and explicit threats have further complicated diplomacy. Talks conducted under the shadow of force rarely produce flexibility. Instead, they strengthen hardliners, narrow political space for compromise, and frame negotiations as acts of resistance rather than problem-solving. In Iran’s case, external pressure has reinforced the narrative that “deterrence, not accommodation, guarantees survival.” This framing limits political room for compromise
and turns negotiations into symbols of resistance rather than instruments of resolution.
Confrontation itself serves domestic political purposes on both sides. In Washington, a hard line on Iran signals resolve to allies and voters. In Tehran, sustained external hostility helps justify internal controls, deflect economic grievances, and consolidate power within security institutions. Periods of heightened tension often coincide with greater political influence for security bodies inside Iran.
Peace, by contrast, removes a useful external adversary and introduces domestic political risk. US–Iran talks rarely fail because diplomacy is insufficient. They fail because the underlying conflict remains strategically useful and structurally unresolved. The only period of genuine progress came when negotiations were narrowly focused, regional issues were deferred, and sanctions relief was clearly defined. Absent a fundamental shift -either a willingness by Iran to negotiate its broader power or an ability by the United States to offer lasting economic normalization- talks will continue to manage tension rather than resolve it. In this sense, recurring negotiations are mechanisms designed to prevent confrontation from spiraling out of control, not signs of imminent peace.
As 2026 unfolds, a strong narrative is circulating among Iraqi dinar investors:
That the future reinstatement (RI) or revaluation (RV) of the Iraqi dinar depends heavily on U.S. foreign policy — specifically under Donald Trump — and the removal of Iranian influence inside Iraq.
Let’s examine the geopolitical argument, the economic realities, and what investors should carefully consider.
🏛️ U.S. Foreign Policy & Iraqi Stability
It is widely acknowledged that U.S.–Iraq relations influence:
Security cooperation
Military assistance
Energy sector partnerships
Banking compliance frameworks
Sanctions enforcement
The argument being presented is that President Trump’s administration will not compromise on limiting outside influence — particularly from Iran — in Iraqi political structures.
From a strategic standpoint, U.S. administrations generally seek:
✔ A stable Iraqi government ✔ Reduced militia influence ✔ Secure oil infrastructure ✔ Compliance with international banking rules ✔ Alignment with broader regional security goals
These factors absolutely impact investor confidence.
👤 The Maliki Factor
Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remains a controversial political figure.
Critics argue:
He fostered sectarian division during prior terms.
His alliances increased Iranian leverage inside Iraq.
His leadership era coincided with economic and security volatility.
Supporters argue:
He remains influential within political coalitions.
He represents certain internal power blocs.
Whether or not he holds formal office, Iraq’s political alignment affects international perception — which in turn influences economic reform momentum.
🌍 Does Removing Iranian Influence Trigger a Revaluation?
This is where analysis must be careful.
Geopolitical stability absolutely supports currency strength. However, exchange rates are not set purely by political preference.
The Central Bank of Iraq determines exchange rate policy based on:
Foreign reserves
Inflation rates
Money supply
Trade balance
External debt
Market confidence
While reduced foreign interference could improve economic confidence, a reinstatement or revaluation must align with macroeconomic fundamentals.
💰 What Would “Reinstatement” Actually Mean?
In dinar investor terminology:
Reinstatement (RI) refers to restoring a previous historical rate.
Revaluation (RV) refers to adjusting the official exchange rate upward.
Officially, Iraq currently operates under a managed exchange rate regime.
Any major change would require:
Coordinated fiscal and monetary policy
Banking system readiness
International settlement capability
Domestic economic stability
It cannot be implemented solely by U.S. executive preference.
📌 Featured Snippet: Does U.S. Policy Determine the Iraqi Dinar Rate?
No. While U.S. foreign policy influences Iraq’s stability and economic environment, the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar is determined exclusively by the Central Bank of Iraq based on monetary and economic conditions.
🏗️ “Make Iraq Great Again” – Economic Reform Vision
The broader vision often referenced includes:
Transforming Iraq into an energy powerhouse
Expanding private sector growth
Strengthening banking transparency
Integrating into global trade systems
These objectives align with long-term reform frameworks already discussed between Iraq and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund.
But economic transformation is a multi-year structural process — not a single event.
🧠 What Investors Should Realistically Watch
Instead of focusing solely on political personalities, monitor:
✔ Official Central Bank statements ✔ Reserve growth levels ✔ Inflation trends ✔ Budget execution progress ✔ Oil export performance ✔
Banking digitization milestones ✔ Parallel market exchange gaps
These indicators provide measurable signals of monetary readiness.
❓ Q&A: Iraq Dinar & U.S. Political Influence
Q1: Could a Trump administration accelerate reforms?
U.S. policy can influence security cooperation and diplomatic alignment, but Iraq’s monetary authority remains independent.
Q2: Does removing Maliki guarantee an RV?
No. Leadership changes may affect confidence, but exchange rates depend on economic fundamentals.
Q3: Is Iranian influence a factor?
Yes, in terms of regional stability and investor perception. However, currency valuation requires broader structural alignment.
Q4: Is a reinstatement only possible under one U.S. president?
There is no official evidence that currency reform depends exclusively on a specific U.S. administration.
📊 The Bigger Picture
Iraq’s economic future will likely be shaped by:
Internal political cohesion
Reduction of militia influence
Strengthened institutional governance
Reserve-backed monetary discipline
International financial compliance
Geopolitical shifts may accelerate or slow reform momentum — but the exchange rate itself is a technical monetary decision.
We see in articles...that the US, under President Trump is not going to backdown, compromise or negotiate and thus allow any outside nation, most importantly Iran, to influence Iraqi politics...if President Trump is going to work with Iraq to mold it into the financial and economic powerhouse, he must have a government in place that he can work with and will not betray his foreign policy...
Nori al-Maliki...time and time again...has not lived up to agreements and promises made to the US. Instead, he has chosen to work with dark elements behind the scenes of US foreign policy and Iranian influence...we have read many articles already on the Trump dream to “Make Iraq Great Again”...As investors, if we have any chance of seeing the reinstatement of the Iraqi dinar and thus revaluation, if will be under the Trump administration.
