“Your time is up.”
AFTER OPENING IN 2026 WITH A DECLARATION OF ALL-OUT WAR: HOW WILL SAVAYA TURN THE TABLES ON EVERYONE AND CARRY OUT ITS THREAT?
On the first day of 2026, US President Donald Trump’s envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, chose to begin the year with a “historic promise”: a year to end militias, uncontrolled weapons, corruption, and foreign interference, along with a long list of ills that have burdened the state and society. In his message to the Iraqi people, Savaya presented himself as the bearer of a “decisive year,” pledging to work to make 2026 the year that would end instability, the plundering of resources, poor services, smuggling, unemployment, militias, money laundering, fraudulent contracts, poverty, foreign interference, embezzlement, inequality, corruption, circumvention of the law, and injustice.
This “long list” has been transformed in political and media discourse into “18 crucial issues” that Savaya said would be among the priorities of his mission in Iraq during the new year, in a speech laden with messages of deterrence such as: “Your time is over, and the time of Iraq and the Iraqis has begun.” But as soon as the wave of flashy headlines subsided, a simpler and more pressing question emerged: Can 18 chronic Iraqi problems truly be resolved in 12 months, even by an envoy with exceptional influence in the White House?
(Mnt Goat: Savaya just needs to convince the Iraqi government of these things he wants to accomplish in 2026. Do we investors in the dinar have to wait for the RV to get all of these items fixed? Of course not, if you read the list I have highlighted some items that we know must be accomplished and are already known issues they have been working on for years already.)
The 18 files in Savaya’s speech: A map of a state’s crisis
Based on what Savaya’s letter contained and statements surrounding it, the 18 files he placed under the title “Year of Decision” can be summarized as follows:
- Political and security instability.
- Plundering the country’s wealth.
- Poor services (electricity, water, health, education).
- Uncontrolled weapons outside the control of the state.
- Smuggling (oil, goods, currency) across ports and borders.
- Unemployment, especially among young people.
- Militias linked to external powers or operating outside the logic of the state.
- Money laundering through banks, money exchange companies, and economic fronts.
- Political and civic ignorance as an environment for manipulating sectarian and populist discourse.
- Internal tensions between blocs, components, and governorates.
- Fake contracts and paper projects in various sectors.
- Poverty and the associated widening social gap.
- Foreign interference in decision-making and sovereign matters.
- Direct embezzlement of public funds.
- Inequality in the distribution of wealth and opportunities between regions and groups.
- Corruption as a general umbrella for all financial and political networks.
- Circumventing the law and using it as a shield to protect the powerful.
- The injustice inflicted on the ordinary citizen and the segments of victims and the marginalized.
On paper, this list looks more like a “state crisis map” than a one-year program. It touches on almost everything that has accumulated since 2003 in terms of political, economic, and security problems, and puts them all together under the heading “2026.”
An envoy outside the diplomatic school: From “the cannabis king” to the man of Iraqi missions
Part of the controversy surrounding Savaya is not just about what he said in his New Year’s message, but about the nature of the man himself. The new envoy is not a career diplomat who graduated from the school of the US State Department, but a businessman of Iraqi Chaldean origin who made his fortune in the legal cannabis industry in Michigan, and is described by American press reports as one of the most prominent figures in this sector, and the “cannabis king” of Detroit.
(Mnt Goat: Oh… here we go again bashing someone because they are not part of the Washington establishment. Maybe they should stop and think about what they say. Maybe this is a very good thing, Savaya being a business man (like trump) in that we need fresh thinkers who can think out of the box and do what is right for America and Iraq and not just for the elite globalists.)
His political career is more closely linked to the world of election campaigns and Republican funding, as he emerged as one of Trump’s supporters in Michigan, before suddenly transforming from a controversial business figure into a special envoy handling one of the most complex files in the Middle East.
Numerous analyses have linked his appointment to the Trump administration’s desire to deal with Iraq through a “trusted man” outside the traditional diplomatic corps, who has direct access to the president and is able to move nimbly between the worlds of politics, business, and security, with a particular focus on three issues: Iranian influence, militias, and redrawing the terms of investment and energy in a country that possesses one of the world’s largest oil reserves.
In this sense, the New Year’s message is not merely a protocolary greeting, but rather the announcement of an American political and security program with a new executive channel, setting 2026 as a test year for Washington’s ability to reshape the rules of the game within Iraq.
The promises are ambitious… but the problem lies in the structure of the system, not in the texts.
From within Iraq, researcher and academic Ali al-Jubouri offered a more cautious analysis, focusing on the gap between rhetoric and actual capability. Al-Jubouri told Baghdad Today, “The promises attributed to US President Donald Trump’s envoy to Iraq, Mark Savva, regarding 2026 being the year to end uncontrolled weapons, militias, corruption, and foreign interference, fall within the realm of ambitious political discourse. However, they clash with a highly complex Iraqi reality that makes their full realization extremely difficult without fundamental changes.”
He adds that “the problem of loose weapons is not just a security issue, but rather the result of political, economic and social accumulations that have extended for years, where some armed factions have become part of the equation of political and economic influence, and have extensions inside and outside state institutions, which makes dismantling or limiting them a complex internal sovereign decision, and not just the result of an external pledge or pressure.”
