Thurs. 20 March 2025 Quantum Financial System on Telegram
The gold-backed financial system has begun. Reports confirm large payouts are moving FAST in Colombia, Zurich, and Reno.
Bank screens are showing the new rates going up in value: IQD: $5.23 VND: $3.89 on Wed,
but will be higher before released to general public.
The system is nearly 90% complete. Notifications are set to drop ANY MOMENT.
American support for Iraqi security forces remains an important factor in enhancing security and stability in Iraq—not due to the inability of Iraqi forces to perform their duties, but because of the support Washington provides in military training, weapons provision and equipment, and intelligence for fighting armed groups such as ISIS.
Generally, the Iraqi government views U.S. security support as necessary to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi army—yet this support has been in tension with Iraq's sovereignty and the presence of foreign forces on its territory, including concern that continued support could lead to increased American intervention in Iraq's internal affairs.
Political positions calling for the withdrawal of American forces—including those of the U.S.-led international coalition—have often been framed as a desire to fully restore national sovereignty,
although these calls are also linked to an Iranian rejection of this presence. However, Donald Trump's return to the U.S. presidency in 2025 and his administration’s own review of funding priorities, including the suspension of much of the U.S. security aid to Iraq, is redefining the conversation in Baghdad about the future of the U.S.-Iraq security relationship and its impact on Iraqi national security.
Forms of Direct Security Support
The United States is one of the main partners of the Iraqi security forces via a series of programs and assistance that include training, equipment, funding, and intelligence information. Most recent aid falls under the provisions of a bilateral security agreement—signed in 2009 during Nouri al-Maliki's premiership—that regulates the nature of the presence and activities of U.S. and international coalition forces in Iraq.
According to official reports, the United States has provided approximately $13.8 billion in funding from 2015 to 2023. This aid was estimated at about $430 million in 2023 (the latest year full data is available), and support includes a range of programs to strengthen the Iraqi military. For instance, the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program for purchasing military equipment and weapons such as aircraft, artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles included $250 million for training and developing Iraqi military capabilities in 2023, enabling Iraq to purchase key military equipment such as F-16 fighter aircraft and M1 Abrams armored vehicles. In addition, Iraq received $21.93 million through the Conventional Weapons Destruction program, further supported by $7.515 million to train Iraqi forces in reconnaissance and mine and explosives removal efforts. Much of this previous aid is currently on hold pending the review of the current administration.
This aid is not only financial; the United States has also developed extensive programs to train tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and security personnel in various security and military fields, such as counterterrorism tactics, intelligence techniques, and surveillance and reconnaissance operations. These soldiers were trained both inside American bases in-country and at the American training center in Jordan. Likewise, the United States also conducts individual and joint operations with Iraqi forces, supplying Iraq with updated intelligence information regarding the movements of terrorist cells and carrying out precise strikes using drones. Technological support is provided through advanced surveillance equipment such as drones, which have helped security forces track enemy movements in rough geographical terrain and desert areas. Logistical support includes providing vital supplies to the Iraqi army, including fuel, spare parts for military equipment, and medical supplies. The United States also provides support in building military facilities, such as air bases and military facilities.
Motives for Support and Reasons for its Suspension
The United States has provided this continuous support to Iraqi security forces for several strategic and political reasons. The first aspect is an ongoing relationship developed in response to the June 2014 request submitted by the Iraqi government—led by then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki—for the international coalition to provide military assistance in confronting ISIS after it took control of major Iraqi cities. Security assistance, including weapons and ammunition provisions as well as logistical support, was combined with kinetic support, such as airstrikes on ISIS positions.
Despite the defeat of ISIS, its cells still carry out operations against Iraqi security forces, especially in remote areas and some locations adjacent to major cities including the Baghdad belt, Diyala and Anbar governorates, and eastern Iraq’s Hamrin Mountains. Moreover, U.S. security support has expanded beyond the initial focus on ISIS to include training and equipping Iraqi forces to face a variety of potential security threats.
For its part, the United States has characterized this assistance as part of its broader strategy in the Middle East; strong and stable Iraqi security forces contribute to protecting U.S. interests and preventing the spread of Iranian influence or terrorist groups in the region. U.S. support is also intended to insulate Iraqi security forces from the influences of Iranian politics in the region or from becoming a tool in the hands of domestic armed groups outside of the state framework, as well as prevent the Iraqi army from turning into a parallel force in favor of Iran-aligned factions.
