Shifting Political Landscape: Recent developments suggest Iraqi political blocs are asserting greater independence in leadership decisions, including the prime minister selection process.
Declining External Leverage: Iran’s long-standing influence through allied parties and militias appears to be weakening amid internal divisions and growing public pressure.
Rise of Iraqi Sovereignty Narrative: Calls for national sovereignty and reduced foreign interference are gaining momentum among lawmakers and the general population.
Regional & Global Factors: Changing regional dynamics and international scrutiny may be limiting Iran’s ability to exert the same level of control as in previous years.
What to Watch Next: Coalition negotiations, militia activity, and official government appointments will be key indicators of whether this shift is temporary—or a true turning point.
WHAT DOES FIXING THE DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE AT 1300 IN THE 2026 BUDGET MEAN? AND DOES THE CENTRAL BANK HAVE A PLAN TO CONTROL EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS? A SUDANESE ADVISOR EXPLAINS
As the Iraqi government seeks to consolidate economic stability and enhance confidence in fiscal and monetary policies, exchange rate decisions stand out as one of the most important indicators affecting the state budget and the course of the macroeconomy.
As the 2026 budget is being prepared, attention is turning to the directions of the Central Bank and the government in managing the value of the Iraqi dinar, especially in light of the challenges of inflation, financing public spending, and maintaining foreign reserves.
Regarding the stabilization of the dollar exchange rate , the Central Bank addressed the Budget Department at the Ministry of Finance concerning the draft Federal General Budget Law for the Republic of Iraq for the year 2026.
The Central Bank stated that “the official exchange rate that will be adopted in 2026 is (1300) dinars per dollar, which has been in effect since February 2023.”
Sources revealed that “the Central Bank will buy dollars at a price of 1300 dinars from the Ministry of Finance and sell them at a price of 1310 dinars to banks, which will sell them at 1320 dinars to traders and foreign transfers.”
REGARDING THE IMPACT OF THE PEG , and commenting on this address, the Prime Minister’s Advisor for Economic and Financial Affairs, Mazhar Muhammad Salih, revealed the dimensions and effects of the Central Bank of Iraq’s decision to peg the official exchange rate at 1300 dinars to the US dollar within the 2026 budget project, stressing that the decision comes within the framework of a well-thought-out economic vision aimed at enhancing the overall stability of the national economy.
Saleh told Iraq Observer that fixing the exchange rate at this level reflects a calculated coordination between fiscal and monetary policies, and is a step towards raising the real value of the Iraqi dinar in a limited way, in line with the reality of economic indicators and the available capacity of monetary policy.
He explained that the decision represents a positive message to local and international markets, as it is based on the strength of the central bank’s foreign reserves and its ability to manage monetary stability with high confidence, without resorting to exceptional tools that may disrupt the economic balance.
Saleh pointed out that the government’s fiscal policy is moving towards maximizing real revenues and diversifying their sources, away from what is known as “monetary adjustment,” which relies on the exchange rate as an indirect means of financing the budget, stressing that this shift promotes reliance on authentic and more sustainable financial instruments in controlling spending and mobilizing resources.
The advisor stressed that fixing the exchange rate sends a clear signal of the priority of containing inflation and maintaining economic stability, while emphasizing the independence of monetary policy and pushing fiscal policy towards greater efficiency and discipline, in order to achieve a sustainable balance in the Iraqi economy and protect the purchasing power of citizens in the medium and long term.
Ultimately, the decision to fix the official exchange rate reflects an economic vision aimed at achieving a calculated balance between the requirements of monetary stability and the objectives of fiscal policy, thereby ensuring sustainable growth and protecting the purchasing power of citizens.
MNT GOAT: Political Shifts Signal Stability, Not an Instant RV
An important political development may soon bring additional stability to Iraq. According to reports, Nouri al-Maliki is expected to endorse Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani for Prime Minister, narrowing the competition and potentially ending prolonged political tension.
Featured Snippet: “Sources suggest Maliki may endorse Sudani’s nomination, helping stabilize Iraq’s political framework.”
Political clarity is a prerequisite for monetary reform, but it should not be confused with an immediate revaluation.
The 1300 Rate: Let’s Get the Facts Straight
Despite widespread confusion, the 1300 dinar figure is NOT a revaluation.
