Three months after Iraq’s parliamentary elections, the country remains unable to elect a president. This constitutional step is the gateway to appointing a new prime minister and forming a fully empowered government. The situation started with a dispute among political blocs and has evolved into a broader test of Iraq’s post-2003 power-sharing system, exposing institutional weaknesses and renewed regional pressures.
Under Iraq’s constitution, parliament must elect a president by a two-thirds quorum. Only after that vote can the president task the largest parliamentary bloc, currently the Shiite Coordination Framework, with forming a government. In practice, the quorum requirement has repeatedly enabled political factions to block sessions by withholding attendance —a tactic that now defines the current impasse.
The International Crisis Group has described Iraq’s post-2003 political order as an ethno-sectarian power-sharing system in which elite bargaining often overrides institutional functionality. The current deadlock appears to reflect precisely that dynamic.
Raad al-Dahlaki, a member of the Al-Azm Alliance, led by Muthanna Al-Samarrai told Shafaq News that the failure to hold a presidential election session is not tied to agreement or disagreement between Kurdish parties, but rather to political conflicts among the blocs that are obstructing the session. He added that disputes within the Coordination Framework and with other blocs over the prime ministerial nominee have effectively “led to political blockage and a breach of the constitution.”
Although tensions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have drawn attention, many observers point to divisions within the Shiite-led Framework as the primary obstacle.
The group, which holds a parliamentary majority of about 185 seats, remains internally divided over the nomination of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. While some factions support his candidacy including his State of Law Coalition and Badr Organization led by Hadi Al-Ameri and the Reconstruction and Development headed by Mohammad Shia Al-Sudani, others such as Qais al-Khazali and Ammar al-Hakim fear it could deepen domestic polarization and provoke external backlash.
Read more: Iraq slips into constitutional vacuum as presidential deadlock drags on
Political analyst Muhannad al-Rawi told Shafaq News that early elections would not resolve this crisis. “Even if new elections were held, the l Framework —numerically dominant yet internally divided— would remain as it is. The faces and blocs would not fundamentally change,” he said. “The problem is not in the ballot boxes, but in the mentality governing the political process, one driven by partisan interests and competition over high-revenue ministries.”
The crisis has also reignited debate over parliamentary discipline. Former lawmaker Rahim al-Darraji warned that absenteeism has become a chronic problem, describing the lack of attendance controls as “one of the biggest flaws in the Council of Representatives.”
Both sessions to elect a president on January 27 and February 1 failed due to a lack of quorum and disagreements.
Political science professor Mohammed Daham echoed that concern, arguing that even legitimate absences effectively obstruct constitutional procedures, and “the failure to attend sessions constitutes a breach of national responsibility.”
Ahmad Ali, another member of parliament, urged the legislature’s leadership to resolve the presidential file and resume committees formation, noting that “the parliament is completely stalled, and the responsibility lies with the presidency of the Council.”
The normalization of such delays raises deeper questions about the durability of Iraq’s institutional framework. The two-thirds quorum rule, intended to ensure broad consensus, has instead become a leverage tool in zero-sum bargaining.
The domestic stalemate unfolds amid renewed regional sensitivities. Washington has signaled opposition to backing any government led by al-Maliki, reflecting lingering concerns over his previous tenure, which ended in 2014 amid security collapse and political fragmentation. While no formal sanctions have been imposed in this context, US policymakers have consistently framed Iraq’s stability as linked to inclusive governance and balanced foreign policy.
Tehran, meanwhile, has emphasized maintaining unity within Shiite ranks. Iran’s strategic interest lies in preserving a cohesive Shiite political front capable of sustaining Iraq’s alignment within the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” while avoiding overt fragmentation that could weaken its influence.
This dual pressure places Iraqi factions in a delicate position. Any prime ministerial nominee must navigate domestic coalition arithmetic while avoiding confrontation with either Washington or Tehran.
Several Iraqi analysts who spoke to Shafaq News argue that calls for early elections amount to a procedural reset without structural reform. Iraq’s proportional representation system, revised in recent years, continues to favor established blocs with entrenched networks.
Without changes in political behavior or coalition-building logic, a new vote could reproduce similar parliamentary fragmentation. The fundamental issue, as Daham suggested, lies not in electoral mechanics but in “institutional maturity and political commitment.”
If the impasse continues, Iraq risks operating under an extended caretaker government with limited authority. Such a scenario could delay budgetary reforms, stall economic planning, and complicate security coordination at a time when Iraq faces fluctuating oil revenues and evolving regional security dynamics.
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Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.