Agreements Are On The Horizon To Resolve The Presidential Issue.
Negotiations to choose the president of the republic remain a central focus of the Iraqi political scene, given the approaching constitutional deadlines and the limited time available. Dialogues continue between the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, amid adherence to the political norms adopted since 2005, in parallel with initial indications that may open the door to an understanding that ends the current stalemate.
In this context, President Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid met on Tuesday with Mohsen al-Mandalawi, head of the Al-Asas Coalition, to discuss political developments and ways to complete constitutional requirements within the established timeframes. During the meeting, the President emphasized the importance of unifying visions and strengthening coordination among national forces to reach political agreements that contribute to consolidating stability and supporting state institutions.
Al-Mandalawi, in turn, praised the Presidency's role in supporting the political de-escalation process, affirming his coalition's commitment to fulfilling the remaining requirements based on the principles of partnership and national consensus.
In parallel, the corridors of the Coordination Framework are witnessing escalating political activity. MP Bahaa al-Araji affirmed that the understandings between the Reconstruction and Development Coalition and the State of Law Coalition stem from the principle of complementary roles within the Coordination Framework, serving the requirements of the current phase.
Al-Araji indicated that supporting Nouri al-Maliki's candidacy aligns with the slogan "Iraq First," emphasizing that the priority today must be achieving progress and transcending the logic of procrastination and unproductive political competition.
Regarding the presidency, MP Sarwa Mohammed Rashid, from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) bloc, told Al-Sabah newspaper that political negotiations are still ongoing within the party and with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), in coordination with other political forces. She stressed adherence to the political convention that allocates the presidency to the PUK.
She clarified that this entitlement is not based on narrow partisan considerations, but rather on political understandings that have contributed to maintaining national balance and political stability in previous phases.
Rashid added that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has finalized its choice to nominate Nizar Amidi for the presidency, noting his extensive political experience and active presence in Baghdad, as well as his ability to manage the position as a symbol of national unity, a guarantor of constitutional implementation, and a servant of all components of the Iraqi people without exception.
In contrast, Abdul Salam Barwari, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), told Al-Sabah newspaper that "there is no definitive new development yet," but there are positive indicators that can be built upon.
He explained that KDP leader Masoud Barzani has presented two main options: the first is to agree on a single candidate from both parties and present him in Baghdad, while the second is to leave the decision to the Kurdish blocs within the Council of Representatives, as happened in the election of former President Fuad Masoum.
Barwari predicted that the outlines of an agreement will become clear within the next week, especially given the link between this issue and the reactivation of the Kurdistan Region Parliament and the formation of the local government.
For her part, political researcher Zahraa Al-Saadi believes that the issue of choosing the president of the republic is one of the most complex issues in the current political stage, warning that the continuation of the Kurdish dispute may keep the position under time pressure and open the door to national interventions to find a consensus formula that enjoys broad acceptance, in order to ensure that the political process is not disrupted and to maintain institutional stability in the country. https://alsabaah.iq/126439-.html
MarkZ shares key updates on Iraq’s political and financial landscape, particularly regarding the Hydrocarbon Law (HCL), budget progress, and potential currency changes.
The main highlights today include:
Iraqi parliament is actively working on the HCL for the past three days.
The Kurdistan region extended their temporary HCL agreement by 3 months, even though they do not expect to need it.
According to Iraqi sources, the sequence appears to be: budget → HCL → Prime Minister → currency value change.
Additional intel from a banker suggests that the Vietnamese dong is being organized and trained for exchange alongside the Iraqi dinar.
This suggests the Revaluation (RV) for multiple currencies may be coordinated and could happen simultaneously.
The Kurdistan region is cooperating while finalizing technical and legal details.
Parliament has dedicated the last three days to HCL discussions, showing priority in Iraq’s economic planning.
HCL is crucial for oil revenue distribution, which directly impacts the new Iraqi dinar rate.
🔹 Budget Significance
According to sources, the 2026 Iraqi budget must be approved before HCL implementation.
The budget and HCL milestones are seen as prerequisites for the dinar RV.