It is as yet unclear which aspects of this calculus will be maintained by the current administration, especially since the suspension of Iraqi security aid along with that provided by USAID is both part of the American President's attempts to reassess his country's military strategy in the Middle East and overall U.S. spending on foreign aid.
A continued suspension of security aid may also be seen as part and parcel of the agreed-upon withdrawal of international coalition forces scheduled for 2026, based on an Iraqi request. Calls for such a move increased inside Iraq after the American operation that targeted both the commander of the Iranian Qods Force, Qassem Soleimani, and the deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Committee, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in early 2020. At that time, members of the Iraqi government began to characterize American forces on Iraqi territory as a challenge to Iraqi national sovereignty, while pro-Tehran parties viewed the continued presence of these forces as an attempt by Washington to expand control over the region.
Yet Baghdad generally views the current suspension as a response to Iraqi domestic political tensions and their impact on the country’s security forces. Specifically, it is understood that American policymakers may now point to the failure of previous support programs to neutralize the Iranian influence on Iraqi security and military forces, especially when it comes to cutting off their existing relationships with Iraq’s armed factions close to Tehran. In the past, Washington has highlighted the Popular Mobilization Forces’ ongoing inclusion of Brigades 45, 46, and 47, which are affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah Brigades, despite their involvement in operations against American forces in the country. If the Trump administration determines that American military support should be linked to achieving tangible results in this regard, this decoupling has not yet been achieved—and whether Baghdad can accomplish this is an open question.
Baghdad Weighs its Options
The Iraqi government and prominent political forces generally tend to take a balanced position between their domestic interests and their need for external support. However, the pressures imposed on them at the moment due to ongoing regional changes have put them in a critical position in terms of ensuring security stability, and Iraq’s political arena may find itself in the midst of a new political storm if it seeks continued security assistance and as it weighs its potential price.
An ongoing suspension of American support for Iraqi security forces has many implications that will affect the performance of these forces and increase subsequent security risks, especially in light of the continued threats posed by ISIS and armed factions. Despite the ability of Iraqi forces in their current state to face some challenges, the long duration of U.S. support has meant that Iraqi forces have become heavily dependent on it. If this support is no longer accessible, their capabilities will likely degrade, opening new security gaps for sleeper cells to take advantage of. This is particularly the case if the military attempts to operate without access to satellite imagery and air support long provided by American drones, especially in remote desert and mountainous areas that are difficult to monitor through other means.
If ISIS becomes more active operationally, armed forces may return to the strategy deployed during the first fight against ISIS, where the severity of the threat pushed the armed forces to cooperate with some factions supported by Tehran in order to unify their efforts to address the major security risks ISIS posed. Effectively, an uptick in ISIS operations without corresponding U.S. assistance to address it will undoubtedly contribute to enhancing the capabilities and influence of armed factions and the possibility of imposing their wider influence within the Iraqi political institution. The Iraqi army will likewise struggle to finance its purchase of American military equipment, leading to an inability to update, maintain, or develop its existing arsenal, while officers will likewise lack training in advanced weapons and modern combat tactics.
Given the potential impact of this sustained suspension, Baghdad may seek to incentivize Washington to view past security aid as a ‘good investment.’ Baghdad expects Washington’s asks to include some or all of the following:
Yet regardless of Baghdad’s willingness to offer some or all of these incentives, it is unclear whether it can adequately respond to the core American critique of Iranian influence in Iraqi armed forces in a way that would satisfy Washington. Moreover, if Washington decides to use security aid to exert pressure in Baghdad, there is unlikely to be a unified Iraqi political response. Some forces and figures may accept the conditions of American support, while others—especially those loyal to Iran or those calling for Iraq's complete sovereignty—may reject these conditions and lean more decisively into strengthening relations with Iran or other countries in the region.
Political forces close to Tehran have developed this relationship due to ideological reasons; most of their leaders and members follow the authority of the velayat-e faqih in Tehran and are not likely to abandon it, even given Iran’s current regional decline. Additionally, even were the leadership of these groups to prove interested in decoupling from Iran, they would be unable to at a speed acceptable to Washington due to the Iranian influence within their group members and the communities that support them.