MNT GOAT emphasizes:
The 1300 rate is NOT the public trading rate
It is a policy exchange rate used internally
It has been in use since February 2023
Its purpose is currency stability and inflation control
The 1300 rate is a tool, not a trigger. ASYCUDA is a process, not a shock event. Political clarity is progress, not the finish line.
Relax. Read. Learn. Let the truth surface.
MNT GOAT
So, here is an interesting point of view in article titled “RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: IT IS LIKELY THAT MALIKI WILL ENDORSE SUDANI’S NOMINATION FOR PRIME MINISTER IN THE COMING HOURS.” Abdul Hadi Al-Saadawi, a member of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, confirmed that the competition within the framework has become limited to Maliki and Al-Sudani, and that one of the two parties must concede to the other, suggestingthat Maliki will, in the last hours, endorse Al-Sudani’s nomination for the premiership.
I can see that by the blog comments on the CBI latest announcement about the 1300 dinar that many still don’t know the truth or refuse to believe it. Folks, I know you want the RV real bad but making up stories will certainly not get it for you. It will only prolong the confusion and pain already in this dinar intel community on the web. So, let’s get real and listen to what the CBI tells us about this 1300 rate.
If I were you, I would read the latest article on this 1300 rate subject matter to help clarify it for you. The article is titled “WHAT DOES FIXING THE DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE AT 1300 IN THE 2026 BUDGET MEAN? AND DOES THE CENTRAL BANK HAVE A PLAN TO CONTROL EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS? A SUDANESE ADVISOR EXPLAINS.” Folks Iraq is telling us what it means are you going to listen?
So, here it is in a short summary. This is not the “official” rate for investors, the public to buy and sell dinar. Get it? It is just an “official exchange rate policy used” to control stability in the dinar and not the “official” rate going forward for 2026 down from 1320. I know something was lost in the wording from Arabic to English. But it describes below how the 1300 rate will be continued to be used in 2026 budgeting and how it was used since 2023.
“The Central Bank stated that “the official exchange rate that will be adopted in 2026 is (1300) dinars per dollar, which has been in effect since February 2023.”
Sources revealed that “the Central Bank will buy dollars at a price of 1300 dinars from the Ministry of Finance and sell them at a price of 1310 dinars to banks, which will sell them at 1320 dinars to traders and foreign transfers.”
Can it get any clearer now? Please stop listening to these other intel guru idiots and their hyped up RV versions of what it means.
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Another topic that needs some clarification is the recent impact of implementation of the ASYCUDA system and how it is the culprit that ties directly into the 1300 rate the CBI is using to stabilize the economy from the shock of the new customs duties. The CBI also told us in the previous article that they will continue this stabilization process in 2026 since they feel the impact of the ASYCUSDA will continue during this timeframe. Take a look at the recent article titled “LEARN ABOUT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIVES IN IMPLEMENTING THE ASYCUDA CUSTOMS SYSTEM.” We must connect the dots and see how the pieces in these articles fit together to get the entire picture and not go off half-cocked.
I quote from the article – “The Center for Strategic Research and Studies affirmed on Saturday that the implementation of the ASYCUDA system and the recent package of customs procedures is not primarily aimed at compensating for the decline in oil revenues, but rather falls within the framework of regulating international trade and protecting the national economy”. Yes, this is it’s primary objectives. But we also learned years ago the massive future potential for revenues to rival that of the oil revenue.
“The center stated in an analytical study followed by Al-Sa’a Network that “the simultaneous launch of the ASYCUDA system, the pre-calculation of customs tariffs, the collection of tax deposits, and the activation of quality control, with the decline in public revenues, led to a mistaken belief that the main objective of these measures is to increase non-oil revenues,” indicating that “this perception does not reflect the essence of customs policies.”
He pointed out that “customs tariff revenues, even in the best of circumstances, will not exceed 8 to 10 trillion dinars annually, (about 8-10 billion) an amount that only covers one month’s expenses of the general budget,” noting that “a decrease in the price of a barrel of oil by $5 is enough to completely eliminate these revenues.”
