The implications of threatening US Presence in Iraq: what lies ahead?, 11 NOV

 Shafaq News/ Iraq stands at a critical juncture, grappling with a delicate balance between international commitments and escalating internal conflicts while striving to fulfill its duty of safeguarding diplomatic missions and foreign nationals residing within its boundaries.

Recent developments have starkly emphasized the nation's obligation to guarantee security for everyone, casting doubts on its capacity to sustain stability amid the rising tide of threats. In the past weeks, a series of attacks targeted U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria, carried out by armed factions expressing solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.

Pentagon data revealed 17 attacks in Iraq and 12 in Syria between October 17th and November 3rd. The "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" announced plans for intensified attacks on "enemy bases," signaling support for Palestinian resistance.

Approximately 2,500 U.S. soldiers are stationed in Iraq, with an additional 900 in Syria, providing vital advisory support in the ongoing fight against ISIS. Against this backdrop, the Iraqi government is under immense pressure to protect not only its citizens but also foreign installations, particularly diplomatic missions.

Col. Muqdad Al-Mousawi, spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, emphasized the inviolability of diplomatic missions, stressing the Ministry's commitment to nationwide security.

In the face of these mounting challenges, security and strategic expert Imad Allaw emphasized the need for comprehensive approaches beyond mere deployment of security forces. He stressed the importance of engaging in dialogues, negotiations, and internal political actions to address the underlying political dimensions fueling these attacks.

In an interview with Shafaq News Agency, Allaw highlighted that these attacks were intricately linked to internal Iraqi dynamics, necessitating the government's proactive pursuit of consultations and negotiations with political factions potentially jeopardizing the interests of foreign nations and their embassies. "The Iraqi government's efforts to initiate dialogues with these factions are crucial to curbing these attacks, which undermine Iraqi interests," Allaw remarked.

Security and strategic expert Mukhallad Hazem underscored the seriousness of the situation, noting that the Iraqi government faced significant embarrassment due to the targeting of American bases and interests. 

"Iraq, bound by a strategic framework agreement with the United States, is obligated to safeguard American diplomatic missions and bases."

Hazem warned that if these missions came under attack, Iraq could face legal repercussions under international law for failing to ensure the security and safety of individuals associated with these missions or present in American bases affiliated with the Global Coalition or NATO.

He also emphasized the gravity of the situation, stating that these incidents could tarnish Iraq's image and security standing among neighboring, regional, Arab, and European countries.

"These targeted attacks pose a negative perception of Iraq's security situation, particularly at a time when the country is striving to establish ties with neighboring nations, attract investments, and foster economic growth," Hazem pointed out. He further noted that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani's assurances to international companies regarding security and safety could be compromised, potentially undoing the progress in attracting investments across various sectors, including energy, health, and infrastructure.

Hazem concluded by expressing the challenges faced by the Iraqi government, caught between honoring international agreements, diplomatic responsibilities, and the operations of resistance factions operating beyond its borders. He hinted at possible surprises in the coming days that could impact both the government and the Iraqi people.

Professor of International Relations Moataz Al-Najm emphasized the critical role played by consular and diplomatic missions affiliated with foreign and European countries in Iraq. Al-Najm underscored that the presence of these missions is closely intertwined with the presence of the American embassy, and any departure of the latter could lead to a domino effect, compelling other missions to leave. Such a scenario, he warned, would push Iraq into the dangerous trap of international isolation.

He told our agency the importance of prioritizing national security and Iraqi interests, arguing that addressing the Palestinian issue should be approached with genuine national integration, fostering a unified vision of how to respond to the ongoing conflict in Gaza.

"Iraq operates within the framework of an international system, bound by various international agreements, including the Strategic Framework Agreement with the United States and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Therefore, popular, religious, and ideological stances must align with the official position of the Iraqi government," Al-Najm stated.

Al-Najm further pointed out that the statements made by Prime Minister al-Sudani, emphasizing the state's role as the official position holder and the determiner of foreign policy concerning local, regional, and international issues, underscored the need for a unified Iraqi position. He stressed the importance of aligning both popular and political perspectives to ensure a cohesive approach to the challenges faced by Iraq in the international arena.

For his part, political analyst Saleh Al-Shadher expressed optimism about Iraq's capability to safeguard diplomatic missions and their headquarters, clarifying that certain parties' threats of escalation were primarily targeted against military bases, not diplomatic missions.

In an interview with Shafaq News Agency, Al-Shadher contextualized the current tension as a response to the aggression against Palestine, deeming the reactions, including demonstrations during the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and rallies by the Sadrist movement, as natural expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

He suggested the situation could subside into calm and peace if the Iraqi government effectively navigates the middle ground. He credited Prime Minister al-Sudani's relationships with various factions and parties, some of which played a role in his ascent to power, as essential in this effort.