In short:
budget first, HCL second, Prime Minister last, then currency changes.
💱 Vietnamese Dong (VND) Preparation
MarkZ reports via a banking source that:
Banks are organizing and training on the Vietnamese dong.
The dong and Iraqi dinar are expected to release at the same time.
This hints at a coordinated multi-currency RV strategy rather than isolated events.
This development is significant for investors and Tier 4 participants monitoring currency movement timelines.
🗓️ Timeline of Events (As Reported)
Event
Status / Notes
Iraqi parliament HCL work
Ongoing (3 days)
Kurdistan temporary HCL extension
+3 months
Iraqi budget
Precedes HCL; key to RV
Prime Minister confirmation
Follows budget/HCL
Currency Revaluation
Expected after budget/HCL; Iraqi dinar & Vietnamese dong potentially simultaneous
❓ Frequently Asked Questions (Q&A)
Why did Kurdistan extend the HCL agreement?
To allow additional time for negotiations and technical preparations, even though they may not require the extension.
What is the significance of the Iraqi budget?
The budget must be approved first, as it is a prerequisite for passing the HCL and finalizing monetary changes.
When is the Iraqi dinar RV expected?
Sources indicate it will occur after the budget and HCL are in place, in coordination with Prime Minister confirmation.
Is the Vietnamese dong connected to the Iraqi dinar RV?
Yes. Banking sources suggest the dong and dinar are being prepared to go simultaneously, hinting at a multi-currency release.
🔑 Key Takeaways
HCL progress and budget approval are essential steps before any dinar RV.
Kurdistan’s 3-month HCL extension indicates careful planning rather than urgency.
Vietnamese dong training signals potential simultaneous RV for multiple currencies.
Investors and Tier 4 participants should monitor budget and HCL milestones closely.
📌 Featured Snippet: MarkZ PDK Update Summary
MarkZ reports Iraqi parliament working on Hydrocarbon Law, Kurdistan extends HCL agreement by 3 months, budget approval precedes HCL, and banks are preparing the Vietnamese dong. Both dinar and dong may RV simultaneously.
Article: “Iraq’s Envoy waves for upcoming sanctions on new Iraqi networks. Talks with US Treasury” They are talking that the Kurdistan region extended their temporary HCL agreement by 3 months…while they work through things... They don’t believe they will need it. But they extended it another 3 months...This dominated the news today…part of the HCL they have been working on. The parliament has been working on HCL for the last 3 days.
I continue to be told from Iraqi sources…First the budget…then the HCL…Then the Prime Minister…and somewhere around the HCL/budget part we get our change in value.
Question: Any dong news?
MarkZ: I did reach out to a banker and they are very much organizing and training on the Vietnamese dong and expect the dong & the Iraqi dinar to go at the same time.
Savaya Discusses Suspicious Financial Payments In Iraq With The US Treasury
January 15, 2026 London – Al-Zaman US envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya confirmed on Thursday that he had agreed with the US Treasury Department to conduct a comprehensive review of records of suspicious payments and financial transactions involving institutions, companies and individuals in Iraq.
“Today I met with the U.S. Treasury Department and the Office of Foreign Assets Control to discuss key challenges and reform opportunities in both state-owned and private banks, with a clear focus on strengthening financial governance, compliance, and corporate accountability,” Savaya said in a Facebook post.
He added, “We agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of suspicious payment records and financial transactions involving institutions, companies, and individuals in Iraq that are linked to smuggling, money laundering, and fraudulent financial contracts and projects that fund and enable terrorist activities.”
Savaya continued, “We also discussed the next steps regarding anticipated sanctions targeting malicious entities and networks that undermine financial integrity and state authority.”
The US envoy stated that “the relationship between Iraq and the United States has never been stronger than it is today under the leadership of President Donald Trump.” LINK
📰 Cliff Notes MarkZ Update: Iraqi Politics, Oil Stability, and Global Geopolitical Shifts
🔔 Overview: Evening Recap Format
The latest Cliff Notes MarkZ update offers a concise evening briefing of major political and geopolitical developments affecting Iraq, U.S. domestic politics, and global events.