Other Shia groups under the political umbrella of the central government, as well as some Sunni and Kurdish forces, often find themselves trapped between the hammer of American pressure and the anvil of internal challenges. Since these groups want to maintain relations with both Washington and Tehran, it is unclear how they will respond to any pressure to make a quick and decisive choice.
Nevertheless, there is growing criticism in Iraq for the Iraqi government’s reluctance to negotiate with Washington to reach a bilateral agreement with the United States or the Global Coalition in general for the sake of Iraq’s national security. It seems that the pressures imposed or the internal weakness in approaching this decision led to a preference to invite foreign forces to leave rather than secure Iraqi national interests in the context of the security challenges the country faces. Consequently, there is a prevailing belief that Iraq will witness a real test period during 2025, and there is an open question about how its political elite will deal with what may prove to be an impossible choice. At minimum, Baghdad will have to understand the price of either choice—to fight for continued security funding at the expense of its relationship with Iran or to allow U.S. security assistance to lapse without significant protest and face the national security repercussions.
Thurs. 20 March 2025
Private transaction platforms in Reno and Zurich have received direct confirmations that Tier 1 & Tier 2 payouts are FINALIZED.
Iraq's PMF Law "Is No Substitute for Real Security Reform"
The Trump administration should not be duped by the supposed “reforms” that militia leaders are considering in parliament, which threaten to turn the PMF into another Iranian “Revolutionary Guard” and keep U.S.-designated terrorists in key posts.
On March 11, the Iraqi parliament withdrew a draft “PMF Service and Retirement Law” from consideration, in the latest—but surely not the last—chapter for a hotly debated bill regarding the structure and funding of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Avowedly focused on reforming the PMF, the law is really about rival militia commanders trying to outmaneuver each other while grabbing a bigger slice of the national budget for the pro-Iran paramilitary organization.
Since its formation in 2014, the PMF has posed a conundrum for U.S. policymakers. On one hand, the all-volunteer force was originally raised with the blessing of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to serve the vital mission of wresting Iraqi territory back from the Islamic State, and was later put on the government payroll and recognized as a formal branch of the security forces. On the other hand, PMF bases, equipment, and personnel have repeatedly been involved in killing Americans and Iraqis alike, with little accountability, and the force is predominantly led by commanders from Iran-backed, U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The current PMF chairman is Faleh al-Fayyad, designated by Washington for serious human rights abuses; the force’s operational commander, Abdul-Aziz al-Mohammadawi (aka Abu Fadak), is a senior member of the U.S.-designated organization Kataib Hezbollah (KH), one of whose many attacks killed three Americans and injured many more in January 2024.
Following regional setbacks to Iran’s “axis of resistance” during the latest wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the PMF has become more worried about the risk of U.S. or Israeli attacks on its senior officials. Accordingly, it has sought to give the impression of “reforming” its structure, retiring certain commanders, and appointing less objectionable leadership. In pushing Baghdad on security reform, however, Washington must be careful to differentiate between cosmetic changes and real measures that reduce the threat posed by malign actors within the PMF.
Iraqi militias are regulated by PMF Commission Law No. 40 of 2016, a brief piece of legislation consisting of just three articles with minimal details on the force’s employment terms and administrative structure. To address this gap, the PMF Commission, led by Fayyad, initiated efforts to draft a new Service and Retirement Law in 2019. Yet passing the legislation has proven challenging, as various Shia militia and political groups seek to shape it in a way that enhances their influence. An initial 39-article draft was announced in 2020, then ballooned to 113 articles in 2023 before being presented in parliament last year.
It speaks volumes that the PMF—avowedly part of the Iraqi security forces—has spent years crafting its own dedicated law on these matters when Iraq already has a general Military Service and Retirement Law on the books (Law No. 3 of 2010). PMF leaders refuse to accept that this extant law applies to them, in keeping with the force’s unofficial mission of serving as a parallel military for Iraqi groups supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s parallel military.
