How Do Wars And International Trade Affect The Iraqi Economy? An Expert Explains
Time: 2025/12/21 Reading: 60 times {Economic: Al-Furat News} Economic expert, Rashid Al-Saadi, confirmed that wars and global trade have a significant negative impact on the Iraqi economy.
Al-Saadi explained to Al-Furat News Agency that: “The economic war between America and China leads to customs duties and restrictions on Chinese goods, and that Iraq has trade with China estimated at about $57 billion annually, and that any negative factors on the Chinese economy also affect Iraq.”
He added that "the strained relations between Venezuela and America also have an impact on the Iraqi economy," noting that all geopolitical factors affect Iraq due to the fragility of its economy and its dependence on external economic relations without alternatives or added value for goods.
Al-Saadi also pointed to "what happened in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis," explaining that "the two countries are considered the breadbasket of Iraq, which reflects the impact of global conflicts on the stability of the Iraqi economy." LINK
This article reflects opinions, analysis, and reports shared by Frank26 and on-the-ground sources. It is not financial advice. Always consult qualified professionals before making financial decisions.
CBI Reduces Dinar Circulation: A Major Monetary Signal
According to a boots-on-the-ground report from Iraq, significant monetary action is now being publicly acknowledged.
OMAR (Iraq On-the-Ground Report)
The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has officially reduced the total circulation of Iraqi dinars by approximately 5.5% during the third quarter of 2025.
This reduction brings:
Total money supply: ~99.68 trillion dinars
Approximate USD value: ~$76 billion
The stated goal is clear:
To keep inflation in check and support the value of the Iraqi dinar.
Reducing currency in circulation is a classic and powerful monetary policy tool. It is commonly used to:
Control inflation
Strengthen purchasing power
Prepare a currency for structural change
This action is not theoretical—it is measurable and reported.
Frank26 Analysis: “They Collected the Three Zeros”
Frank26’s interpretation is direct and significant:
“They are telling you they have collected a lot of three zeros.”
In monetary reform terminology, this implies:
Large-denomination notes are being removed
Liquidity is being consolidated
The groundwork is being laid for redenomination
This aligns with long-standing reform plans involving lifting three zeros from the dinar.
Inflation Control Supports Currency Value
A reduced money supply typically:
Limits excess liquidity
Stabilizes prices
Increases confidence in the currency
For Iraq, inflation control is essential before:
Introducing a new exchange rate
Reintegrating into international markets
Expanding foreign trade and investment
IMF and U.S. Treasury Oversight
Frank26 emphasizes that Iraq is not acting alone.
Key Oversight Players
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
United States Treasury
Frank describes them as:
“A proud mother and father of the monetary reform of Iraq.”
These institutions:
Monitor CBI actions
Approve reform sequencing
Ensure compliance with global financial standards
Role of U.S. Influence and Advisors
Frank26 also points to:
Direct U.S. involvement
Strategic oversight tied to the Trump-era framework
Consulting support from Oliver Wyman, a global financial advisory firm
This suggests:
Every major CBI move is being observed
Policy is being guided, not improvised
Mistakes are less likely to be tolerated
January 1st: A Logical Target?
Frank26 raises a key question:
“Maybe it’s all for January 1st.”
Why January 1st matters:
New fiscal year
Clean accounting transition
Expiration of the current exchange framework
Global norm for monetary adjustments
While not a confirmed date, it remains a logical benchmark.
What This Means for Monetary Reform
Taken together, these developments suggest:
Active tightening of the money supply
Collection of large-denomination notes
Inflation control measures in effect
International oversight fully engaged
This is process, not hype.
Featured Snippets
Did the Central Bank of Iraq reduce the dinar supply?
Yes. The CBI reduced dinar circulation by about 5.5% in Q3 2025 to control inflation and support currency value.
Why is reducing money supply important for Iraq?
Lowering the money supply helps stabilize prices, strengthen the dinar, and prepare for monetary reform.