Key objectives of this update:
Quick, reliable 15-minute summaries for busy viewers
Optional detailed morning sessions for in-depth analysis
Covers Iraq, U.S. politics, international relations, sanctions enforcement, and global conflicts
🏛️ Iraqi Political Developments: The Maliki Candidacy
⚖️ Political Trap in Motion
Nouri al-Maliki’s potential return as Iraq’s prime minister remains highly controversial.
📌 Featured Snippet: Cliff Notes MarkZ Update Summary
Cliff Notes MarkZ Update (Jan 2026) covers Maliki’s political trap in Iraq, stable oil exports, Iraq-U.S. strengthened ties, NOPE Act legislative developments, enforcement against Iranian/Venezuelan oil sanctions, and Trump’s assessment of the Ukraine conflict. The update provides concise evening recaps for viewers short on time while maintaining options for deeper morning analysis.
❓ Frequently Asked Questions (Q&A)
Why is Maliki’s candidacy controversial?
Opponents may be using him as a political trap to reduce his influence despite public elevation.
What is the Cion pipeline update?
Iraq extended stable oil exports through the Cion pipeline for three months, strengthening energy cooperation.
What does the NOPE Act aim to do?
Prevent DOJ politicization and the weaponization of federal agencies in partisan disputes.
What is the “dark fleet”?
Ships involved in illegal transport of Iranian and Venezuelan oil to bypass sanctions.
Why is Trump critical of Zelensky?
He argues Ukraine is less willing than Russia to compromise, affecting peace prospects.
1. Iraqi Political Developments: The Maliki Candidacy
Summary
The video presents an informal evening news update focusing on political developments in Iraq, U.S. domestic politics, international relations, and ongoing geopolitical tensions. The host proposes introducing a daily evening recapsummarizing key news points related to the “reset” and dinar-related topics, aimed at viewers with limited time, while still offering more detailed morning sessions for those interested in deeper analysis.
Nouri al-Maliki’s potential return as Iraq’s prime minister remains highly controversial.
The Coordination Framework and various political factions are divided on supporting Maliki.
Sudani’s camp denies formal endorsement of Maliki, emphasizing that any decision would be for the country’s benefit, not personal gain.
Maliki’s candidacy is described as a “political trap”—his opponents appear to be elevating him publicly to expose his weaknesses and ultimately diminish his political influence.
Public protests and political movements label Maliki as unfit and compromised, likening the situation to past political dynamics where candidates were pushed forward only to fail.
The host highlights the strategic nature of this move, suggesting it is a masterful political tactic to marginalize Maliki.
2. Iraq’s Oil Sector and International Relations
Iraq has successfully extended stable oil exports through the Cion pipeline for three more months, marking positive progress in regional oil agreements.
After 19 years, Iraq officially recalled its ambassador to Moscow, signaling strengthened international diplomatic representation.
The U.S. envoy declared that Iraq-U.S. relations are at their strongest, with joint efforts to crack down on money laundering linked to terrorist organizations and Iranian influence.
A deep dive into financial issues involving 14 billion Iraqi dinars and Raffphodame Bank is anticipated.
3. U.S. Domestic Politics: The No Political Enemies Act
A Senate hearing addressed the regulation of abortion pills sold online, with controversy over a Democratic witness refusing to acknowledge that only women can get pregnant, leading to confusion and ridicule.
The No Political Enemies (NOPE) Act was introduced by Senators Schumer, Murphy, and Crowe to prevent political weaponization of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Democrats accuse the Biden administration of using the DOJ to target political opponents, while the White House counters by accusing the Trump administration of similar abuses.
The host critiques the hypocrisy in both parties weaponizing federal agencies and the current push to avoid prosecutions altogether, reflecting a deep partisan divide over DOJ oversight.
4. U.S. Foreign Policy and Venezuela
Trump’s position on Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado remains supportive but skeptical about her electoral chances.
U.S. forces seized six tankers involved in transporting Iranian and Venezuelan oil in violation of sanctions, signaling a more active enforcement stance than in previous years.