The draft PMF law is currently deadlocked, but not because militias balked at real reform; rather, they have been sparring over potential leadership change. Some Shia blocs in parliament, including those belonging to militias, have pushed to institute a retirement age of sixty for PMF members (currently there is no mandatory retirement age). This effort is being spearheaded by al-Sadiqoun (formed by the U.S.-designated terrorist organization Asaib Ahl al-Haq, or AAH) and the State of Law Alliance (led by former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki), with support from Harakat Hoquq (formed by KH). The primary goal of this provision is plain—to force the retirement of Fayyad, who is sixty-eight. If the law passes in its current form, it would also result in the retirement of approximately 180 high-ranking PMF personnel, including the heads of various brigades and regional operations commands.
For now, Fayyad has successfully blocked versions of the law containing these provisions, with support from Hadi al-Ameri (head of the Iran-backed Badr Organization), Abu Ala al-Walai (head of the U.S.-designated terrorist group Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada), and Ammar al-Hakim (head of the Hikma Movement). Fayyad’s most senior political ally, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, is also “fighting tooth and nail to prevent the law from passing,” according to influential Sadiqoun member Ali Turki. On February 18, Fayyad traveled to Iran in a presumed bid to garner Tehran’s support for blocking the legislation; three weeks later, the draft law was withdrawn from consideration, at least in its current form.
The United States has a clear national interest in preventing the consolidation of another Iran-backed “Revolutionary Guard” in the Middle East. Allowing the PMF’s unchecked growth and corruption to continue under the leadership of designated terrorists is the easiest way to lose Iraq to Tehran.
Indeed, state allocations for the PMF’s budget and personnel have increased dramatically in recent years. According to the parliamentary finance committee, its official force size surged by 95 percent in the 2023 budget, from 122,000 personnel to 238,000. Some of these slots are almost certainly fictitious, enabled by years of deliberate opacity in the PMF’s registered manpower that enable militias to systematically exploit state funds. Meanwhile, the force’s budget surpassed $3.4 billion in 2024, up from $2.8 billion in 2023, and $2.16 billion in 2022. Enacting the PMF Service and Retirement Law would likely increase this budget even further, as it would require the government to allocate funds for new expenditures.
More important for U.S. interests, using the new law to remove Fayyad without mandating other deep reforms would merely open the door for a younger set of Iranian-controlled, U.S.-sanctioned commanders drawn from rival terrorist factions. Like previous PMF “professionalization” initiatives, the current law has nothing to do with bringing the force under state control—it is just another power play by terrorist groups like AAH and KH. For example, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali recently stated that the PMF chairman should be selected from within and embody the force’s “values” and “culture.” His colleague Ali Turki allowed for the option of appointing “experienced officers from outside the PMF,” but only if they “share an ideological affinity with the PMF.” This suggests that AAH is laying the groundwork to replace Fayyad with an Iraqi military commander who has a history of supporting the “axis of resistance”—and close ties to AAH, of course. This is why sacking Fayyad is not enough to spur real change. Yes, he should go, but so should all of the other U.S.-designated terrorists and human rights abusers in the PMF leadership.
As Baghdad continues to discuss cleaning up its security sector, the Trump administration should ignore fake “reform” initiatives like the PMF Service and Retirement Law, instead focusing on the following lines of effort:
Michael Knights is the Bernstein Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, where Hamdi Malik is an associate fellow. Their joint projects include the Institute’s Militia Spotlight platform.
Mnt Goat
I am going to show you the ...events that...can have a huge impact on moving forward with the reinstatement of the Iraqi dinar. These events include:
1. ...the direct implementation of the ASYCUDA SYSTEM at customs throughout Iraq.
2. ...the “White Paper” Pillars of Financial Reform... we know that the...efforts are all but fully completed.
3. ...the issue of the parallel market (black market) and the CBI now tells us they have to “kill it” permanently.
4. The Silk Road and Industrial Cities projects.
5. The US has already declared that Iraq must deal with the Iranian militia...According to the US president, Iraq must reverse its course from an Iranian puppet state.
6. The passing of the Oil and Gas law... I firmly believe that it will be convergence of these six (6) activities above that will get us the reinstatement back to FOREX.
🚨 POST-EXCHANGE WEALTH MANAGEMENT BLUEPRINT (IQD Scenario Planning Guide) 💡 Key Financial Strategies (Beyond Basic Exchange Planning) 1....