I was amazed at this past statement as we have been told many times through other articles the funds collected could rival the oil revenues if they were collected and managed correctly. What the hell is wrong with 8-10 billion dollars anyway? Is this article talking about just the funds from current imports as of today or from a standpoint of Iraq being a clearing house for the middle east and parts of Europe with massive imports and exports through the port of Faw and the Development Road project? We must also remember that if these revenues along with other non-oil sources of revenues can be accounted for and sent to the national treasury, we can see some significant changes in Iraq. But they must start somewhere and these negative comments in these articles don’t help Iraq move forward. Is the glass half empty or half full?
So, this next paragraph explains why the dollar spiked again in the parallel market. One must keep in mind that the parallel market is an illegal black market. Remember they have been rolling out this new customs system since 2023, so no one is going to tell me this isn’t a “phased approach”. The dollar rise is temporary while they implement the next phase of ASYCUDA system. In the end of the last phase of implementation, if you recall, the dinar went as low as 1305 afterwords, so it was reported. So, they have a plan, and it does include a phased approach. Could they have done a better job maybe and included more phases thus roll out certain products more slowly? Probably, maybe but I am not the expert nor are the authors of this article. So, suggestions may be a good idea but is not today’s reality. By the way where were they when they were planning this event of rollouts…
So, here is more from the article and I quote – “The study criticized “implementing all the measures at once,” arguing that “a gradual approach would have mitigated the shock by starting with the most valuable and impactful goods, and postponing some systems such as tax trusts and quality control to later stages.”
Yet more proof that the CBI is just using the 1300 rate as a stabilizing factor for the economy while the phase in the ASYCUDA system in article titled “NO FEAR FOR THE DINAR… THE “MONETARY AUTHORITY’S” MEASURES ABSORB THE DOLLAR SHOCK AND PREVENT INFLATION.” Their words not mine. I don’t make up RV stories. Remember no Hype or Rumors! Again, in this article we get the connection between the 1300 CBI actions and the ASYCUDA system implementation. Folks, this is not rocket science to understand but you have to read the articles and tie it all together and stop knee-jerk reactions/thinking. Let it play out and the truth always surfaces. Events don’t happen in a vacuum. The news from Iraq responds to events. Relax and take the RV hat off and learn! Everything is not about the immediate RV.
Iran’s Traditional Role Challenged: Historically, Iran has exerted significant influence through pro-Tehran parties and allied militias in Iraqi politics, including in prime minister selections.
Post-Election Maneuvering: After the 2025 elections, major parties and coalitions are negotiating government formation, and some factions are showing more independence from Tehran’s priorities.
Leadership Shifts Reduce Iran’s Leverage: Recent developments — such as internal political decisions and coalition balancing — indicate Iraq’s political actors are not relying solely on Iranian backing to decide the next prime minister.
Balancing Sovereignty and Foreign Influence: Iraq’s leaders are attempting to assert national sovereignty while navigating relationships with both Iran and the United States, reflecting a nuanced shift rather than outright dominance by any external power.
Militias and Parties Still Key Players: While Iran-aligned militias and Shiite blocs remain influential, their unity and control over decision-making have been tested in recent political negotiations.
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: IT IS LIKELY THAT MALIKI WILL ENDORSE SUDANI’S NOMINATION FOR PRIME MINISTER IN THE COMING HOURS
Abdul Hadi Al-Saadawi, a member of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, confirmed that the competition within the framework has become limited to Maliki and Al-Sudani, and that one of the two parties must concede to the other, suggesting that Maliki will, in the last hours, endorse Al-Sudani’s nomination for the premiership.
However, Al-Saadawi’s interpretation is not unanimously accepted within the Shiite alliance, as it is countered by differing assessments that believe Al-Maliki remains a serious candidate and that he is handling the matter with strategic patience, drawing on his long political experience in crisis management and negotiating at the last minute—a tactic he has employed in previous stages of the political process.
(Maliki is a peanut head idiot, having almost destroyed Iraq during his 8 years as prime minister. How in hell does he even still exist? He has a long list of constitutional violations and orchestrated letting ISIS and the Iranians into Iraq. Do people forget his history? Why are they even letting him have a part in selection process, never mind being a candidate? Are these Iraqi wackos or what? Yes, regardless of other nonsensible articles you have read about Maliki challenging Sudani for the prime minister.)