Commenting on Al-Sudani's regional visit to Iran and the Gulf, Al-Shadher highlighted the potential for a humanitarian truce and aid delivery to Gaza, leading to a compromise or peaceful resolution. He expressed hope for positive outcomes if collective Arab and Islamic efforts align in support of the Palestinian cause.

https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-Grapples-with-Diplomatic-Dilemma-Juggling-Security-Commitments-and-Internal-Strain-Amidst-Escalating-Threats

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Iraq's al-Sudani experiences a year marked by a blend of outcomes: Report, 11 NOV

Iraq's al-Sudani experiences a year marked by a blend of outcomes: Report

Shafaq News / The Arab Center in Washington said in a report it published on Wednesday that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, had a mix of successes and failures, influenced by internal and external factors, including the unresolved oil dispute with the Kurdistan Region.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani completed his first year in office on October 27 with a mixed record of successes and failures owing to objective domestic and external circumstances that impacted his parliament-approved government program. The program was a hybrid, two-part document. In the first part, Sudani laid out his own goals, which were firmly oriented toward improving services to citizens. The second was a political agreement adopted by the State Management Alliance, a post-2022 election coalition forged between the Shia Coordination Framework (CF), the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance led by Speaker of the House of Representatives Mohammed al-Halbousi, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

The agreement embodied political demands made by each of the allies, and provided the basis for the formation of Sudani’s government in October 2022. The program spelled out five broad priorities—combating corruption; creating jobs; addressing poverty; reforming the economic and financial systems; and improving public services—and elaborated steps to address them. What was absent from Sudani’s governing document were the overtly political goals that were left to the overarching political agreement forged by the State Management Alliance, an absence that in the end may have impacted the prime minister’s ability to make headway on his much-vaunted goals of government.

Hit and Miss on the Economy

During his first year in office, Sudani harnessed his energies to improving services and presented parliament with an unprecedented and record-setting three-year budget to secure continuity of funding for projects and programs. However, the $153 billion 2023-2024 budget (about one-third of which is a budget deficit) is heavily weighted toward operating costs, and only $38 billion is allocated for developmental investment, an imbalance criticized by many observers. To ease unemployment quickly, as many as 600,000 government jobs were added to the already inflated government payroll, in a clearly populist move to win public approval and avert renewed protests.

To alleviate poverty, Sudani oversaw the expansion of the social welfare network to include hundreds of thousands of needy families and individuals. He has pushed the Ministry of Health to improve service in the abysmally broken health sector. The government has launched road and highway projects that can be completed quickly. But these remain short term solutions to deep economic problems, such as a negligible private sector contribution to the gross domestic product, heavy dependence on hydrocarbons and imports, and almost total reliance on government as the employer of first resort. What makes this worse are a sclerotic byzantine bureaucracy and entrenched political interests that impede progress in long term and necessary economic reform.

To improve the economic outlook in the medium term, Sudani has energetically pursued foreign investment, but only with some success. The multi-pronged $27 billion agreement with TotalEnergies to develop Iraq’s oil and gas sectors was signed in its final form in July 2023 after languishing for years following objections by Iraqi politicians. Gulf countries have also stepped in: the deal with TotalEnergies includes a 25 percent investment by QatarEnergy. In July also Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates each pledged $3 billion dollars in investments in Iraq.

 Although these are capital-intensive investments, they will serve two important Sudani objectives: to create associated private sector jobs and to reduce Iraq’s dependence on fuel and gas imports from Iran and other sources. More ambitiously, last May Sudani proposed a “Development Road,” a $17 billion transport project that will link Al-Faw Port in southern Iraq with Turkey, and thence to Europe, and generate $4 billion annually and create thousands of jobs.

While partnerships in the energy sector are forthcoming with international corporations, there is little foreign appetite for investment in industries like agribusiness or manufacturing. Red tape, corruption, an opaque legal environment, and uncertain security are all barriers. To top off challenges to the economy, the Iraqi dinar’s decline against the dollar has persisted. Ironically, in February 2023, the government revaluated the Iraqi dinar from IQ1,460 to the dollar to IQ1,320, hoping to strengthen the national currency. 

While this rate has officially held, the move backfired in the parallel market: the dinar fell to 1,560 to the dollar in early October, creating even larger profits for speculators, but also prompting the Central Bank of Iraq to announce a halt to dollar cash withdrawals that commences on January 1, 2024. And despite multiple banking measures, some under pressure from the United States Treasury, dollar smuggling out of Iraq continues unabated.

On Sudani’s first stated priority, combating the “pandemic” of corruption, the record is patchy. There have been several convictions on corruption charges, some of which may be politically driven, of former provincial governors, mid-level officials, and others, yet Sudani’s anti-corruption drive has failed to target the powerful political parties and individuals who instigate, benefit from, and provide cover for corruption rackets. Government contracts, whether by federal or provincial authorities, are a rich mine for personal or party enrichment.

