The end of the Iraqi-American scene and the effects of the invasion remain for the winners
The clock is ticking to remove the remaining American forces from Iraq in accordance with the “Strategic Framework Agreement” and the need for them as “non-combat” forces carrying out training, consulting, arming and combating terrorism missions. No one knows why she stayed, as she had to leave after officials in Baghdad announced that the Iraqi armed forces had become strong, capable, and capable of fighting ISIS and facing challenges and threats to national security, nor why the governments did not implement the Parliament’s decision to remove those forces. The game is not that simple amid the complexities of the Iraqi situation locally, regionally and internationally.
The irony is that those demanding the removal of American forces and those required to arrange the timetable for exit are the ones who came to power on the back of American tanks with the invasion in 2003, overthrowing the regime headed by Saddam Hussein, dissolving the army, and beginning the de-Baathification with an understanding with Iran.
As for those who raised the slogan “No to the American and Iranian occupations,” they are the young people who carried out the October 2019 revolution in Karbala, Najaf, Baghdad, and most of the governorates in the “Shiite” south, but the tragic scene has become surreal in recent times and is a candidate for moving to a scene that is difficult to define in this period. stage.
The governments that declare in the speech that there is no need for American forces act in practice on the basis that they still need them, and they allow them to be present inside Iraqi bases in several places, and are committed to protecting them from missile attacks and protecting the diplomatic missions in the Green Zone in Baghdad, but the governments have not been able to Preventing the pro-Iranian factions within the “Popular Mobilization Forces,” which are theoretically under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Prime Minister, from continuing to bombard American forces with missiles and drones. Of course, it does not accept that American forces respond to those who attack it, because that embarrasses it and prompts it to describe the American military responses as “an attack on Iraq’s sovereignty.”
Baghdad tried, during the government of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, and to some extent with the government of Muhammad Shiaa Al-Sudani, to organize balanced relations with the Arab, Iranian, and Turkish environment, and to prepare to play the role of a “bridge” instead of the role of joining an axis, and it partially succeeded to a reasonable realistic degree, but the greed of sectarian and ethnic forces Money and power weaken the state. The remnants of American policy after the invasion, along with Iranian policy, still enshrine sectarian and ethnic quotas as a constant factor in Mesopotamia in the Lebanese manner, the method of sectarian quotas in light of the dominance of a strong, shifting sect in Lebanon and a constant one in Iraq, with a strong armed faction outside power that is practically in control of it and linked to the Quds Force. Of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
And the facts speak. The “Popular Mobilization Forces,” some of whose factions existed and were then established based on a fatwa to confront the threat of ISIS, was not one. It was composed of two types, the first of which was the “religious wing” affiliated with the religious authority in Najaf and the “sufficient jihad” fatwa issued by Al-Sistani, and the second of which was the “loyalty wing” which was the mobilization of the state and its authority, Khamenei. Nor was confronting ISIS the only mission of the state wing.
The most prominent thing said by Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, who was assassinated by the Americans along with General Qassem Soleimani after landing at Baghdad airport, is, “The Popular Mobilization Forces is a project of a nation, a project of reference,” and the state project led by the “Guardian Jurist,” Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is currently advancing in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, regardless of The ability or inability to achieve it in a complex Middle East, an Arab world with its own leadership and project, and an international conflict over the region. And what is hidden is greater.
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