Al-Jubouri links the issue of militias to the broader map of conflict in the region, stressing that “the issue of militias is directly linked to regional and international balances, and any talk about ending them or restricting weapons to the state requires a unified and undivided Iraqi political will, and broad internal consensus that precedes any field action, in addition to reducing reliance on external axes in national decision-making.”
Then he moves on to the second point in Savaya’s speech: corruption. According to Al-Jubouri, “Corruption in Iraq is structural, not circumstantial, as it has infiltrated the joints of the state through networks of interests that transcend parties. Eliminating corruption cannot be achieved with temporary slogans, but rather requires deep administrative and legal reform, a genuine activation of accountability, and protection of oversight institutions from political pressures.”
As for foreign interventions, he says that “Iraq is still an arena for the intersection of regional and international interests, and that reducing these interventions depends on the state’s ability to strengthen its economic sovereignty, unify its foreign policy, and build balanced relations based on interests, not alignments.”
Al-Jabouri concludes his reading with a warning against turning 2026 into a “year of miracles”: “The year 2026 may witness partial steps or relative improvement if a genuine national will is available, but portraying it as a decisive year for the end of all these thorny issues seems closer to political promises and slogans than to a program that can be implemented on the ground unless the internal rules of the game change radically.”
With this description, Savaya’s discourse transforms from a “promise of decisive action” into a point of reference: where does what can actually be accomplished begin, and where does the ability of any foreign envoy end when his questions touch upon the structure of the regime itself?
Uncontrolled weapons and militias: The issue that tests the credibility of the slogan
If Savaya has indeed compiled 18 issues into one basket, the first thing Iraqi forces and the public will hold him accountable for is the file of militias and uncontrolled weapons. This file, in particular, is not only related to the security chaos, but also to the position of these factions within the state, their entanglement with the shadow economy, and their network of alliances stretching from Tehran to Damascus and Beirut.
Much of the American approach to Iraq in recent years has placed these Iranian-linked armed groups at the center of attention, linking any effort to reorganize the American presence to Baghdad’s ability to control these factions or reintegrate parts of them into state institutions according to new rules.
But this is precisely where the limits of the “year of decision” become apparent. Militias are no longer merely armed groups operating outside the law; some possess political representation, economic fronts, a presence in parliament and the government, and enjoy a social base in certain provinces. Any “direct” attempt to end this influence within a single year effectively means a redistribution of power within the Iraqi system, not simply the implementation of a series of security measures. This type of transformation cannot be managed with a congratulatory message, but rather through profound internal compromises that have yet to materialize.
Structural corruption and the parallel economy: When Savaya’s list intersects with the spoils network
Another part of Savaya’s list relates to corruption, money laundering, plundering of resources, fictitious contracts, embezzlement, and poor services. These are not mere labels, but rather the features of a system that has been formed over more than two decades, linking public funds with partisan quotas and turning contracts and projects into tools for personal gain, as revealed by Iraqi oversight and media reports on ports, border crossings, oil contracts, and reconstruction deals.
When al-Jubouri says that corruption is “structural,” he implicitly means that dismantling it requires reshaping the relationship between the state, political parties, and the economy, not merely pursuing a few individuals or opening dozens of files in the media. Here, too, the power of a foreign envoy, regardless of their relationship with the White House, appears limited without an internal decision that redefines the very structure of the political system, or at least establishes new “red lines” to protect what remains of the state from organized plunder.
Foreign interventions and the limits of Washington’s power
Savaya’s list also includes “external interference” and “internal tensions,” as if the envoy is trying to encompass everything regional actors have been accused of in Iraq over the past years. But the irony is that Washington itself is one of the most important external players on the Iraqi scene; the presence of American forces, the network of alliances, and the role of international financial institutions all make the United States part of the equation of intervention, not merely an external observer.
Here a twofold question arises: To what extent can the Trump administration reduce the influence of its regional rivals in Iraq, foremost among them Iran, without itself being seen as a party exercising parallel interference? And to what extent does Baghdad have a real margin to say “no” to any of the competing axes, if its economic sovereignty is not strengthened and the levels of dependence in the energy, finance and arms files are not reduced?
2026: A year of testing for the insider before it becomes a year of testing for Savaya.
Savaya’s message about “the end of the era of corruption and militias” gave a segment of the public a glimmer of hope and provided the media with ready-made material for sensational headlines. However, it simultaneously raised expectations to a level that would be difficult for any political actor, whether domestic or foreign, to fully meet within a single year.
If we start from Ali al-Jubouri’s reading, the fundamental question becomes not: Can Savaya finish 18 files in 2026? Rather: Does the Iraqi political system have the readiness to open these files from their roots?
Without a relatively unified political will, internal compromises that redefine the role of weapons, and genuine strengthening of oversight and judicial institutions, the US envoy’s message will remain more of a “statement of intent” than a binding roadmap. The year 2026 could become a transitional year, testing the limits of both Washington and Baghdad simultaneously: the former in terms of its willingness to use pressure and incentives, and the latter in terms of its readiness to relinquish part of the network of interests forged after 2003.
Between Savaya’s statement, “Your time is up,” directed at “those who have wreaked havoc in Iraq,” and al-Jubouri’s warning that changing the rules of the game requires more than mere rhetoric, Iraq stands on the threshold of a year that could mark the beginning of a different path, or simply another link in the chain of postponed promises. The difference will be decided, as always, internally before externally.