 Impunity has reached epic proportions. This was illustrated by what was called the “heist of the century” in which a monumental $2.5 billion sum was embezzled from the tax authorities of Iraq. In this bizarre and convoluted case, three prominent people were convicted: a businessman, a former member of parliament, and a senior official in the state-owned Rafidain Bank. Despite their admission of guilt and their conviction, both the businessman and the former MP were released after returning a modest percentage of the funds they stole, and they are said to have left the country soon after.

There is a national consensus that such a huge theft could not have been carried out without the involvement of political parties and influential politicians, yet none has been named or accused. Such impunity and the government’s failure to get to the roots of corruption has made the public rightly skeptical of the government’s will or ability to arrest this scourge. With political cover, corruption is systemic, entrenched, and often backed by intimidation from armed militias. Indeed, Sudani cannot challenge the political parties that brought him to power, despite the fact that corruption undermines virtually every aspect of his agenda.

The same gap between Sudani’s goals and the political reality preventing him from realizing them is seen in relations with Arab neighbors. Sudani has successfully advanced the steps taken by his predecessor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, to strengthen economic and security relations with them, including Jordan, Egypt, and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A major goal is to improve the availability of electrical power and diversifying sources of gas and fuel away from dependence on Iran. For example, by the end of 2024 Iraq will join the electric grid established by the GCC Electricity Interconnection Authority, providing Iraq with much needed power from GCC surpluses. Iraq and Jordan have also established an electricity connection that will supply electrical power to western provinces in exchange for oil exports to Jordan. In addition to energy cooperation, Iraq has stepped up security coordination with both Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

However, the rapprochement with Arab countries is not welcomed by some Shia political parties and members of the Iran-friendly Popular Mobilization Forces. To be sure, detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran has made it easier for Sudani to woo GCC countries, but suspicions remain. Militias like al-Nujaba Movement, a radical group closely aligned with Iran, has condemned the building of a long-proposed oil pipeline between Basra and Aqaba, Jordan, and Iraqis who support it. Even as PM Sudani, in his September 22, 2023 address to the UN General Assembly, asserted Iraq’s commitment to respect UN resolutions, MPs from the Coordination Framework were decrying the 2012 agreement with Kuwait over the Khor Abdullah waterway, which was ratified by the Iraqi parliament. Simultaneously, the Supreme Federal Court issued a ruling declaring the agreement unconstitutional and void. The backlash from Kuwait and the GCC countries was immediate and unequivocal, infecting carefully nurtured relations with Iraq.

In his UN address, the prime minister declared Iraq’s determination to maintain an independent and balanced foreign policy, preserving good relations with all nations. Meanwhile, the social media of Shia militia groups were denouncing US and NATO presence in Iraq as a form of occupation and accusing them of promoting “moral deviance.” While Sudani attempts to achieve some stability and even-handedness in foreign policy, he has to look over his shoulder at the hardline Shia armed groups both inside and outside the Coordination Framework.

Such messaging confusion raises a broader question about Sudani’s freedom to pursue his agenda. To the frustration of Sunnis and Kurds, the prime minister has not been able to, or possibly has not been willing to, fulfill the demands laid out in the political agreement that underpins the State Management Alliance and the formation of the current government. The political agreement stipulated a major Kurdish demand: negotiation and approval of a gas and oil law within six months; by the end of the first year, the law is still stalled and differences between Baghdad and Erbil persist. Sunni demands for the return of internally displaced persons to their original homes within six months have not been implemented, and the Amnesty Law eagerly advocated by Sunnis has met with firm opposition from Shia leaders. Similarly, Sudani has been unable to re-deploy paramilitary units (militias) out of urban areas, as stipulated in the agreement, and restrict their activities to national defense under his authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Coordination Framework parties are using obstruction tactics to assert their authority over their putative Sunni and Kurdish partners. Shortly after the formation of the government in October 2022, the parties within the CF launched a virulent campaign to vilify and unseat Speaker Halbousi. They also attacked vital Kurdish interests, applauding, if not instigating, two Supreme Court rulings that effectively shut down the Kurdistan Regional Government’s oil sector and Kurdish revenues. The Kurds have complained of increasing moves toward centralization. While the prime minister tries to avoid the labyrinths of politics, keep the peace among his backers, and pursue his service agenda, he is inevitably hampered by political divisions and acrimony.