Are the IMF and U.S. Treasury involved?
According to Frank26, both institutions closely monitor and guide Iraq’s monetary reform process.
Q&A Section
Q: Does this confirm a revaluation is happening now?
A: No. It confirms preparation and reform activity, not a public rate change.
Q: What does “collecting the three zeros” mean?
A: It refers to removing large-denomination notes as part of a redenomination strategy.
Q: Is January 1st guaranteed?
A: No. It is a logical timeframe, not an official announcement.
Final Perspective
This boots-on-the-ground report provides verifiable policy action, not speculation. A measurable reduction in money supply—combined with IMF and U.S. Treasury oversight—indicates that Iraq’s monetary reform is active, supervised, and progressing deliberately.
Quiet steps like these often matter more than loud headlines.
OMAR: On the news now today, the Central Bank of Iraq has reduced the total circulation of Iraqi dinar by about 5.5% in the 3rd quarter of 2025.
That brings the money supply down to roughly 99.68 trillion dinars or about $76 billion US. The main goal is to...keep inflation in check which should support the dinar's value...
FRANK: They are telling you they have collected a lot of three zeros.
Frank26 The IMF and United States Treasury are like a proud mother and father of the monetary reform of Iraq. They see everything the CBI is now doing with Trump and Oliver Wyman because we are watching and pushing them. Maybe it's all for January 1st.
Financial reform in Iraq: A plan on paper or the beginning of economic change?
Amid the end of the current government's term, the latest decisions came under the title of financial reform in Iraq to reduce expenditures and maximize resources, but they face implementation challenges due to the government's limited powers, which raises questions about its ability to address deep financial imbalances and secure real economic stability before the next government takes over.
After the Iraqi government reached the end of its constitutional term, it launched a package of financial decisions under the title of “reducing spending and maximizing revenues,” without having political or time cover to ensure that they would be turned into effective policies.
These decisions, issued by a government with limited powers, are not binding on the next government, nor are they part of its program, making them closer to reforms on paper, put forward at the last minute to manage financial pressure rather than to address the roots of the crisis, amid widespread doubts about their ability to be implemented or to continue after the formation of the new government.
Decisions of the Ministerial Council for the Economy
The Ministerial Council for the Economy, during a meeting dedicated to discussing the issue of reducing spending and maximizing revenues, approved a package of decisions aimed at controlling public expenditures and strengthening the state’s financial resources.
The decisions included reviewing the allowances and salaries of the three presidencies and working to equalize them with the salaries of the Prime Minister's office staff, in addition to updating the salary scale for all state employees, based on the recommendations of the Ministry of Planning. The Council also decided to reduce the allowances for official travel for state employees by 90%, limiting such travel to cases of extreme necessity and requiring the approval of the relevant minister, as well as reducing the supervision and monitoring percentages for new projects.
Maximizing non-oil revenues
For his part, the Prime Minister’s advisor, Dr. Mazhar Muhammad Saleh, confirmed that the recent drop in oil prices to below $60 a barrel constitutes a manageable financial pressure and does not amount to a financial crisis, noting that Iraq still possesses important safety margins, foremost among them comfortable foreign reserves and public debt levels within safe limits, in addition to the continued ability to meet basic obligations, primarily salaries and service spending.
Saleh said that the continuation of global oil prices at these levels may be reflected in the 2026 budget with a manageable deficit, the size of which depends on price developments, production levels, and the extent of control over public spending.
He pointed out that fiscal policy is working to manage this deficit by rearranging priorities, maximizing non-oil revenues, and making limited use of domestic financing tools when necessary, without compromising economic stability.
Saleh added that the government adopted clear standards for reducing unnecessary spending, including reviewing the salaries and allowances of the three presidencies, and reducing foreign delegations by up to 90%, while maintaining only delegations of a sovereign and necessary nature, in accordance with the principle of justice and accountability starting from the highest level of the state.