This action is part of Trump’s efforts targeting the so-called “dark fleet” that bypasses international laws.
5. Ukraine Conflict and Trump’s Commentary
Trump criticized Ukrainian President Zelensky, suggesting that Zelensky is hampering peace efforts with Russia.
Trump claims, “Putin’s ready for peace, Ukraine is less ready,” indicating that Ukraine demands extensive reparations and refuses compromise.
The host presents this view as a straightforward assessment of the conflict’s stalemate, without moral judgment but emphasizing the importance of acknowledging differing perspectives.
Proposed Format Change
The host is considering a regular evening “cliff notes” summary Monday through Friday, condensing key news into a 15-minute format for viewers short on time.
This format would complement the more detailed morning sessions, incorporating political, economic, and international news with occasional commentary and humor.
Timeline of Key Events Discussed
Timeframe/Period
Event/Development
Notes
Current (Today)
Debate over Maliki’s candidacy
Political trap; divided factions
Recent months
Extension of oil exports via Cion pipeline
Positive regional oil cooperation
After 19 years
Iraq recalls ambassador to Moscow
Strengthened diplomatic ties
Recent (Yesterday/Today)
Introduction of NOPE Act in U.S. Senate
DOJ politicization concerns
Recent days
U.S. seizes six tankers transporting Iranian/Venezuelan oil
Increased enforcement effort
Ongoing (Ukraine war)
Trump critiques Zelensky and peace negotiations
Highlights Ukraine’s intransigence
Key Terms and Definitions
Term
Definition/Context
Coordination Framework
Iraqi political coalition involved in premiership decisions
Political Trap
Strategy to elevate a candidate to expose or diminish their influence
NOPE Act
“No Political Enemies Act,” legislation to prevent DOJ politicization
Dark Fleet
Ships involved in illegal sanctions evasion (Iran/Venezuela oil)
Cion Pipeline
Oil export pipeline from Iraq
Core Insights
Maliki’s political maneuvering signals deep divisions within Iraqi politics and may be a calculated move by opponents to neutralize his influence.
Iraq’s strengthened diplomatic presence and oil export stability mark important steps in national sovereignty and economic recovery.
U.S. political dynamics reveal intense partisan conflict over DOJ’s role and oversight, reflecting broader struggles over governance and justice.
Enforcement actions against sanctions violations indicate a more assertive U.S. posture on international law.
Trump’s commentary on Ukraine challenges mainstream narratives, underscoring the complexity of the conflict and peace prospects.
Conclusion
This video provides a concise yet broad overview of significant political and geopolitical developments, particularly focusing on Iraq, U.S. domestic political controversies, and international relations. The proposed evening recap format aims to offer quick, reliable updates for busy audiences while maintaining the option for in-depth morning discussions. The host balances informative content with light commentary, inviting viewer engagement on the evolving news landscape.
The Central Bank Reveals A Decrease In Iraq's Domestic Public Debt.
Today 15:06 The Central Bank of Iraq revealed on Thursday that domestic public debt decreased at the end of October 2025.
In a report reviewed by Al-Maalomah News Agency, the bank stated that "Iraq's domestic public debt decreased at the end of October of last year to reach 88 trillion and 515 million dinars, a decrease of 0.32% compared to September, which stood at 90 trillion and 615 billion dinars. However, it is 6.58% higher than in 2024, when it reached 83.05 trillion dinars, and 25% higher than in 2023, when it reached 70.558 trillion dinars.
" The bank added that "the decrease resulted from a reduction in loans from government banks, from 7.01 trillion dinars to 5.6 trillion dinars."
He noted that "the debt remained unchanged, whether it was the financial debt, which amounted to 556 billion dinars, the discounted transfers at the Central Bank, which amounted to 50.486 trillion dinars, the treasury transfers at the Ministry of Finance, which amounted to 1.5 trillion dinars, the loans from financial institutions, which amounted to 14.366 trillion dinars, or the bonds, which amounted to 14.137 trillion dinars." (End of quote) LINK