Sudani has done nothing in the past year to bring armed militias under state control, as promised in his political program. Thus the question of who controls policy and decision-making came to a head over the current war on Gaza. On October 19, Prime Minister Sudani published an op-ed in a leading Arab daily in which he condemned Israel’s attacks on civilians, stressed the need for a cease-fire and delivery of humanitarian aid, and called for a unified Arab stance on Palestinian rights. After October 17, however, militia groups launched repeated drone and rocket attacks on bases housing US military personnel. In an explicit interview on October 22, a leading member of the Coordination Framework stated that the Iraqi Resistance Factions (militias) “do not need to coordinate with the Iraqi government regarding their positions and actions against the U.S., ” and will make their own decisions regarding operations against the US presence in Iraq. As if in response, the following day Sudani’s military spokesperson issued a statement rejecting attacks on US military personnel and promised to pursue perpetrators. Nevertheless, over the next several days, attacks by militias against the United States only intensified, and no government action was forthcoming. Leading members of the Coordination Framework called for the expulsion of the US ambassador to Iraq and the closure of the embassy, despite the prime minister’s pledge to protect foreign missions. Such security and political instability, a veritable fog of uncertainty, is sure to severely undermine what Sudani set out to do twelve months ago.

On December 18, Iraq will hold its first provincial elections in ten years. These will be vigorously contested, not least among the different factions within the Coordination Framework, several of which will compete against each other in the central and southern provinces and in some predominantly Sunni ones. Depending on the outcome of these elections, Sudani’s ability to maneuver between the factions, as he does now, may be further restricted. Equally unsettling for the prime minister, the outcome of the provincial elections is likely to determine the outcome of parliamentary elections in 2025 and his own political future. It is thus likely that the post-provincial elections period will be a touchstone for Sudani’s political acumen and resolve, as well as an important moment in the history of the country as it deals with the difficulties facing his multi-faceted and ambitious government program.

(Arab Center Washington DC)

https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-al-Sudani-experiences-a-year-marked-by-a-blend-of-outcomes-Report

Iraqi Ambassadors Conference in Baghdad issues 6 recommendations, 10 NOV

 Iraqi Ambassadors Conference in Baghdad issues 6 recommendations

Shafaq News / The concluding statement of the seventh Iraqi Ambassadors Conference held in Baghdad outlines six recommendations, emphasizing Iraq's openness in its foreign policy to all parties.

According to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the conference, held from November 4-8, 2023, focused on diplomatic strategies, balanced international relations, and sustainable economic development. Notable attendees included the President, Prime Minister, and other key figures. The seventh edition, following a hiatus due to the pandemic, involved 85 ambassadors and political and consular mission heads from around the world.

During the conference, the ministry aimed to enhance dialogue with Iraqi parliamentary committees, ministers, experts, advisors, and military leaders, covering topics such as national security, counter-terrorism, energy, oil, sovereignty, borders, planning, development, consular services, passports, industry, finance, monetary policy, environment, climate change, international relations, foreign policy, investment, reconstruction, and housing.

The discussions led to recommendations to elevate coordination and collaboration between the ministry and relevant national entities, diversify economic and developmental partnerships, and strategically reclaim Iraq's strategic role internationally.

The conference highlighted the importance of reshaping external relations bilaterally and multilaterally, aligning with regional and international developments. It emphasized Iraq's diplomatic influence through soft power sources like the economy, energy, and development, contributing to de-escalation in the region.

The initial stance on the Palestinian issue, the unjust war in Gaza, and the significance of humanitarian support were affirmed, promoting continued coordination with Arab and Islamic groups. The conference concluded by reiterating the Foreign Ministry's commitment to expressing national interests, supporting Iraqi communities worldwide, and issuing recommendations to enhance political, diplomatic, administrative, technical, financial, and organizational capacities. These recommendations aim to strengthen Iraq's position, fostering an environment for open foreign policy based on solid principles and mutual interests.

https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq-News/Iraqi-Ambassadors-Conference-in-Baghdad-issues-6-recommendations

Iraqi Dinar of Reinstatement and the International Float Ahead | HOT NEWS

Iraq Dinar - International - WTO - UNCTAD - Progression - Coins - Conver...BY MILITIAMAN

"RV UPDATE" BY WALKINGSTICK, 10 NOV

 Walkingstick 

[Iraqi bank friend Aki update]

When Saddam was removed, many retirees...expatriots...soldiers...citizens left Iraq...A great portion has come to the United States of America therefore these [CBI affiliated] private banks are needed for the reinstatement for the Central Bank of Iraq to re-collect the 3-zero notes that are missing...They turned the private exchange centers into private banks for...the change in the exchange rate of the Iraqi currency. 

You have all these countries that want to pour into Iraq and they're going to bring in their currency...

Go ahead bring in your currency  but you're going to have to convert it into Iraqi dinar.  And that's what?  Supply and demand on the market which will blow the Iraqi dinar value up...  

[Iraqi bank friend Aki update] 

These banks that Aki is representing the CBI with, they were exchange centers... but they were converted into banks recently last year.  The reason why is because they know a change to the Iraqi dinar exchange rate is coming...