He stressed that these measures will not affect vital investment projects or basic services for citizens, as spending related to the water, electricity, health and education sectors has been neutralized, with priority given to projects with advanced completion rates, in addition to protecting the salaries of the middle and lower segments.
He concluded by saying that the current fiscal policy is based on smart management of public spending, which maintains economic and social stability, and deals with fluctuations in oil prices as periodic challenges that require adaptation and reform, without imposing additional burdens on the citizen.
In extra time
Economic expert Ziad al-Hashemi believes that the Iraqi government is now playing for time, after the damage has been done, as he put it, and is trying to score last points in its favor by proposing a financial reform plan aimed at reducing spending and increasing revenues.
Al-Hashemi points out that “governments in various countries around the world usually present their financial programs at the beginning of their formation, to address previous imbalances, improve the quality of spending, maximize returns, and draw up a systematic and disciplined financial policy. However, what happened in Iraq was the complete opposite of that.”
Over the past four years, Al-Hashemi explains that “the government program was based primarily on expanding spending, through highly politicized financial budgets, which contributed to inflating salaries and subsidies, and piling up government employees in numbers that exceed the needs and capacity of state institutions, in addition to maximizing the financial deficit and accumulating debts, and allowing corruption to operate freely.”
He adds that all of this “happened at a time when Iraq’s financial revenues, especially oil revenues and others, were witnessing a significant decline, yet the government ignored internal warnings and international reports that repeatedly sounded the alarm, warning of the risks of inflated spending in light of deteriorating revenues, without receiving any response.”
Lost opportunities for reform
After the opportunities for reform were lost and the financial crisis worsened dangerously during the past years, Al-Hashemi points out that “the government is now emerging, at the end of its lifespan, with a financial reform plan, after the financial pressure has reached its peak, and the possible solutions are now only harsh and painful, and their impact will most likely be felt by the citizen before anyone else.”
Al-Hashemi raises questions about the mechanisms for implementing this plan, asking about “how it can be implemented by a caretaker government with limited powers, which does not have enough time to implement broad reform measures, in addition to the ambiguity of the implementing bodies, the commitment mechanisms, and the timetables, in light of the imminent formation of a new government.”
It is likely that “this move is an attempt by the government to polish its image in its final days, by announcing a financial reform plan, perhaps with the aim of encouraging political parties to reappoint the current Prime Minister and give him a chance to implement this plan.”
He concluded by saying: “In any case, the next government, whether the current Prime Minister is reappointed or another figure is chosen, will face an extremely difficult financial test, which will force it to take more harsh and painful measures, and financial austerity may be the most prominent theme for the next four years.”
Crisis management, not economic reform
For his part, academic and economic researcher Nawar Al-Saadi believes that “the real goal of these measures is not to launch a comprehensive economic reform in the strict sense, as the caretaker government lacks the political cover and sufficient time to proceed with reforms of this kind.”
Al-Saadi says that “the goal is limited to reducing the financial bleeding and containing the risks until the responsibility is transferred to the next government,” adding that these steps “carry a dual message; the first is directed to the markets and regulatory bodies, indicating that the financial situation is still under control for the time being. The second is to the next government, indicating that the margin for maneuver has become narrower than it was previously.”
Al-Saadi explains that “the problem lies in the structure of the economic decision itself. Iraq does not suffer from a lack of plans or diagnosis, but rather from a weakness of executive will and the prioritization of short-term political calculations at the expense of painful reforms.”
Al-Saadi notes that “what is happening today is more of a crisis management effort than a genuine economic reform. The recent decisions may help alleviate the immediate pressure on the treasury, but they do not address the root causes of the problem, which are the bloated public sector, the fragility of non-oil revenues, and the weakness of financial governance.”
He concluded by warning that “unless the next government moves from the logic of ‘temporary austerity’ to comprehensive structural reform, Iraq will remain stuck in the same cycle, between high spending in years of plenty and belated austerity decisions with the first tremor in oil prices.” link